Evidence of both Ledford's condition and conduct authorized any rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that she was driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for her to drive. See Mealor v. State, 233 Ga. App. 193, 194(4) ( 504 S.E.2d 29) (1998); compare Webb v. State, 223 Ga. App. 9 ( 476 S.E.2d 781) (1996), and cits. The evidence supports Ledford's DUI conviction under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.E.2d 560) (1979). 2.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Webb v. State, 223 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 476 S.E.2d 781) (1996). Moreover, "the mere fact that a defendant has ingested marijuana is not sufficient to support a conviction under OCGA ยง 40-6-391 (a) (2), because that statute does not prohibit driving after ingesting any quantity of drugs."
It follows that, since the record is completely devoid of any evidence tending to show that Head was a less safe driver as a result of being under the influence of alprazolam and cocaine, we must reverse his conviction on this count. See generally Ricks, 255 Ga.App. at 190, 564 S.E.2d 793; Bowen, 235 Ga.App. at 901-902, 510 S.E.2d 873; Webb v. State, 223 Ga.App. 9, 10-11, 476 S.E.2d 781 (1996). Compare Morris v. State, 210 Ga.App. 617, 618(1), 436 S.E.2d 785 (1993).