Opinion
KNLCV176029843S
02-21-2018
David Watson v. Lucille Thoma
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Calmar, Harry E., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE (#110)
Calmar, J.
The defendants move to strike counts one and two of the plaintiff’s amended complaint, which allege constructive trust and unjust enrichment, respectively, on the grounds that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient for a finding of constructive trust and unjust enrichment. The defendants also move to strike count two on the ground that the statute of limitations for a cause of action in unjust enrichment has expired. Lastly, the defendants move to strike counts one and two on the ground that the defendant, Reinald Thoma, Trustee, (Trustee) has divested himself of any interest in the property located at 119 Lewis Road in Preston.
This action was brought against the eight defendants: Lucille Thoma, Christine Kendall, Colleen Brooks, Reinald Thoma, Trustee of the Lucille W. Thoma 2013 Family Gift Trust, the Lucille Thoma 2013 Family Trust, and the Lucille A. Thoma 2016 Irrevocable Trust, Christine Kendall as the Trustee of the Watson Daughters Irrevocable Trust, and Lucille Thoma as the Trustee of the Watson Daughters Irrevocable Trust. On January 31, 2018, this court granted the defendants’ request to substitute Reinald Thoma, Executor of Lucille Thoma’s estate, for the now deceased defendant Lucille Thoma. See Order #112.01.
With respect to count one, " [a] constructive trust arises contrary to intention and in invitum, against one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy ... A constructive trust arises ... when a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it ... The issue raised by a claim for a constructive trust is, in essence, whether a party has committed actual or constructive fraud or whether he or she has been unjustly enriched." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mitchell v. Redvers, 130 Conn.App. 100, 112-13, 22 A.3d 659 (2011). Accordingly, because the plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to support a finding of constructive trust, the defendants’ motion to strike count one is denied.
In count one, the plaintiff alleges that there existed a confidential relationship between the defendant Reinald Thoma (Trustee), David Watson, and Colleen Watson Brooks. The plaintiff further alleges that " [t]he conveyance by Thoma and Kendall of the parcels at 119 Lewis Road and 16 Rude Road ... has given [the defendants] title to property which they should not hold in equity and good conscience because of their agreement to re-convey the property to the [p]laintiff." The plaintiff alleges that the defendants have obtained the properties through actual or constructive fraud, duress, and abuse of confidence at the expense of the plaintiff, and " [t]he defendants have an equitable duty to convey the property to the [p]laintiff to avoid being unjustly enriched by retaining properties for which they gave no real consideration."
The defendants also move to strike count one on the ground that the Trustee conveyed any interest he had in the property located at 119 Lewis Road to the Lucille W. Thoma 2016 Irrevocable Trust, and, thus, he has no interest in the property. A review of the record reveals that the plaintiff did not bring claims against Reinald Thoma in his individual capacity, but rather, in his capacity as the trustee. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiff’s complaint is denied as to this ground.
As to count two, in order for the plaintiffs to recover from unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must prove: " (1) that the defendants were benefited, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs’ detriment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 433, 451-52, 970 A.2d 592 (2009). Here, the plaintiff alleges that: (1) the defendants, Thoma, Kendall, and Trustee received a benefit from the plaintiff through retention of the properties located at 119 Lewis Road and 16 Rude Road; (2) the defendants have refused to return the properties and to pay fair market value for the property to the plaintiff; and (3) their refusal to pay for these benefits is to the plaintiff’s detriment. Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to maintaining their legal sufficiency, the plaintiff has sufficiently plead the elements necessary for a claim of unjust enrichment. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to strike count two is denied as to this ground.
Alternatively, the defendants move to strike count two on the ground that the plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment is barred by the statute of limitations. " [O]rdinarily, [a] claim that an action is barred by the lapse of the statute of limitations must be pleaded as a special defense, not raised by a motion to strike." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. United Technologies Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 344-45 n.12, 890 A.2d 1269 (2006). There are two exceptions to this general rule. " The first is when [t]he parties agree that the complaint sets forth all the facts pertinent to the question [of] whether the action is barred by the [s]tatute of [l]imitations ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Forbes v. Ballaro, 31 Conn.App. 235, 239, 624 A.2d 389 (1993). The second exception " exists ... when a statute gives a right of action which did not exist at common law, and fixes the time within which the right must be enforced, the time fixed is a limitation or condition attached to the right- it is a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 277 Conn. 345, n.12. Here, there is no indication of any agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants that the amended complaint sets forth all the pertinent facts in order to resolve the issue of whether the defense of the statute of limitations applies. Furthermore, the plaintiff has alleged a common-law claim for unjust enrichment. Accordingly, neither exception applies and the defendant’s motion to strike is denied as to this alternative ground.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to strike counts one and two of the plaintiff’s amended complaint is denied.