Opinion
Civil Action No. DKC 2002-3274
January 7, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this racial discrimination case is the motion by Plaintiffs Brettana Weathers and Andrea Weathers to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The issues have been briefed and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant the motion to dismiss with prejudice.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following are facts either uncontroverted or viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs Brettana Weathers and Andrea Weathers, both of whom are African-American. On or about December 26, 1999, Plaintiff Bretanna Weathers visited the KB Toy Store located in the Forest Village Park Mall in Forestville, Maryland, then owned by Defendant Consolidated Stores Corporation, with her two sons. As they brought the items they had chosen to the check-out counter, Plaintiff Bretanna Weathers began to fill out a check as payment. The cashier informed her that the store did not accept checks. When Plaintiff Bretanna Weathers inquired as to the reason, the cashier replied that it was store policy. Plaintiff Bretanna Weathers then left the items with the cashier and went to an ATM machine in the mall to withdraw cash to pay for the items. Upon her return to the store, the security gate had been pulled down and the cashier allegedly ignored her for a period of time.
In April 2000, Plaintiff Andrea Weathers visited the KB Toy Store located in the Iverson Mall in Temple Hills, Maryland, with her daughters. After selecting an item for purchase, Plaintiff Andrea Weathers planned to pay with a check, having noticed a sign stating that the check policy of the store required two accompanying forms of identification. She wrote the check, but the cashier told her that the store did not accept checks, explaining that the sign was regional and that this particular store did not accept checks. Plaintiff Andrea Weathers then purchased the item with a credit card.
B. Procedural Background
On October 7, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that Defendant discriminated against them on the basis of race by having "deliberately and intentionally" implemented a "no checks" policy in those stores frequented predominantly by African-Americans. Paper 1 at ¶ 27. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. After having requested additional time to respond to Defendant's summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. On December 8, 2003, this court denied Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss and directed Plaintiffs to respond to Defendant's summary judgment motion within 15 days or else the court would order dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs have now moved to dismiss their complaint with prejudice.
At the time Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint, Defendant was facing a lawsuit on substantively similar claims, of which Plaintiffs were aware. See Paper 1 at ¶ 3. This court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. See Buchanan v. Consolidated Stores Corp., 217 F.R.D. 178 (D.Md. 2003).
II. Analysis
Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, reiterating their position that they "no longer wish to move forward." Paper 25 at 1. Where, as here, "the plaintiff moves under Rule 41(a)(2) for voluntary dismissal, specifically requesting dismissal with prejudice, it has been held that the district court must grant that request." 9 Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller § 2367 (2d ed. 1995). In this situation, the fact that Plaintiffs seek "dismissal with prejudice is of paramount importance." F.D.I.C. v. Backer, 166 F.R.D. 14, 15 (D.Md. 1996) (emphasis in original).
Indeed, a voluntary dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) operates as "a complete adjudication on the merits of the dismissed claim." Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 534 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001) ("`[W]ith prejudice' is an acceptable form of shorthand for `an adjudication upon the merits'") (quoting 9 Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller § 2373 (2d ed. 1995)). A dismissal with prejudice "will bar a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies on the same claim." 9 Wright Miller § 2367; see also In re Tomlin, 105 F.3d 933, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1997) ("generally `[d]ismissal of an action with prejudice is a complete adjudication of the issues presented by the pleadings and is a bar to a further action between the parties'") (quoting Harrison, 924 F.2d at 534).
Because a dismissal with prejudice of the main action removes the threat of subsequent lawsuits on the dismissed claims, "any injustice to the defendant is significantly lessened." Becker, 166 F.R.D. at 15. Dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs' complaint therefore insulates Defendant from further litigation arising out of the dismissed claims and does not deprive Defendant of any rights. Moreover, in these circumstances, Plaintiffs have taken their one and only bite at the apple because "[n]ormally, a plaintiff may not appeal the dismissal of his suit with prejudice, which is granted on his own motion." Distaff, Inc. v. Springfield Contracting Corp., 984 F.2d 108, 110 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Proctor Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 680 (1958)).
Despite filing a summary judgment motion, Defendant's interests are well-served by a dismissal with prejudice because " [a] n adjudication in favor of the defendants, by court or jury, can rise no higher than this." Harrison, 924 F.2d at 534 (internal quotation omitted).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. A separate Order will follow.