Webb v. State

14 Citing cases

  1. State v. Hoggins

    718 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1998)   Cited 61 times
    Holding that an accused's right to remain silent under article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution precluded the use of post-arrest, preMiranda silence to impeach a defendant's testimony at trial even though the Federal Due Process Clause permitted such a use

    Hoggins was convicted of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm, armed robbery, aggravated assault with a firearm, and resisting arrest without violence. On appeal, the court recognized that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution do not preclude the use of pre- Miranda silence for impeachment purposes; however, the court, relying on Webb v. State, 347 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1977), held that the prosecutor's improper comments on Hoggins' custodial, pre- Miranda silence violated the due process guarantees found in article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution.Hoggins, 689 So.2d at 384-86.

  2. Hoggins v. State

    689 So. 2d 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 3 times

    The language in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) and United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), although set in the context of silence at arrest, reflects a general policy. While the Willinsky court dealt with silence at a preliminary hearing, in Webb v. State, 347 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), we applied the same type of analysis to a situation factually similar to the instant case. Webb testified on his own behalf to an alibi and on cross-examination the prosecutor was allowed to ask why Webb had not told the police about the alibi on his arrest.

  3. State v. Horwitz

    191 So. 3d 429 (Fla. 2016)   Cited 26 times
    Concluding that "[t]here [was] no question ... that the State directly commented on [the defendant's] silence" by eliciting testimony from officers that the defendant "didn't answer" when asked about what had happened immediately after the incident

    but an educated, sophisticated defendant familiar with his right to remain silent who was not apprised of that right by the police would be subject to impeachment for the exercise of a known constitutionally protected right.[Webb v. State, 347 So.2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).] Thus, by relying on the right to remain silent to preclude evidence of and comment upon postarrest silence we avoid treating differently defendants who are aware of their Miranda rights and those who are not. Moreover, we do not provide police officers with an incentive to delay the giving of Miranda warnings.

  4. Tsavaris v. Scruggs

    360 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1978)   Cited 34 times
    In Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1977), we found that this Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition to a trial court in a case where the defendant had been indicted for first-degree murder.

    Maness v. State, 341 So.2d 246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) Webb v. State, 347 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) Boyd v. State, 351 So.2d 1041 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)

  5. Ferrari v. State

    260 So. 3d 295 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 13 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding the good faith exception did not apply where the State did not rely on binding precedent or clearly applicable statutes

    Under Florida law, the State cannot "comment on a defendant's postarrest silence whether o[r] not the silence was induced by Miranda warnings." State v. Hoggins , 718 So.2d 761, 769 (Fla. 1998) (alteration added, emphasis added); seeWebb v. State , 347 So.2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). However, the State may impeach a defendant with his or her pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.

  6. Ferrari v. State

    No. 4D14-464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sep. 5, 2018)   1 Legal Analyses

    Under Florida law, the State cannot "comment on a defendant's postarrest silence whether o[r] not the silence was induced by Miranda warnings." State v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 761, 769 (Fla. 1988) (alteration added, emphasis added); see Webb v. State, 347 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). However, the State may impeach a defendant with his or her pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.

  7. Whyte v. State

    785 So. 2d 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

    We hold that the trial court erred when it summarily denied appellant's motion for post-conviction relief, because it was legally sufficient. See Webb v. State, 347 So.2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (reversing convictions on direct appeal, finding trial court erred by allowing prosecutor to impeach defendant by his silence after arrest; "we think there was nothing inconsistent with Webb's police station silence and his alibi testimony at trial, and we also think the cross-examination as to appellant's pretrial silence violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Smith v. State, 340 So.2d 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)"); Lee v. State, 422 So.2d 928, 930 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (state court is free to place greater restrictions on use of post-arrest silence than do federal courts), rev. denied, 431 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1983); Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331, 334 (Fla. 1978) (holding that contemporaneous objections were required to preserve for appeal improper comments on defendant's right to remain silent); Jackson v. State, 711 So.2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (reversing order summarily denying motion for post-conviction relief, inter alia, because any error involved in counsel'

  8. Thompson v. State

    634 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that officer's testimony that defendant refused to answer booking questions was impermissible evidence of defendant's exercise of right to silence

    The scope of the right to be free from the state commenting on the exercise of silence is not tied to whether Miranda warnings have been given or are even necessary. Lee v. State, 422 So.2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), rev. denied, 431 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1983); Webb v. State, 347 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1977). The record is silent as to whether appellant was ever given Miranda warnings which might have induced his silence.

  9. Hicks v. State

    590 So. 2d 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that as matter of state constitutional law, it is impermissible to comment on defendant's post-arrest silence whether silence is induced by Miranda warnings or not

    The objection was overruled and the motion denied. As a matter of state constitutional law, it is impermissible to comment on defendant's post-arrest silence whether or not that silence is induced by Miranda warnings. Lee v. State, 422 So.2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), review denied, 431 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1983); see Webb v. State, 347 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1977); see also Hosper v. State, 513 So.2d 234 (Fla.3d DCA 1987); Weiss v. State, 341 So.2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The participation of the uniformed Miami police officer constituted state action in Hick's apprehension and detention; thus, triggering his right to keep his silence after arrest from the jury.

  10. Ivey v. State

    586 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 9 times
    Holding state did not impermissibly comment on defendant's right to remain silent when it cross-examined him on the inconsistency of his testimony with the prior statement he made to the arresting officer after being given the Miranda warnings

    Finally, in Florida, the Miranda decision has generally been held to be irrelevant to the resolution of arguments claiming improper comment upon the right to silence. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 422 So.2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), review denied, 431 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1983); Webb v. State, 347 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1977). Lee was cited as authority in Smith.