Watson v. Howard

2 Citing cases

  1. Curtis v. Chicago Transit Authority

    793 N.E.2d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)   Cited 6 times
    In Curtis, the court again considered whether a complaint filed within the statutory notice period could cure a deficient notice.

    70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 2000). Where the word "shall" appears in a legislative provision, the requirements of that provision are generally interpreted as mandatory. Watson v. Howard, 322 Ill. App. 3d 562, 565 (2001). Our courts have consistently held that the section 41 notice requirement demands strict compliance and the burden of such compliance falls solely on the plaintiff.

  2. Brennan v. Kolman

    335 Ill. App. 3d 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 15 times

    We agree with petitioners that the requirement that the circulator of a petition attest that the signers were registered voters is mandatory. See Watson v. Howard, 322 Ill. App. 3d 562, 565, 749 N.E.2d 427, 429 (2001) ("shall" in legislative provision generally interpreted to be mandatory); Schumann v. Kumarich, 102 Ill. App. 3d 454, 457-58, 430 N.E.2d 99, 101 (1981). If a statute imposes duties and expressly states that the failure to perform those duties renders the proceeding void, courts are generally bound to interpret those provisions as mandatory; however, the statute is directory if it merely provides that certain procedures should be done in a particular time and manner "and does not declare that their performance is essential to the validity of the proceeding." People ex rel. Village of Grayslake v. Village of Round Lake Beach, 242 Ill. App. 3d 750, 756, 609 N.E.2d 1061, 1066 (1993).