The distinction between such an administrative receivership and the court-created equity receivership is established in the case law. In re Casualty Co. of America (1927), 244 N.Y. 443, 144 N.E. 735, 736; Riches v. Hadlock (Utah, 1932), 15 P.2d 283, 288; People ex rel. Barrett v. Shurtleff (1933), 353 Ill. 248; People ex rel. Palmer v. Peoria Life Ins. Co. (1934), 357 Ill. 486, 489; Webb v. Marozas (1932), 268 Ill. App. 338, 348. In the ordinary equity receivership, the receiver is an officer of the court, appointed by the court, and he administers assets which are in the custody of the court; and his fees and those of his employees are set only by the court.
There is a close analogy between section 15 of the Probation Act and section 78 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, chap. 110, par. 78.) Section 78 provides that appeals from interlocutory orders shall go to the Appellate Court and that the judgments of that court are not reviewable. The Appellate Court has often held that this section gives it jurisdiction even though constitutional questions are involved. ( Klever Shampay Karpet Kleaners, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 238 Ill. App. 291; Webb v. Marozas, 268 Ill. App. 338; cf. Murray v. Hagmann, 315 Ill. 437.) Section II of article VI of the constitution does not require that this court be given jurisdiction of all cases involving constitutional questions, and so appellate jurisdiction in those cases rests with the legislature.