Opinion
2019-SC-0595-MR
09-28-2023
SCOTTY WATSON APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Kathleen K. Schmidt Julia K. Pearson Assistant Public Advocates COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Daniel J. Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky Melissa A. Pile Assistant Attorney General
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ON APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE CLARENCE A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE NO. 18-CR-00092
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Kathleen K. Schmidt Julia K. Pearson Assistant Public Advocates
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Daniel J. Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky Melissa A. Pile Assistant Attorney General
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING
A Lyon Circuit Court jury found Scotty Watson guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. The jury recommended a sentence of twenty years, which the trial court then imposed. Watson appeals as a matter of right.Watson argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it ruled that evidence showing that Watson was on probation at the time of the current offense was admissible under KRE 404(b). Also, Watson argues that the trial court should have granted a mistrial after approximately ten to fifteen potential jurors viewed Watson in handcuffs prior to the commencement of trial. After a careful review of the record, we hereby affirm the judgment of the Lyon Circuit Court.
Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 5, 2018, Officers Gary Blackburn and Zack Green from the Department of Probation and Parole went to the residence of Scotty Watson to do a home visit as they had received reports that Watson was trafficking methamphetamine. Watson was on probation at the time. Detective Mike Lantrip of the Pennyrile Narcotics Task Force waited nearby in case any narcotics were discovered.
When Officers Blackburn and Green knocked on the door, a female acquaintance of Watson allowed them to enter the residence. After Officer Blackburn entered Watson's bedroom, he found Watson in bed, and on the nightstand beside him, discovered marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a mirror with methamphetamine on it. Watson admitted using methamphetamine and consented to a search of his residence. Officer Blackburn then contacted Detective Lantrip to assist with the search.
When Detective Lantrip arrived, he observed digital scales on a coffee table. After Lantrip read Watson his Miranda warning, Watson admitted there was more methamphetamine in the house. Watson led Detective Lantrip to a separate room where there was approximately eight to ten grams of methamphetamine underneath a DVD case together with some money and digital scales. Detective Lantrip continued to search and recovered around twenty-five to twenty-eight grams of methamphetamine, roughly one hundred plastic baggies, and one hundred and eighty-nine dollars. Watson was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance, first degree, first offense, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was arrested, and a Lyon County grand jury later added the charge of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree.
Several months prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a notice under KRE 404(b) in order to allow Detective Lantrip to testify that he came into contact with Watson by assisting the Department of Probation and Parole with a home visit of Watson's residence. On the morning of trial, when the issue was argued, the trial court initially agreed with the defendant's objection and surmised that if the jury had knowledge that Watson was being supervised by Probation and Parole, then the jury would likely know Watson had a previous felony conviction. The Commonwealth responded that the jury would be confused when Officer Blackburn from Probation and Parole testified because they would not know who he was or how he came into contact with Watson that day. This convinced the trial court to allow this into evidence as the trial court held that Watson's status as a probationer was inextricably interlinked with the case in chief but also admonished the jury to not consider Watson's status when determining guilt in the present case.
The Commonwealth's notice states it was filed under KRE 404(b), despite the notice requirement originating from KRE 404(c).
The Commonwealth's notice only raised the issue of the testimony of Detective Lantrip under KRE 404(b), no notice was given under KRE 404(c) for Officer Blackburn from Probation and Parole to testify that Watson was on probation at the time. Since Watson did not raise the issue of insufficient notice, either at trial or on appeal, this Court will not address it.
Another issue discussed before the trial began was that Watson was apparently seen in handcuffs by approximately ten to fifteen potential jurors as he was led into the courtroom. Watson was not attired in jail issued clothing, nor was he was shackled around his ankles. Because of this, Watson moved for a mistrial, pointing out that in light of the ruling on the issue of Watson's status as probationer, any potential jurors that saw Watson in handcuffs would amount to "two strikes" against him. The trial court declined to grant a mistrial and instead admonished the jury.
The jury found Watson guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance, first degree, first offense, more than two grams, and found Watson to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. At sentencing, the jury recommended a sentence of twenty years in prison, which the trial court imposed. We now address the merits of the appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
Watson first argues the trial court erred when it declined to grant Watson's motion for a mistrial because several veniremen may have observed Watson in handcuffs as he was brought in the courtroom. A trial court's denial of a mistrial is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Bray v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 375, 383 (Ky. 2002). "A mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when there appears in the record a manifest necessity for such an action or an urgent or real necessity." Bray v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 741, 752 (Ky. 2005).
It is a longstanding principle that a defendant should not be made to appear in front of a jury in shackles or restraints. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 628 (2005). A defendant forced to appear in front of a jury in restraints undermines the presumption of innocence that forms a core tenant of our system. Id. at 630.
Watson primarily relies on this Court's recent decision in Deal v. Commonwealth in support of his position. 607 S.W.3d 652 (Ky. 2020). In Deal, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to play a thirty-five-minute recording of the defendant's police interrogation while the defendant was shackled and dressed in jail attire. This Court reversed the trial court explaining:
[W]e remain convinced that videos of the defendant "bearing badges of custody" pose a threat to the defendant's right to a fair trial because it tends to suggest to the jury that some official determination has already been made that the defendant needs to be restrained and separated from society.Id. at 667. The Commonwealth argues other cases are more on point, such as Moss v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1997), and Shegog v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 101 (Ky. 2004). We agree. In both cases it was claimed that prospective jurors had seen the defendant when he was brought to the courthouse while he was handcuffed. In Moss, this Court stated "[w]e have repeatedly held that the inadvertent viewing of the defendant in either handcuffs or another restraint for the sole purpose of being taken to or from the courtroom is not automatically reversible error." 949 S.W.2d at 582-83. In Moss, we declined to reverse the trial court because there was no evidence that any juror saw the defendant bound; consequently the defendant could not demonstrate prejudice. Id. at 583. In Shegog, the defendant also alleged error because he claimed that potential jurors had an opportunity to view the defendant in handcuffs as he was led into the courtroom. 142 S.W.3d at 108. Counsel in Shegog requested a continuance so more jurors could be brought in, but the trial court denied it. In Shegog, we affirmed the trial court's ruling because "defense counsel had the opportunity to voir dire the potential jurors to discover whether any of them had, in fact, observed Appellant. As such did not occur, we cannot conclude that Appellant was prejudiced." Id. at 109. These facts are remarkably like the present case. Here, defense counsel also had an opportunity to ask the panel if any of them had observed Watson brought into the courtroom but did not, and therefore Watson cannot establish any prejudice. Here it must be said that Watson claims over and over in his brief that he was observed by jurors when he was brought into the courtroom in handcuffs. There is a great deal of difference between a potential juror, who does not ultimately sit on the jury, and a sworn member of the jury that actually decides a case. Had Watson been able to establish that actual jurors had observed him in handcuffs, he may have been able to establish prejudice. As it stands now, he cannot. Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Watson's motion for a mistrial.
Watson next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the Commonwealth to introduce, under KRE 404(b), evidence that Watson was being supervised by the Department of Probation and Parole at the time of the offense for which he now stands convicted.
Evidentiary rulings by the trial court are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court's ruling was arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). KRE 404(b)(2) states as follows:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible:
....
. . . If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering party.Watson implores this Court to analyze this case through the lens of our jurisprudence pertaining to the utilization of mugshots at trial because, he claims, it is analogous to his present situation. Watson cites Redd v. Commonwealth, 591 S.W.2d 704 (Ky. App. 1979). Unfortunately for Watson, this is not the proper framework for analyzing this case. Rather, the trial court's decision to admit this evidence under KRE 404(b) should be viewed in light of our decision in Webb v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Ky. 2012). In that case we held that:
One of the accepted bases for the admissibility of evidence of other crimes arises when such evidence "furnishes part of the context of the crime" or is necessary to a "full presentation" of the case, or is so intimately connected with and explanatory of the crime charged against the defendant and is so much a part of the setting of the case and its "environment" that its proof is appropriate in order to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context or the 'res gestae' "or the" uncharged offense is 'so linked together in point of time and circumstances with the crime charged that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other....' [and is thus] part of the res gestae of the crime charged."Id. (quoting Norton v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Ky. App. 1994)). This Court has affirmed a trial court's admission of evidence that showed there were two outstanding warrants of arrest for the defendant in Kerr v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 250, 254 (Ky. 2013). We held this admissible under KRE 404(b)(2) because:
the existence of the arrest warrants was inextricably intertwined with the police surveillance of the Pinehurst Lodge and with Kerr's initial arrest. "KRE 404(b)(2) allows the Commonwealth to present a complete, unfragmented picture of the crime and investigation[,]" including a "picture of the circumstances surrounding how the crime was discovered."Id. at 261 (footnotes omitted). Even more on point, the Commonwealth cites to an unpublished decision from this Court affirming a trial court's decision to allow the Commonwealth to show the accused was on probation at the time. Nix v. Commonwealth, No. 2017-SC-0217-MR, 2018 WL 1417633 (Ky. Mar. 22, 2018). In Nix, we held that Nix's status as a probationer was essential for the jury to have a complete understanding of the events surrounding the alleged crime. This Court held that the jury "needed to have information as to who McHargue was, his familiarity with Nix, and the reason for the search of the vehicle. Only with this information would the jury understand the context for finding the evidence of trafficking." Id. at *5.
McHargue was Nix's probation officer.
Of course, as this Court held in Ordway v. Commonwealth, when deciding on the admissibility on KRE 404(b)(2) evidence, even if it is otherwise admissible, trial courts should undertake a KRE 403 analysis. 391 S.W.3d 762, 791 (Ky. 2013). KRE 403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.KRE 403 does not however, "offer protection against evidence that is merely prejudicial in the sense that it is detrimental to a party's case." Webb, 387 S.W.3d at 326. Here the trial court held that the full context of the Commonwealth's presentation of its case required the introduction of Watson's status as a probationer. The trial court also carefully weighed whether this information was more unduly prejudicial than probative and decided it was not. Though we hold that the trial court was well within its discretion to admit this evidence under KRE 404(b)(2) and KRE 403, we note that the trial court also gave the jury an admonition to not let Watson's status as a probationer lead to an inference of guilt in the present case, and as we have repeatedly held, a "jury is presumed to follow an admonition to disregard evidence and [an] admonition thus cures any error." Meece v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W. 627, 675 (Ky. 2011).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of Watson's status as a probationer. We also find the trial court did not err when it denied Watson's motion for a mistrial and hereby affirm the judgment of the Lyon Circuit Court.
All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell, JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion.
THOMPSON, J., CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: I strongly disagree with the trial court's ruling that the Commonwealth could properly introduce evidence that Probation and Parole was conducting a home visit because such evidence was "so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case [how the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were discovered] that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering party." It would have been easy to exclude any such reference. Officer Blackburn could have identified himself as a law enforcement officer investigating a complaint; there was no need for him to reference that the complaint prompted the home visit. He could have explained he was given permission to enter and search and then explained what he found. Detective Lantrip could have stated he was called in to assist Officer Blackburn.
The evidence that Watson was on probation should have been prohibited pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b) as it established Watson's criminal propensity. Even under a KRE 403 analysis, this evidence was highly prejudicial and had no probative value in determining whether Watson was guilty of the instant crimes.
Had Watson testified, this evidence might have been admissible on rebuttal, depending on whether his testimony made it relevant pursuant to KRE 404(b)(1).
However, given the large quantity of methamphetamine seized, the legality of the search, and Watson's admissions, I conclude that admission of this evidence was harmless error. The evidence against Watson was overwhelming and he had no real defense. Accordingly, I concur in result only.