We will now address the question of duty as it relates to the Noeckers. For other cases see: Watts v. Holmes, Wyo., 386 P.2d 718 (1963), and Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494 (1976). We have applied this "known and obvious — natural accumulation" rule to affirm summary judgment in the past.
We have numerous Wyoming cases right on point. In Watts v. Holmes, Wyo., 386 P.2d 718 (1963), this court stated: "Dangers created by the elements such as the forming of ice and the falling of snow are universally known, and the cases seem generally to hold there is no liability where the danger is obvious or is as well known to the plaintiff as to the property owner.
Mostert v. CBL Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1098 (Wyo. 1987). However, this court has adopted the rule that an owner or occupier of a premises will not be liable for injuries resulting from a slip and fall on a natural accumulation of ice or snow. Petersen v. Campbell County Memorial Hosp. Dist., 760 P.2d 992, 994 (Wyo. 1988); Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo. 1982); Johnson v. Hawkins, 622 P.2d 941, 943 (Wyo. 1981); Bluejacket v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo. 1976); Watts v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718, 719 (Wyo. 1963). This appeal presents us initially with the question whether the legislature's adoption of comparative negligence abrogated the natural-accumulation rule.
It has been settled that a storekeeper is not an insurer of the safety of customers. Watts v. Holmes, Wyo. 1963, 386 P.2d 718, 719. The operator of a facility, such as that of defendants bears a similar relationship to their customers.
It seems to be well settled that there is no liability for injuries from dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as well-known to the person injured as they are to the owner of the facilities in question. Watts v. Holmes, Wyo., 386 P.2d 718, 719; Moore v. Southwestern Sash Door Co., 71 Ariz. 418, 228 P.2d 993, 995. McKee's own testimony in this case establishes clearly that all of the dangers of defendant's power lines were obvious and apparent to him and as well-known to him as they were to the power company itself.
We have previously recognized a complaint should show the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Tuttle v. Lee, 2018 WY 104, ¶ 8, 425 P.3d 998, 1000 (Wyo. 2018) (stating a motion to dismiss will be sustained when the complaint shows on its face the plaintiff is not entitled to relief); see also Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 583 (Wyo. 1979) (citing Watts v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718, 719 (Wyo. 1963)). The same holds true for motions:
Bluejacket v. Carney , 550 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo. 1976) ; see also Paulson v. Andicoechea , 926 P.2d 955, 957 (Wyo. 1996). We adopted the natural accumulation rule in Watts v. Holmes , 386 P.2d 718, 719 (Wyo. 1963), where we held that a store owner cannot be considered negligent "for allowing the natural accumulation of ice due to weather conditions, where he has not created the condition." [¶15] The rationale underlying the rule is that "[t]he plaintiff is in a much better position to prevent injuries from ice or snow because the plaintiff can take precautions at the very moment the conditions are encountered."
In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00, 2012 WY 75, ¶ 24, 278 P.3d 234, 240 (Wyo. 2012); BB, 2007 WY 4, ¶ 13, 149 P.3d at 732-33; Watts v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718, 719 (Wyo. 1963). [¶41] We recently addressed the issue of a defective pleading in the context of piercing the corporate veil.
When a claim is pled under the WGCA, we will not speculate that the appellant also intended to plead a separate tort claim against the governmental employee. See Krenning, 2009 WY 11, ¶¶ 30-31, 200 P.3d at 783; Watts v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718, 719 (Wyo. 1963); W.R.C.P. 8(a), (e). The two state law tort claims made against the deputy in the appellant's complaint were (1) assault and battery, and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
[¶ 13] In light of these standards, we agree with the district court that Father's general allegation was sufficient to apprise Mother of the nature of the claim against her. Although Mother contends that she arrived at trial with very little knowledge concerning the specific facts to support Father's claim, those facts could have been fleshed out during the discovery process. In Watts v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718, 719 (Wyo. 1963), we explained that: We also note that Mother did not file a motion for a more definite statement pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(e), which provides: