Opinion
1:23-CV-00167-SPB
01-29-2024
RICHARD EDWARD WEBER, Plaintiff v. ERIE COUNTY, ERIE COUNTY PRISON, WARDEN BRYANT, MAJOR SYMOUR, LT BOLT, LT DEFRANCO, NURSE 1 BRIANNA MUSSINA, NURSE 2 JANE DOE, CO VOLTZSON, CO RAMBY, CO JOHN DOE 1, CO JOHN DOE 2, CO JOHN DOE 3, CO JOHN DOE 4, DW MICHAEL HOLMAN, CAPTAIN HERMAN, LT BENDER, LT STEVENS, RYAN VOLZ, ROBERT SAMLUK, MICHAEL BEGANICS, COREY GOSS, MEAGEN CARNEY, AMANDA MARIE MILLER, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PENDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ECF NOS. 2, 51, AND 73
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
Three motions to dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment are before the undersigned for Report and Recommendation: (1) a motion on behalf of Defendants Erie County, the Erie County Prison, Warden Bryant, Major Symour, Captain Herman, Lt. Bolt, Lt. DeFranco, Deputy Warden Michael Holman, Lt. Bender, Lt. Stevens, Ryan Volz, Robert Samluk, Michael Beganics, Corey Goss, and Megan Carney (collectively, “County Defendants”) [ECF No. 2]; (2) a motion on behalf of Amanda Marie Miller (“Miller”) [ECF No. 51]; and (3) a motion on behalf of Briana Mussina (“Mussina”) [ECF No. 73]. Because Plaintiffs claims against all Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations, it is respectfully recommended that all three motions be GRANTED.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Richard Edward Weber (“Weber”) commenced this action by filing a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Pennsylvania, on April 20, 2023. See ECF No. 1-1. His complaint alleges that he was subjected to excessive force and denied needed medical care while he was a pretrial detainee housed in “E 1 Block, E 2 block, [and] Nurse Iso Block” of the Erie County Prison. The complaint asserts claims for violation of Weber's constitutional rights against Erie County and the Erie County Prison, seven identified individuals-Warden Bryant, Major Symour, Captain Harmon, Lt. Bolt, Lt. DeFranco, Corrections Officer Voltzson, and Correction Officer Ramby-two “Nurse-Jane Doe” Defendants, and four “CO John Doe” Defendants. The Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446 based on subject matter jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. See ECF No. 1.
The Defendants moved to dismiss Weber's complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment. See ECF No. 2. Weber then filed an Amended Complaint, which again asserted claims against Defendants Erie County, Erie County Prison, Bolt, Bryant, DeFranco, and Symour, but omitted any reference to Defendants Voltzson and Ramby. The Amended Complaint also named eleven new Defendants: Beganics, Bender, Carney, Goss, Herman, Holman, Miller, Mussina, Samluk, Stevens, and Voltz. ECF No. 8. The Court granted the County Defendants leave to supplement their motion to address the Amended Complaint's new allegations and Defendants. See ECF No. 14. The County Defendants filed a supplemental Concise Statement of Material Facts and a supplemental brief in support of their motion. See ECF Nos. 39, 40. Defendant Miller and Defendant Mussina later filed separate motions to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 51 (Miller), 73 (Mussina). All three motions raise many of the same arguments, including expiration of the statute of limitations. Weber has filed separate briefs in opposition to each motion. See ECF Nos. 55 (County), 64 (Miller), 81 (Mussina). The three pending motions are ready for decision.
III. Standards of Decision
To the extent the Defendants have moved to dismiss pursuant Rule 12(b)(6), they challenge the legal sufficiently of the Amended Complaint. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the pleading's allegations of fact as true and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011), cert, denied, 566 U.S.921(2012) (citing In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010)). Although the Court must accept the Amended Complaint's factual allegations as true, it is “not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs “[f] actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that, while the Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a constitutional claim and must state a claim that is plausible on its face). Because Weber is proceeding pro se, his complaint will be scrutinized under less stringent standards than those applied to the work product of an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This liberality, however, does not relieve Weber of his obligation to allege facts sufficient to support a cognizable legal claim. Furthermore, the Court may reject as frivolous claims based on allegations that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (citations omitted).
To the extent the Defendants' motions seek summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is well-settled that such relief is proper only if they have demonstrated the absence of a “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and their entitlement “to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it ‘affect[s] the outcome of the suit under the governing law'.” Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court's function is not to weigh the evidence, to determine the truth of the matter, or to evaluate credibility. See Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2013). Rather, “[i]n determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, [the Court] view[s] the underlying facts and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.” Bland, 900 F.3d at 83 (citing Dougherty v. School Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014)). See also Muriente-Vega v. Pancoast, 2023 WL 3393537, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2023) (summarizing applicable standards), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3394581 (W.D. Pa. May 11, 2023).
IV. Discussion and Analysis
A. Claims of the Amended Complaint
Weber's Amended Complaint asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,1985, and 1986. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege violations of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To state a claim under § 1985, the plaintiff must allege facts to support “(1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to the person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997). To support the “unconstitutional conspiracy” element of the claim, “a plaintiff must assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “[A] bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “[T]o maintain a cause of action under § 1986, the plaintiffs must show the existence of a § 1985 conspiracy.” Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 n.5 (3d Cir. 1994). See also McClain v. Carney, 2024 WL 113761, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2024).
The Amended Complaint identifies the “crux” of Weber's claims as “how the defendant Amanda Miller conspired to have defendant Lt. Bolt, Ryan Volz and Brianna Mussina a nurse to conspire with all other Defendants to assult (sic) tase, spray, inject, beat, caged, and cause Plaintiff to suffering harm both mental, physical, emotional that caused Plaintiff to sustain life altering perm (sic) harm that can NEVER go away and that is irreverable (sic) that put damaged to plaintiff left leg that will never be the same again.” ECF No. 8, ¶ 1. Weber asserts that all Defendants subjected him to excessive force “every day at least 4 times a day” from “late 2 September of 2019.”1 Id., ¶ 11. He also asserts that “all defendants conspired” to use excessive force against him. Id., ¶ 13.
The Amended Complaint further alleges that on September 17, 2019, Defendant Miller met with Defendant Volz and “conspired to commit to have all his CO buddys (sic) to hurt, beat, drug, assault, spray, and treat [Plaintiff] like an animal” and that Miller paid Volz $5000.00 in furtherance of this conspiracy. Id., ¶ 7. According to the Amended Complaint, on November 5, 2019, Miller conspired with Defendant Herman to use excessive force against Weber and that Miller paid Herman $10,000.00 to harm Weber. Id., ¶ 9. Thereafter, Herman used excessive force against him “for months almost an entire 2 years this accured (sic) day after day upon plaintiff by all Defendants until his release to state prison.” Id. On March 9, 2021, Defendant Mussina allegedly met with Miller “who paid and provided drugs to inject plaintiff with while she [Mussina] was working as a nurse at ECP.” Id., ¶ 8. Finally, the Amended Complaint alleges that “all supervisors” are liable because “they directed to continue to harm plaintiff for months and months knowing his rights were being violated and policy with no regard to the plaintiff rights AT ALL.” Id., ¶ 14.
B. Weber's §§ 1983 and 1985 claims are time-barred.
Defendants argue that all claims of the Amended Complaint are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See ECF No. 39, p. 3; ECF No. 40, p. 3; ECF No. 51, p. 1, ¶ 4; ECF No. 73, p. 12. “A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute of limitations grounds only when the statute of limitations defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). “Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, but borrows the statute of limitations from state personal injury torts.” Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018); Sameric Corp. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). The same is true for actions brought pursuant to § 1985. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).
Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 5524. See also McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 n. 2 (3d Cir.2009). Although courts apply the applicable statute of limitations under state law, the determination of when a civil rights claim accrues is a question of federal law. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir.2009) (citing Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991)). Under federal law, a civil rights claim accrues “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based.” Id. (quoting Sameric Corp, of Delaware, Inc., 142 F.3d at 599). “The determination of the time at which a claim accrues is an objective inquiry; we ask not what the plaintiff actually knew but what a reasonable person should have known.” Id. (quoting Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1988)). Generally, a cause of action is considered to have accrued “at the time of the last event necessary to complete the tort, usually at the time the plaintiff suffers an injury.” Id. (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 (1979)).
The Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants committed the acts upon which Weber bases his claims between September 2019 and March 9, 2021. See ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 7-8. Accepting these allegations as true, Weber's claims accrued as early as September 2019 and no later than March 9, 2021. Even using the latter date, the statute of limitations on Weber's §§ 1983 and 1985 claims expired on March 9, 2023. In fact, the summary judgment record produced by the County Defendants demonstrates that Weber's claims accrued well before March 9, 2021. Weber alleged that the events upon which he bases his claims occurred while he was confined in “E 1 Block, E 2 Block, and Nurse I so Block” of the Erie County Prison. ECF No. 1-2, ¶7. The County Defendants have produced prison records showing that Weber was housed in one or a combination of those three blocks from October 20, 2019, until January 16, 2020, and again from June 24, 2020, until June 30, 2020. ECF No. 2-1, ¶¶ 6-10; ECF No. 2-5. Weber does not dispute these facts. This timeline places the accrual of his claims no later than June 30, 2020, and the expiration of the statute of limitations no later than June 30, 2022. Weber did not commence this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County until April 20, 2023, more than ten months beyond the latest date the statute of limitation could have expired. Even if the Court were to disregard the undisputed evidence concerning Weber's confinement history and adopt his dates, he still missed the expiration of the statute of limitations by more than a month. Therefore, Weber's §1983 and 1985 claims against all Defendants are time-barred and subject to dismissal unless he can demonstrate some basis upon which the statute of limitations was tolled.
Weber first contends that the statute of limitations was tolled because of his “mental, medical, and physical incapacity.” ECF No. 55, p. 1. This argument has no merit because in Pennsylvania, mental illness or incapacity does not toll the statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5533(a) (“[I]nsanity or imprisonment does not extend the time limited by this subchapter for the commencement of a matter.”). See also Kreider v. Philhaven Adolescent Inpatient Treatment Ctr., 592 Fed.Appx. 59, 61 (3d Cir. Nov. 14, 2014) (“Under Pennsylvania law, the existence of a mental incapacity is not a defense to the statute of limitations .... Pennsylvania therefore subscribes to a ‘hard rule [of limitations] as a matter of legislative policy'”, quoting in part, Riddick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 499 A.2d 694, 696-97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985). See also Ziegler v. Cnty. of Bucks, 1992 WL 129643, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June 8,1992); Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2013) (“mental incompetence is not a per se reason to toll a statute of limitations”) (citing Lake, 232 F.3d at 371). Courts have acknowledged that Pennsylvania's statutory prohibition on tolling based on incapacity may be viewed as harsh. See, e.g., Faber v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2015 WL 1636967, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2015). Nevertheless, the prohibition comports with the general common law rule in Pennsylvania that mental incapacity does not toll the running of the relevant limitations period, a rule that the state legislature later codified as applicable to civil actions generally. See Walker v. Mummert, 146 A.2d 289, 291 (Pa. 1958) (ruling that the incapacity of a plaintiff who is non compos mentis at the time of injury does not toll the running of the limitations period for personal injury actions); see also Walters v. Ditzler, 227 A.2d 833, 835 (Pa. 1967) (“[T]he statute of limitations will run against persons under a disability, including ... incompetents.”); Pearce v. Salvation Army, 674 A.2d 1123, 1124 n. 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (“In 1978, the Judicial Code was amended in order to codify existing law precluding extension of the statute based on ... insanity). These same principles of Pennsylvania law dispose of Weber's contention that the statute of limitations was tolled due to his “repressed” memory and “psychotic breaks.” ECF No. 79, p. 1. Assertions of “repressed memory” fall within the scope of “mental capacity” and thus do not toll the applicable statute of limitations. See e.g., Dever-Gorka v. Hosier, 26 Pa. D. & C.4th 448, 454 (Com. Pl. 1994), aff'd, 667 A.2d 426 (Pa. Supr. Ct. 1995). See also Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 170 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting claim that plaintiffs repressed memory from childhood injury sufficed to toll the statute of limitations for a battery action).
Relatedly, Weber argues that the “discovery rule” saves his claims from untimeliness. See, e.g., ECF No. 55, p., 1 (“Plaintiff did not discover that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated until November 2022, when he met with medical official[s] at Sci-Camp Hill.”). Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations is tolled when “a plaintiff is unable, ‘despite the exercise of due diligence, to know of the injury or its cause.'” Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 F.3d 502, 510 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pocono Int'l Raceway v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983) (emphasis omitted). “The focus of the discovery rule is not on the plaintiffs actual knowledge, but rather on whether the knowledge was known, or through the exercise of diligence, knowable to the plaintiff.” Id., 449 F.3d at 511 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The discovery rule has no application in this case because Weber indisputably knew of the acts of excessive force and other acts in furtherance of the alleged “conspiracies” as they occurred. See, e.g., Krieder, 592 Fed.Appx. at 61; Mest, 449 F.3d at 510. Indeed, Weber alleges that the excessive force the Defendants repeatedly used against him was so severe that it left him with permanent injuries that “can never go away.” ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 1, 11. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “the very essence of the discovery rule in Pennsylvania is that it applies to those situations where the nature of the injury itself is such that no amount of vigilance will enable the plaintiff to detect an injury.” Gretchy v. County of Northumberland, 120 Fed.Appx. 895, 898-99 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Dalrymple, 701 A.2d at 170). A battery, like the repeated acts of excessive force alleged by Weber, are known to the plaintiff at the time of the offense it self. Id. In essence, Weber's discovery rule argument is nothing more than a reconstituted version of his invalid incapacity and “repressed memory” arguments.
Finally, although Weber has not raised the issue, the Court notes that “Pennsylvania's statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies” as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Pearson v. Sec 'y Dep't of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 2015). See also, Callahan v. Clark, 2023 WL 5596269, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2023) (discussing when PLRA tolling commences), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5580998 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2023). The first step an inmate must take to exhaust his administrative remedies at the Erie County Prison is to file a written grievance within fifteen days after the complained-of event. See Baxter v. Social Security Administration, 2018 WL 1256741, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2018). Prison officials then must make an initial decision on the written grievance within twenty days, and a dissatisfied inmate may, in turn, appeal to the Warden within five working days of receiving the initial decision. Id. Had Weber timely initiated and followed through with this grievance process, his claims would have been tolled pending a final appeal decision. Weber acknowledges, however, that he did not do so, as evidenced by his “repressed memory,” “psychotic break,” and other incapacity arguments. Weber asserts that he delayed pursuing any claim against the Defendants because he did not remember the events upon which he bases his claims until long after they occurred. As noted, he asserts that he did not recall that he had been the victim of repeated acts of excessive force until after he was transferred out of the Erie County Prison. Given such admissions, he cannot plausibly claim that he filed a timely grievance and, therefore, he cannot invoke tolling of the statute of limitations based on PLRA exhaustion.
C. Weber's § 1986 claim is also time-barred.
Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See, e.g., Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984). This claim is predicated essentially on the same allegations of conspiracy and excessive force upon which Weber bases his §§ 1983 and 1985 claims. Given this, the statute of limitations on Weber's § 1986 claim expired a full year earlier than the statute of limitations on his other claims.
V. Conclusion
Because all claims asserted in the Amended Complaint are barred by the applicable statute of limitation, each of the pending motions to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment should be granted, and Weber's Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Any attempt to amend to cure this bar would be futile. See Mickman v. Philadelphia Professional Collections LLC, 2023 WL 6392756, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2023) (dismissed time barred claims with prejudice) (citing Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that “[a]mendment of the complaint is futile if the amendment will not cure the deficiency in the original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a renewed motion to dismiss”).
VI. Notice Concerning Objections
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72((b)(2), and Local Rule 72(D)(2), the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 631 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72(D)(2).
SUBMITTED.