"`In the ordinary case res ipsa loquitur merely permits the jury to choose the inference of the defendant's negligence in preference to other permissible inferences. It avoids a nonsuit and gets the plaintiff to the jury; but a verdict for the defendant will be affirmed even though he offers no evidence.'" See, also, Watts v. Richmond, F. P.R. Co., 1949, 189 Va. 258, 52 S.E.2d 129, 7 A.L.R.2d 1418; and Bloch v. Brown, 1947, 201 Miss. 653, 29 So.2d 665, 173 A.L.R. 874. In the instant case, the court, after hearing all of the evidence, made a finding that the defendant was not negligent with respect to the wall.
Having proved that she was injured by an instrumentality which was within the exclusive control of defendant, and that the accident was of such nature and character as does not ordinarily occur if due care is used, plaintiff relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and rested her case. Norfolk So. Ry. v. Tomlinson, 116 Va. 153, 81 S.E. 89; MurphyHotel v. Cuddy, 124 Va. 207, 97 S.E. 794; Bromm Baking Co. v. West, 166 Va. 357, 186 S.E. 289; Anderson v. Sisson, 170 Va. 178, 196 S.E. 688; Danville Community Hospital v. Thompson, 186 Va. 746, 43 S.E.2d 882, 173 A. L. R. 525, and Watts v. Richmond, etc., Ry. Co., 189 Va. 258, 52 S.E.2d 129. [1-3] The offending vehicular agency was under defendant's exclusive control. It departed from the designated and usually traveled roadway and entered a forbidden area and there inflicted injury. This was an occurrence which in the ordinary course of things does not happen if the one having exclusive control over the agency uses proper care.