Opinion
Nos. 05-09-01195-CR, 05-09-01196-CR
Opinion issued June 7, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F03-41090-I, F08-40253-I.
Before Justices O'NEILL, FRANCIS, and MURPHY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Rodney Clay Watson appeals the revocation of his community supervision in one case and the adjudication of guilt in the other case. In three issues, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision, adjudicating his guilt and sentencing him to prison. We affirm the trial court's judgments. The background of the cases and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the cases is well settled. In cause no. 05-09-01195-CR, appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years. Following the plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudication of guilt, placed appellant on deferred adjudication community supervision for ten years, and assessed a $1500 fine. In cause no. 05-09-01196-CR, appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. Also following the plea agreement, the trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at ten years in prison, probated for five years. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt and to revoke appellant's community supervision, alleging appellant violated conditions of his community supervision. In a hearing on the motions, appellant pleaded true to the allegations. In cause no. 05-09-01195-CR, the trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at fifteen years in prison. In cause no. 05-09-01196-CR, the trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and set punishment at ten years in prison. In his first and second issues, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to imprisonment in each case because the sentences do not further the rehabilitative goals of the penal code. Appellant asserts his testimony established he lacked the funds to pay the fees because he had to pay for housing, and he could not attend counseling programs because they required payment of a fee as a prerequisite. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review and, alternatively, the record does not show that the sentences violated the objectives of the penal code. Appellant did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in motions for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion). After sentencing, appellant did not object to the sentences, and he did not file a motion for new trial in either case. Thus, appellant has not preserved this issue for our review. Even if appellant had preserved error, however, his argument still fails. As a general rule, punishment that is assessed within the statutory range for the offense is not excessive or unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). In these cases, the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offenses. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32, 22.021(e) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(b)(2) (Vernon 2006). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the fifteen and ten year sentences. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal). We resolve appellant's first and second issues against him. In his third issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating guilt in cause no. 05-09-01195-CR because the State presented no evidence regarding appellant's nonpayment of fees. The State responds the trial court did not abuse its discretion because proof of one violation is sufficient and not all the allegations dealt with fees. In its motion to adjudicate, the State alleged appellant committed eight violations, including, failing to report, allow the probation officer to visit his home, pay probation fees, pay a Crime Stoppers fee, pay urinalysis fees, provide proof that he registered with the local police department, pay a sex offender fee, and participate in sex offender counseling. At the hearing on the motion, appellant pleaded true to all of the allegations. A plea of true to any violation, standing alone, supports revocation of community supervision. See Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Appellant's signed plea of true and stipulation of evidence was admitted into evidence. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision and adjudicating his guilt. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (appellate review of order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, and such order must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence); Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (to prevail, appellant must successfully challenge all the findings that support a revocation order). We resolve appellant's third issue against him. In each case, we affirm the trial court's judgment.