Waugh v. State

7 Citing cases

  1. Wynn v. State

    117 Md. App. 133 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that the number and uniqueness of the items recovered from the appellant's home "allow the inference that appellant stole the items even though they were recovered ten months later"

    Prior to the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Wilson v. Arkansas, and its 1997 decision in Richards v. Wisconsin, Maryland Courts had held that announcement and demand for admittance are not a requisite to execution of a search warrant when facts make it evident that the officers' purpose is known or when announcement and demand would frustrate the arrest, increase the peril of the arresting officer, or permit destruction of evidence. See Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 204 A.2d 516 (1964); Kates v. State, 13 Md. App. 688, 284 A.2d 651 (1971); Waugh v. State, 3 Md. App. 379, 239 A.2d 596 (1968) ( per curiam); In Henson, the appellant claimed that the police officers' conduct in breaking open his door without first announcing who they were and making demand that entry be granted was illegal and vitiated all the evidence that followed. Id. at 520, 204 A.2d 516.

  2. State v. Savage

    170 Md. App. 149 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006)   Cited 24 times
    Observing that the evidence was found as a result of the search warrant, and not the "knock and announce" violation

    On two occasions prior to the filing of Wilson v. Arkansas, the Court of Special Appeals had had occasion to consider the common-law "knock and announce" requirement. In Waugh v. State, 3 Md.App. 379, 239 A.2d 596 (1968), the police, in the course of executing a search warrant, "broke open the door and entered the premises without prior announcement." Id. at 381, 239 A.2d 596.

  3. Davis v. State

    525 P.2d 541 (Alaska 1974)   Cited 16 times
    In Davis v. State, 525 P.2d 541 (Alaska 1974), we explained the purposes of knock and announce requirements: "(1) to protect the occupant's right to privacy...; (2) to safe-guard the police who might be mistaken for prowlers and be shot..; and (3) to protect other persons who might be injured by violent resistance to unannounced entries...."

    In fact, it is not clear that an announcement by the police of their identity and purpose is required by the United States Constitution, even absent exigent circumstances. Some courts have upheld police entries without announcement in narcotics and gambling cases, permitting police to assume that it is necessary that they enter without announcement because evidence in those cases may be easily disposed of. See, e.g., Waugh v. State, 3 Md. App. 379, 239 A.2d 596 (Md. Sp.Ct.App. 1968) (narcotics); State v. Juliano, 97 N.J. Super. 28, 234 A.2d 236 (N.J. 1967) (gambling). But see, State v. Valentine, 504 P.2d 84, 85-87 (Or. 1972).

  4. Garrison v. State

    272 Md. 123 (Md. 1974)   Cited 55 times
    Holding that although the defendant was the colessee of the premises, there was insufficient evidence to establish that she was in possession of heroin in her apartment

    3, 188 A.2d 543 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 851 (1963), where he gave an oral statement admitting use of heroin; Gault v. State, 231 Md. 78, 188 A.2d 539 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 851 (1963), where an oral confession was given admitting the purchase and injection of heroin; Broadway v. State, 3 Md. App. 164, 237 A.2d 820 (1968), cert. denied, 250 Md. 731 (1968), where the appellant admitted that he had used drugs while upon the premises. There was no evidence of the existence of any "fresh needle marks" upon her body as there was in Hill v. State, supra; Henson v. State, supra; Williams v. State, supra; Gault v. State, supra; Peachie v. State, 203 Md. 239, 100 A.2d 1 (1953); Brooks v. State, 13 Md. App. 151, 282 A.2d 516 (1971), cert. denied, 264 Md. 746, 749, 750 (1972); Anderson v. State, 9 Md. App. 639, 267 A.2d 302 (1970), cert. denied, 259 Md. 729 (1970); Jason v. State, 9 Md. App. 102, 262 A.2d 774 (1970), cert. denied, 258 Md. 728, 729 (1970); Broadway v. State, supra; Waugh v. State, 3 Md. App. 379, 239 A.2d 596 (1968); McCuen v. State, 3 Md. App. 73, 237 A.2d 785 (1968), cert. denied, 252 Md. 732 (1969). The seized heroin was not in the plain view of the appellant, nor was there a juxtaposition between her (in the front bedroom) and the contraband being jettisoned by her husband in the bathroom.

  5. People v. Lujan

    174 Colo. 554 (Colo. 1971)   Cited 39 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that exigent circumstances pertain in "every case involving a search for narcotics"

    More recently, however, the exception has been held applicable in those instances where there is no reason to believe that evidence is being destroyed but only that it would be destroyed if the officers announced their presence. State v. Clarke, 242 So.2d 791 (Fla 1970); Waugh v. State, 3 Md. App. 379, 239 A.2d 596 (1968); State v. Juliano, 97 N.J. Super. 28, 234 A.2d 236 (1967). See Commonwealth v. Manduchi, 203 Pa. Super. 373, 198 A.2d 613 (1964).

  6. State v. Riley

    147 Md. App. 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)   Cited 13 times
    In Riley, the issue was the correctness of a ruling by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County invalidating a search and seizure warrant containing a "no-knock" provision because the application for the warrant did not provide sufficient justification for a "no-knock" entry.

    On three occasions prior to 1995, Maryland recognized the "knock and announce" requirement as a part of the common law, but on each occasion held that exceptions to the requirement satisfied the rule. Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 204 A.2d 516 (1964); Kates v. State, 13 Md. App. 688, 284 A.2d 651 (1971); Waugh v. State, 3 Md. App. 379, 239 A.2d 596 (1968). Maryland, of course, has no exclusionary rule for general violations of search-and-seizure requirements.

  7. Kates, Adams and Kritel v. State

    13 Md. App. 688 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971)   Cited 5 times
    In Kates v. State, 13 Md.App. 688, 284 A.2d 651 (1971), the defendant contended that a search warrant had been "invalidly executed" because "before an officer may use force to break and enter, he must first give proper notice of his purpose and authority and be denied admittance."

    We have held that narcotics cases may fall within the exception above noted "for if opportunity is given all evidence easily may be destroyed during the time required to give notice, demand admittance and accept communication of denial of entry." Waugh v. State, 3 Md. App. 379, citing Henson v. State, supra. We think such a rationale equally applicable in gambling and/or lottery cases.