Opinion
A-13924 0322
05-10-2023
WESLEY EUGENE WATT, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Monique Eniero, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Heather Stenson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Trial Court No. 3AN-19-06572 CR Kevin M. Saxby, Judge.
Appearances:
Monique Eniero, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Heather Stenson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Wesley Eugene Watt was convicted, following a jury trial, of third-degree criminal mischief and third-degree assault after he slammed his body into Jeremy Canaday's vehicle, denting the door and breaking a window, and then pulled out a handgun and pointed it in Canaday's direction. On appeal, he argues there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions.
AS 11.46.482(a)(1) and AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A), respectively.
When we review a claim of insufficient evidence on appeal, we are required to view the evidence - and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence - in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict. We then determine whether, viewing the evidence in this light, a fair-minded juror could find that the State had met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Iyapana v. State, 284 P.3d 841, 848-49 (Alaska App. 2012).
Id.
With regard to the criminal mischief conviction, Watt argues that there was insufficient evidence he intentionally caused damage to Canaday's vehicle because he collided with the vehicle by accident. But interpreted in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence demonstrated that Watt was aware that his wife had been having an affair with Canaday and he became upset when he discovered the two of them talking in Canaday's vehicle. Watt testified that he ran "as fast as [he] could" toward Canaday's vehicle. An uninvolved witness described that Watt "lowered his shoulder" like a "linebacker in football" and did not slow down as he approached, slamming his body into the rear driver's side door of the vehicle. The impact broke one of the vehicle's windows. We conclude that the jury could reasonably reject Watt's explanation that the collision was an accident and find him guilty of third-degree criminal mischief.
AS 11.46.482(a)(1) ("A person commits the crime of criminal mischief in the third degree if, having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe the person has such a right, with intent to damage property of another, the person damages the property of another in an amount of $750 or more."). Watt does not dispute that he damaged Canaday's vehicle nor that the damage was in an amount of $750 or more.
With regard to the third-degree assault conviction, Watt argues that he was acting in self-defense and that there was insufficient evidence that he recklessly placed Canaday in fear of imminent serious physical injury. But at trial, several witnesses testified that, after colliding with Canaday's vehicle, Watt fell to the ground. Canaday testified that he maneuvered his vehicle to leave the parking lot, and when he looked out of his driver's side window, he saw Watt pull a handgun out and direct it toward him. At trial, Watt admitted that Canaday's vehicle was not directly pointed at him, and other witnesses confirmed that Canaday never positioned his car to face Watt or drove toward him in a threatening manner. We conclude that a fair-minded juror could have rejected Watt's self-defense claim and found that Watt recklessly placed Canaday in fear when he pointed his gun toward him.
AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A) ("A person commits the crime of assault in the third degree if that person recklessly places another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument.").
Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.