Opinion
NO. 01-15-00134-CR
03-22-2016
JENNIFER LEANN WATSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 338th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1363069
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After appellant, Jennifer Leann Watson, with an agreed punishment recommendation from the State, pleaded guilty to the offense of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, namely, methamphetamine, weighing more than four grams and less than two hundred grams, the trial court deferred adjudication of her guilt and placed her on community supervision for three years. The State, alleging several violations of the conditions of her community supervision, subsequently moved to adjudicate appellant's guilt. After a hearing, the trial court found each of the allegations true, found appellant guilty, and assessed her punishment at confinement for six years. In her sole issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that she committed a new offense.
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.102(6), 481.115(d) (Vernon 2010).
We affirm.
Background
On September 19, 2013, the trial court placed appellant on community supervision subject to certain conditions, including that she commit no new offenses, report to a community-supervision officer, submit to random urine-specimen testing, participate in certain programs, and pay fines and fees as assessed. In its motion to adjudicate appellant's guilt, the State alleged that she violated these conditions by committing the offense of possession of a controlled substance, failing to report as instructed to the community-supervision officer, failing to submit when requested to random urine-specimen testing, failing to participate in the "Felony Mental Health Court Specialized Caseload" ("FMHC") program as instructed, and becoming $154.50 in arrears in court-assessed fees. Appellant pleaded "not true" to the allegations.
At a hearing on the State's motion, Harris County Adult Probation Officer S. Poole testified that appellant violated the terms of her community supervision by failing to participate in the FMHC program by not reporting to and attending treatment regularly. Poole noted that although appellant, as a participant in the program, was offered various mental-health, childcare, and financial resources, she did not utilize these resources. Poole also noted that appellant had failed to report to her as instructed on February 11, 2014, May 2, 2014, June 25, 2014, and July 15, 2014. And she failed to submit to random urine-specimen analysis on May 1, 2014 and on June 6 and 27, 2014. Further, appellant was in arrears $15.00 in court-assessed laboratory processing fees; $39.50 in court-assessed supervision fees; and $100 in court costs.
Poole explained that the FMHC is a "specialized court where clients with a mental health diagnosis or co-occurring disorder are able to receive assistance from the case managers and intense supervision with the Judge and community supervision officer." --------
Harris County Sheriff's Office Deputy J. Norris testified that on July 15, 2014, he and two other deputies went to a house in North Harris County to execute a felony arrest warrant on another individual. When they arrived, the front door of the house was "standing wide open." After the deputies identified themselves, they went inside the house, where Norris could hear people talking in one of the bedrooms. Once inside the bedroom, Norris saw appellant and a man asleep on a bed. He also saw two women talking while they stood beside the bed. After the deputies had awakened appellant and the man, Norris noticed, on the bed next to appellant, a purse, which was "standing," "unzipped," and "open." He saw in the purse "hypodermic needle plunger ends sticking up out of the top." And he saw "little bags commonly used to transport crystal meth, or methamphetamine." Norris explained that one of the bags, which the trial court admitted into evidence, contained a "grayish white powder residue," and he opined, based on his experience and training, that it "had . . . crystal meth in it." Norris determined from his discussions with the occupants of the house that the purse belonged to appellant. And he noted that appellant retrieved from inside the purse a wallet, which matched the purse and contained her identification.
Harris County Institute of Forensic Sciences Chemist Dr. M. Hohler testified that the bag entered into evidence contained methamphetamine weighing 1.963 grams.
Chris Hernandez testified that on July 15, 2014, he and appellant were asleep in the bedroom at her house. He did not realize that his cousin, Jessica Mattou, and a friend, Desiree Hass, were also in the bedroom, until law enforcement officers arrived at "around 12 o'clock noon." Hernandez noted that when the deputies arrived, Desiree "immediately started flipping out," meaning that she "started crying" and making "major body twitching movements." He asserted that appellant "was not using drugs" and had "never done any drugs around [him]." He noted, however, that Desiree was a "drug addict" and had previously done "[h]eroin, cocaine, meth, [and] pills" around him. Hernandez also testified about his numerous prior federal and state convictions for possession and distribution of controlled substances.
Appellant testified that the "plungers and needles and baggies" found in her purse did not belong to her. She had allowed Desiree, who "sleeps downtown," to come over and "get a shower and a change of clothes." Appellant noted that Desiree is "on drugs," mainly uses "heroin and meth," and refused to admit to the deputies that the methamphetamine was hers because her brother would "kill" her. Appellant further explained that although she did not timely report to her community-supervision officer or submit specimens for narcotics testing as directed, she had notified Poole and reported on later dates. And although appellant had not paid her court-assessed fees as directed, she explained that she was unable to pay.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court found all of the State's allegations true, found appellant guilty, and assessed her punishment at confinement for six years.
Standard of Review
Appellate review of an order adjudicating guilt is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 2015) ("This determination [to adjudicate guilt] is reviewable in the same manner as a [community-service] revocation hearing . . . in which an adjudication of guilt had not been deferred."); Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ("Appellate review of an order revoking probation is limited to abuse of the trial court's discretion."). The trial court's decision must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763. The evidence meets this standard when the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that a defendant has violated a condition of her community supervision. Id. at 764.
We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order. Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). As the sole trier of fact, a trial court determines the credibility of witnesses. See id.; Jones v. State, 787 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd).
When a trial court finds several violations of community-supervision conditions, we will affirm if the proof of any single allegation is sufficient. See Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Canseco v. State, 199 S.W.3d 437, 439 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd). Thus, to prevail on appeal, a defendant must successfully challenge all of the findings that support the trial court's revocation order. See Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26; Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
Adjudication of Guilt
In her sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in adjudicating her guilt because the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that she committed a new offense. As noted above, however, the State need only establish one sufficient ground for revocation to support the trial court's order adjudicating guilt. See Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26.
The record shows that the trial court placed several conditions on appellant, including that she report to her community-supervision officer as directed, submit to random urine-specimen analyses, and participate in the FMHC. And Officer Poole testified that appellant failed on four occasions to report to her as directed, and she failed to submit to random urine-specimen analyses. Poole further noted that appellant did not participate as directed in the FMHC program.
Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that appellant violated the terms and conditions of her community supervision by failing to report to her community-supervision officer, submit to a random urine-specimen analyses, and participate in the FMHC program. See Jones v. State, 176 S.W.3d 47, 51 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (evidence of failure to report to community-supervision officer sufficient to support revocation); see also Carter v. State, No. 01-11-00936-CR, 2012 WL 5989440, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (evidence of failure to report sufficient to support revocation and adjudication); Gutierrez v. State, No. 14-09-01034-CR, 2010 WL 4892310, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 2, 2010) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (evidence of "missed random drug tests" sufficient to support revocation). Having so held, we need not address appellant's challenge to the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that she had also committed the new offense of possession of a controlled substance. We further hold that the trial court did not err in adjudicating appellant's guilt.
We overrule appellant's sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Huddle. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).