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finding no abuse of discretion where district court declined to consider plaintiff's untimely opposition to summary judgment where plaintiff was warned about the consequence of missing the deadline
Summary of this case from In re Navidea Biopharmaceuticals Litig.Opinion
No. 08-6069-cv.
December 4, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Marrero, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Rosetta Watson. Brooklyn, NY, for Appellant.
Brian K. Morgan, Sarah S. Normand, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Lev Dassin, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, ROBERT D. SACK and ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Rosetta Watson, pro se, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her claims of discrimination and retaliation against the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
This Court reviews a district court's decision to decline to consider an untimely response to summary judgment motion for abuse of discretion. See Davidson v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1984). Here, Watson was properly notified of the consequences of failing to respond to the motion for summary judgment, and even received an extension of time to file her response. Despite these warnings, Watson failed to timely file an opposition, and, thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the Government's motion based on the file it had before it. Moreover, Watson did not raise this argument in her opening brief, and we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 1999).
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, and ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, this Court is "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). However, "conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Davis v. New York, 31 f) F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).
Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly granted the Government's motion for summary judgment. We affirm the district court judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned memorandum and order.
We have considered all of Watson's contentions on this appeal and have found them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.