Opinion
Cause No. 3:06-CV-31 RM.
January 13, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
Richard Wear, an inmate confined at the Indiana State Prison, submitted a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was denied adequate medical care by the defendants. The court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint seeking redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Courts apply the same standard under § 1915A as when addressing a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint. Weiss v. Colley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000).
A claim may be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Accordingly, pro se complaints are liberally construed.
In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court requires only two elements: First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of the right acted under color of state law. These elements may be put forth in a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). In reviewing the complaint on a motion to dismiss, no more is required from plaintiff's allegations of intent than what would satisfy Rule 8's notice pleading minimum and Rule 9(b)'s requirement that motive and intent be pleaded generally.Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations, quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).
Mr. Wear alleges that the defendants, Dr. Mitcheff and nurse Christine Maddox, denied him adequate medical care when they denied him surgery for a serious hernia injury. He says that on May 23, 2004 he submitted a health care request for pain in his abdomen and groin. He was seen by medical staff and Nurse Black on May 24, 2004, after he complained of "the pain of a possible hernia." Complaint, pg. 7. Nurse Black did not find that Mr. Wear had a hernia. On June 27, 2005 Mr. Wear was seen by Dr. Mitcheff who didn't find that Mr. Wear had a hernia. Again, on August 20, 2005, Mr. Wear placed a sick call request. The next day he was seen by Nurse Maddox who referred him to Dr. Mitcheff. On August 22, 2005, Mr. Wear was examined by Dr. Mitcheff who diagnosed the hernia and scheduled corrective surgery. Mr. Wear has not yet had the surgery.
A violation of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause consists of two elements: (1) objectively, whether the injury is sufficiently serious to deprive the prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, and (2) subjectively, whether the prison official's actual state of mind was one of "deliberate indifference" to the deprivation.Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
In medical cases, the Eighth Amendment test is expressed in terms of whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's serious medical needs. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997). A medical need is "serious" if it is one that a physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention, and if untreated could result in further significant injury or unnecessary pain, and that significantly affects the person's daily activities or features chronic and substantial pain.Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d at 1373.
Deliberate indifference is comparable to criminal recklessness, and is shown by "something approaching a total unconcern for [the plaintiff's] welfare in the face of serious risks, or a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent harm." Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992). The defendant "must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This total disregard for a prisoner's safety is the "functional equivalent of wanting harm to come to the prisoner." McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 347 (7th Cir. 1991). Negligence does not satisfy the "deliberate indifference" standard, Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1994), and it is not enough to show that a defendant merely failed to act reasonably. Gibbs v. Franklin, 49 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1995). Even medical malpractice and incompetence do not state a claim of deliberate indifference. Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2000).
Prisoners are not entitled to any particular treatment, and disagreement with a physician over a course of medical treatment states no claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hendricks v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. 435, 458 (N.D. Ind. 1981), aff'd in part vacated in part on other grounds sub nom., Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1983) (a mere disagreement with a physician over a course of medical treatment states no claim under § 1983). That medical personnel see and treat an inmate normally establishes lack of indifference to his medical problems. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 107-108.
Mr. Wear complained of a possible hernia. Each time he complained he was seen and examined the next day by medical staff. No hernia was diagnosed until August 22, 2005. Once the hernia was diagnosed, surgery was scheduled. Mr. Wear was seen and treated by medical personnel. He may not have agreed with the diagnosis he was given before August 22, 2005, but the facts as stated do not allege, nor would it be reasonable to infer, that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Nor does the fact that he was housed on SMU for two weeks state a claim against these defendants.
For the foregoing reasons, the court DISMISSES this complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
SO ORDERED.