Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 99-2106-CM
April 12, 2002
For Sandra Folse Watson, William L. Bushue, Steven Perry, Christine Perry, Carla Balzer, Christy Knight, Ronald Beachman, Dora Huff, plainiffs: Mark K. Birmingham, Kansas City, KS.
For Kansas City, Kansas, City of, Carol Marinovich, Dennis Hays, Harold T. Walker, Pat Ohler, Lt., Ray Bond, Gregory A. Talkin, Edwin A. Rust, Maurice Ryan, Debbie Ward, Wayne G. Bradley, Lupe Gonzalas, John Lacy, Debbie Graber, James McDaniel, Steve Williams, defendants: Douglas M. Greenwald, Daniel B. Denk, Gregory P. Goheen, McAnany, Van Cleave Phillips, P.A., Kansas City, KS.
For Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kansas, The defendant: Daniel B. Denk, Gregory P. Goheen, McAnany, Van Cleave Phillips, P.A., Kansas City, KS.
Wyandotte Countians Against Crime, Inc., movant: Douglas M. Greenwald, Daniel B. Denk, McAnany, Van Cleave Phillips, P.A., Kansas City, KS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case proceeded to trial in November 2001. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' action in enforcing housing code provisions by seeking to enter and inspect residential properties either owned or occupied by plaintiffs violated plaintiffs' federal and state constitutional rights, as well as various state tort laws. Following a three and a half week trial, on December 4, 2001, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of all defendants against all plaintiffs. On December 5, 2001, the court entered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. Pending before the court is plaintiffs Sandra Watson, William Bushue, Carla Balzer, Steve Perry, Christine Perry, Christy Knight, Ronald Beachman, and Dora Huff-Beachman's (hereinafter "plaintiffs") Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Doc. 207). As set forth below, plaintiffs' motion is denied.
The court notes that the jury was not presented with all of the plaintiffs' claims against all of defendants. Instead, in accordance with rulings made throughout the course of the litigation of this case, only certain of plaintiffs' claims were submitted to the jury for consideration.
Applicable Standard
Plaintiffs move the court to alter or amend judgments entered either at or near the time of trial and at the close of trial. Plaintiffs raise seven separate arguments and assert the applicable standard for review of their motion is Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Whether a motion will be considered under Rule 59(e) depends upon the timing of plaintiffs' motion in relation to the date the judgment at issue was entered.
Motions for reconsideration "filed within ten days of the district court's entry of judgment . . . [are] treated as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)." Hatfield v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Converse County, 52 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1995). The court is without authority to extend the 10-day time period specified in Rule 59(e). Weitz v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 214 F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000); see Collard v. United States, 10 F.3d 718, 719 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Rule 6(b) expressly prohibits a trial court from extending the time to file [a Rule 59(e)] motion."); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b) (providing that the court "may not extend the time for taking any action under Rule . . . 59(b), (d) and (e). . ."). Motions filed outside the 10-day time period set for Rule 59(e) motions are examined under Rule 60(b). United States v. Emmons, 107 F.3d 762, 764 (10th Cir. 1997). Rule 60(b) specifies that a motion pursuant to this rule "shall be made within a reasonable time."
Plaintiffs challenge judgments as a matter of law entered by the court prior to the entry of final judgment in this case. Specifically, plaintiffs challenge the court's entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Unified Government, entered on November 30, 2001, in response to defendants' motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiffs further challenge the court's entry of judgment as a matter of law relating to the res judicata judgment entered on November 21, 2001, in response to defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs filed their motion to alter or amend on December 19, 2001, more than 10 days after the district court's entry of the November 21 and 30 judgments at issue. Accordingly, the court may not treat these bases for the plaintiffs' motion as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Instead, the court will examine these bases for the plaintiffs' motion under Rule 60(b)'s more stringent standard.
In contrast, the remaining arguments raised by plaintiffs each arguably relate to the court's entry of final judgment on December 5, 2001. Plaintiffs' remaining arguments relate to the court's decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial. Accordingly, the court construes plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend as having been timely filed pursuant to Rule 59(e). Consequently, the court will examine these bases for the plaintiffs' motion under Rule 59(e).
Rule 60(b) Motion to Alter or Amend
Rule 60(b) Standard
Rule 60 provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud . . . misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). A party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) must satisfy one or more of the six grounds stated in the rule. Van Skiver v. United States , 952 F.2d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1991); Loum v. Houston's Rest., Inc . , 177 F.R.D. 671, 672 (D.Kan. 1998). A district court has discretion to grant relief as justice requires under Rule 60(b) . Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2000). However, such relief is considered "extraordinary" and should "only be granted in exceptional circumstances." Id . "A litigant shows exceptional circumstances by satisfying one or more of Rule 60(b)'s six grounds." Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243-44. The court may not grant a Rule 60 motion where no basis for relief is provided. See Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 580 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that granting a Rule 60 motion without basis for relief would be an abuse of the court's discretion).
A Rule 60(b) motion triggers consideration of the established policy in favor of final judgments. United States v. Johnson , 934 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D.Kan. 1996). "Not a substitute for a direct appeal, a rule 60(b) motion addresses matters outside the issues on which the judgment was entered." Nutter v. Wefald, 885 F. Supp. 1445, 1450 (D.Kan. 1995) (citing Brown v. McCormick, 608 F.2d 410, 413 (10th Cir. 1979)). A Rule 60(b) motion "is not the opportunity for the court to revisit the issues already addressed in the underlying order or to consider arguments and facts that were available for presentation in the underlying proceedings." Id . (citing Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243).
Discussion
Plaintiffs challenge the court's November 30, 2001 entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant Unified Government regarding the insufficiency of the pattern and practice evidence submitted at trial. In addition, plaintiffs challenge the court's November 21, 2001 entry of judgment as a matter of law regarding the preclusive effect of Case 98-CV-2380 on the claims of plaintiffs Watson and Bushue in the present action under the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiffs do not specify which of Rule 60(b)'s grounds support their motion for relief from the final judgments at issue. Considering the substance of plaintiffs' arguments, the court construes plaintiffs' motion as seeking relief by asserting "mistake" under Rule 60(b)(1) or by setting out another "reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment" under Rule 60(b)(6). Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The "mistake" provision of Rule 60(b)(1) addresses situations in which the trial court has made a substantive mistake of law or fact in a final judgment or order. Steele v. Ellis, 961 F. Supp. 1458, 1468 (D.Kan. 1997). However, relief is available only for "obvious" judicial errors that are apparent on the record. Id. Errors that are not "facially obvious" do not warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Id. If the factual and legal conclusions in the order are "arguable," Rule 60(b)(1) does not provide a basis for relief. Seyler v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 121 F. Supp.2d 1352, 1357 (D.Kan. 2000). The "catch all" provision in Rule 60(b)(6) allows for relief only in extraordinary circumstances. Loum, 177 F.R.D. at 672. Relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved for situations in which it "offends justice" to deny relief. Loum, 177 F.R.D. at 672.
Plaintiffs attempted to establish at trial that the Unified Government engaged in a pattern and practice of unconstitutional conduct.
As set forth below, plaintiffs have failed to "satisfy one or more of the six grounds stated in the rule;" therefore, relief under Rule 60(b) is denied. Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1244.
November 30, 2001 Judgment as a Matter of Law in Favor of Unified Government Regarding Insufficient Pattern or Practice Evidence
Plaintiffs assert the court "interjected the standard of res judicata for the admissibility of evidence to establish a pattern, practice[,] policy[,] or custom of the municipality," and therefore applied an incorrect standard for admissibility of pattern or practice evidence. (Pls.' Mem. at 4). Plaintiffs also appear to argue that the court mistakenly found that plaintiffs' proof was insufficient to raise an inference that the Unified Government engaged in a pattern or practice of Fourth Amendment violations under the applicable law.
Improper Basis
Initially, the court notes that plaintiffs' arguments either were presented or were available for presentation to the court at the time of the original motion. As such, the court finds these arguments are an improper basis for relief under Rule 60(b). See Johnson, 934 F. Supp. at 386 (noting Rule 60(b) motion "not the opportunity for the court to revisit the issues already addressed in the underlying order or to consider arguments and facts that were available for presentation in the underlying proceedings"). However, even where the court considers plaintiffs' arguments as properly raised, the court finds they are insufficient to justify relief under Rule 60(b).
Single Incident Insufficient
In its order of November 30, 2001, the court granted judgment as a matter of law to defendant Unified Government pursuant to Rule 50(a). The court found plaintiffs failed to present evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that plaintiffs had established the custom or practice element necessary to each of their Fourth Amendment claims against the Unified Government. Specifically, the court noted that plaintiffs sought to establish that the Unified Government had a municipal policy or custom of violating an individual's Fourth Amendment rights by conducting unlawful searches under the guise of code enforcement procedures. Plaintiffs asserted that the evidence established a pattern or practice from which such a policy or custom could be inferred. The court disagreed.
In its order, the court found that when examining the evidence directed towards establishing the asserted municipal policy or custom, such evidence was insufficient to establish a pattern or practice of violating the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights under the guise of code enforcement. The court noted that the only evidence submitted in support of plaintiffs' assertion was the Pearson case, as discussed during the court's in limine conference. In Pearson v. Kansas City, Kansas, a case filed in state court, the court found the Unified Government had conducted an illegal, warrantless search of the curtilage of that plaintiff's home in June of 1997 under the guise of enforcing municipal codes.
Applying the standard set forth above, during its in limine conference the court precluded the admission of several incidents that plaintiffs asserted met the criteria for admission to support a pattern or practice claim.
Plaintiffs now assert that the court improperly construed the sufficiency of the evidence regarding pattern and practice and that, even if the Pearson case is the only evidence properly considered for pattern and practice, it is sufficient to give rise to an inference of a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct. The court disagrees.
In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, the Supreme court set out standards for determining when a single instance of conduct could give rise to municipal liability.
Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker. Otherwise the existence of the unconstitutional policy, and its origin, must be separately proved. But where the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality, and the causal connection between the "policy" and the constitutional deprivation. 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985). As noted in its ruling on the record, the court relied on the City of Oklahoma case in reaching its decision. Applying the standard in Rule 60(b)(1), the court finds no clear error in its decision that there was insufficient evidence presented to establish a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct. That is, the court finds no "facially obvious" judicial error in its decision and finds that the factual and legal conclusions in the court's order are "arguable." Therefore, relief is unavailable under Rule 60(b)(1). Steele, 961 F. Supp. at 1468. In addition, the court finds plaintiffs have not established the extraordinary circumstances necessary for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Plaintiffs' motion is denied on this basis.
Proper Standard Applied
The court set out the standard applicable to the admissibility of evidence intended to establish a municipal policy or custom in its in limine conference prior to trial. At its in limine conference and throughout the trial, the court indicated that, in order for plaintiffs to rely on prior grievances to establish a custom or usage sufficient to establish a municipal policy or custom under Section 1983 principles, they must establish: 1) that the prior grievances were the same or substantially similar to the plaintiffs' constitutional injury; and 2) that the final policy-making authority of the municipality had actual or constructive notice of the prior unconstitutional acts of employees to establish deliberate indifference. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997) ("plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional . . . right will follow the decision"); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999) ("a plaintiff cannot rely upon scattershot accusations of unrelated constitutional violations to prove either that a municipality was indifferent to the risk of her specific injury or that it was the moving force behind her deprivation"); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998) (addressing requisite notice). The court's standard is correct under the law and did not improperly "interject the standard of res judicata" here. (Pls.' Mem. at 4). Plaintiffs' motion is denied on this basis.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the court finds plaintiffs have failed to show that the court committed a "mistake" or that it is entitled to judgment under Rule 60(b)'s catch-all provision. Plaintiffs' motion is denied on this basis.
November 21, 2001 Judgment Regarding Res Judicata
Plaintiffs next assert the court improperly applied the doctrine of res judicata in its November 21, 2001 order. In its order, the court found that the dismissal with prejudice, entered in Case 98-CV-2380 in this federal district court, barred plaintiffs Watson and Bushue from re-litigating those constitutional claims raised in Case 98-CV-2380. Plaintiffs now assert that the court failed to consider an argument it intended to raise at the time of the briefing on the res judicata issue. Specifically, plaintiffs appear to argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine acted as a bar to the court's subject matter jurisdiction in Case 98-CV-2380. Therefore, the judgment was improperly entered in that case, and consequently, could have no preclusive effect on the present action. The court disagrees.
First, plaintiffs assert that, in the original briefing, although they "failed to use the proper terminology," they "were seeking to sho[w] that the Rooker-Feldman (sic) doctrine should have been applied and not the doctrine of res judicata." (Pls.' Mem. at 12).
In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., the Court said that Congress in enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1257 had foreclosed federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, from reviewing final judgments of state courts. Rooker, 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). In Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, the Supreme Court extended that rule to a state court's final judgment in a bar admission matter. Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App., 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). Federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack authority to review state court decisions. Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986). Rooker effectively serves as "an independent basis for prohibiting collateral attack on state court judgments." U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Laborde, 794 F. Supp. 454, 462 (D. Puerto Rico 1992).
Arguments not raised in the underlying proceedings are not a proper basis for Rule 60(b) relief. See Johnson, 934 F. Supp. at 386 (noting Rule 60(b) motion "not the opportunity for the court to revisit the issues already addressed in the underlying order or to consider arguments and facts that were available for presentation in the underlying proceedings"). Therefore, where plaintiffs failed to raise this argument in the initial briefing on the issue of res judicata, it is an improper basis for Rule 60(b) relief. However, even if the court considers the impact that the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has on the court's res judicata decision, it is clear that Rule 60(b) relief is not appropriate.
Second, the court finds that even where the judgment entered in Case 98-CV-2380 is affected by the impact of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, its preclusive effect on the present litigation is unaffected. A judgment entered by a federal court acting beyond its subject matter jurisdiction remains eligible for res judicata effects if there is no other defect. See 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4427 (noting "a judgment entered by a federal court acting beyond its subject-matter jurisdiction remains eligible for res judicata effects if there is no other defect"). The present action is not the proper forum in which to collaterally challenge the effect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine on the final judgment entered in Case 98-CV-2380.
Moreover, the court finds no basis to show the court's order regarding res judicata is a mistake. Applying the standard in Rule 60(b)(1), the court finds no clear error in its finding that Case 98-CV-2380 had a preclusive effect upon the claims of plaintiffs Watson and Bushue in the present action, under the doctrine of res judicata. That is, the court finds no "facially obvious" judicial error in its decision and finds that the factual and legal conclusions in the court's order are "arguable." Therefore, relief is unavailable under Rule 60(b)(1). Steele, 961 F. Supp. at 1468. In addition, the court finds plaintiffs have not established the extraordinary circumstances necessary for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Plaintiffs' motion is denied on this basis.
Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment
Rule 59(e) Standard
Rule 59(e) preserves the district court's right to alter or amend a judgment after the judgment is entered. Motions to alter or amend a judgment are appropriate where they involve reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in the decision on the merits. White v. N.H. Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982). In fact, a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment is essentially a motion for reconsideration. Henry v. Office of Thrift Supervision, No. 92-4272, 1993 WL 545195, at *1 (D.Kan. Dec. 28, 1993) (citing Hilst v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 725, 726 (10th Cir. 1989)), aff'd, 43 F.3d 507 (10th Cir. 1994)). It allows a party to allege fundamental legal errors that require the court to reconsider an earlier decision. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Botkin Grain Co., 856 F. Supp. 607, 609 (D.Kan. 1994). Reconsideration is proper when there has been a manifest error of law or fact, when new evidence has been discovered or when there has been a change in the relevant law. Brumark Corp. v. Samson Res. Corp., 57 F.3d 941, 948 (10th Cir. 1995); All West Pet Supply Co. v. Hill's Pet Prods. Div., Colgate Palmolive Co., 847 F. Supp. 858, 860 (D.Kan. 1994). A party cannot invoke Rule 59(e) to raise arguments or evidence that should have been raised in the first instance or to rehash arguments previously considered and rejected by the court. See id.; Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 856 F. Supp. at 609.
"The party moving for reconsideration has the 'burden to show that there has been a change of law, that new evidence is available, or that reconsideration is necessary to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.'" Mackey v. IBP, Inc., No. 95-2288-GTV, 1996 WL 417513, at *2 (D.Kan. July 22, 1996) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen Helpers of Am. v. Sambol Meat Packing Co., No. 92-2338-JWL, 1993 WL 393010, at *2 (D.Kan. Sept. 30, 1993)). Whether to grant or deny a motion to reconsider is committed to the district court's sound discretion. Hancock v. City of Okla. City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1395 (10th Cir. 1988).
Discussion
Plaintiffs challenge several of the decisions made by the court both during the course of trial and prior to the court's entry of judgment on December 5, 2001. As set forth below, the court finds plaintiffs' have failed to meet their burden to show "reconsideration is necessary to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Mackey, 1996 WL 417513 at *2 (quoting Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, 1993 WL 393010 at *2).
Application of Standard for Pattern or Practice Proof
Plaintiffs assert the court applied an incorrect standard of proof regarding the admissibility of plaintiffs' "proof for pattern, practice, policy or custom against the Unified Government as a defendant." (Pls.' Mem. at 1). Plaintiffs have failed, however, to submit any argument in support of their assertion. As such, the court finds plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to establish relief is proper under Rule 59(e). Moreover, as discussed above, the court set forth the standard applicable to the admissibility of prior grievances submitted to establish a custom or usage sufficient to establish a municipal policy or custom under Section 1983 principles. See Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 411; Carter, 64 F.3d at 218; Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307. Plaintiffs have submitted no argument to establish the court's standard was improperly applied. Plaintiffs' motion is denied on this basis.
Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Legality of July 11, 1997 Search Warrant
Plaintiffs assert that the court "made an error in denying plaintiffs['] presentation of evidence to the jury that the search warrant on July 11, 1997 had been found to be illegal, unconstitutional and void on its face as to [plaintiff] Watson." (Pls.' Mem. at 1). In essence, plaintiffs contend the court's exclusion of the Wyandotte County District Court opinion and the subsequent Kansas Court of Appeals opinion declaring the July 11, 2001 warrant at issue in this case to be invalid was error. However, plaintiffs have failed to submit any argument in support of their assertion. As such, the court finds no basis to declare its evidentiary ruling regarding the prior state court decisions in error. Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to establish relief is proper under Rule 59(e); therefore, plaintiffs' motion is denied on this basis.
Admission of Videotapes
Plaintiffs next assert that the court erred in allowing the admission of a videotape of the inspections conducted by defendants in this case. Plaintiffs assert that the video tapes should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial under a Fed.R.Evid. 401/403 analysis. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the videotapes were untimely produced by defendants and plaintiffs were therefore denied the opportunity to prepare their response to the tapes. Plaintiffs also assert the tapes were unduly prejudicial because the original tapes were not produced during discovery and because defendant Gonzales testified that the tapes presented at trial had undergone minor editing. Plaintiffs next argue that the content of plaintiffs' exhibit 21 should have operated to preclude defendants from presenting their videotapes at trial. Finally, plaintiffs assert that the contents of the videotapes are not relevant to the case. The court addresses each of plaintiffs' arguments.
First, the court notes that plaintiffs provide no legal support suggesting that the court's rulings regarding the admissibility of the videotapes was in error. Instead, plaintiffs set out unsupported argument. Moreover, plaintiffs have failed to establish that their evidentiary objections were preserved by a contemporaneous trial objection.
Second, based on discovery documents presented to the court, the court issued a ruling during trial, finding the defendants had properly disclosed the videotapes to plaintiffs during discovery and during the exchange of trial exhibits. Therefore, the court found defendants' offering of the videotapes at trial was proper. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence or argument to detract from this ruling.
Third, the court admitted the videotapes, which depicted the searches at issue in this case, finding defendants had laid a proper foundation. At trial, in response to defendants' pleading entitled Foundational Requirement for Admission of Videotape Evidence (Doc. 179), the court found the videotape relating to the October 9, 1997 warranted inspection was admissible. In so ruling, the court noted that a videotape may be authenticated by testimony that is a fair and accurate representation of the actual scene or event it purports to depict. Moreover, the court noted that any flaws in the chain of custody, relating to the questioned editing by defendant Gonzalez, go to the weight of the evidence, but do not preclude its admissibility. See United States v. Washington, 11 F.3d 1510, 1514 (10th Cir. 1993). Having considered the impact the editing of the tapes may have on their admissibility, the court admitted the evidence. The court further noted that the admission of duplicates, rather than originals, is expressly contemplated in Fed.R.Evid. 1003. Plaintiffs set forth no argument or evidence to establish the court's foundational ruling was in error.
Fourth, plaintiffs assert that plaintiffs' exhibit 21 should impact the admissibility of the defendants' videotape exhibits. Plaintiffs represent that exhibit 21 is a videotape presented by defendant Gonzalas to plaintiff Watson during the course of separate litigation. In addition, plaintiffs assert that, at the time of its disclosure, defendants represented that exhibit 21 was a copy of all the video taken regarding the searches involved in the present case. Exhibit 21 contained only "6-minutes of tape taken on July 10th and [on] the morning of July 11, 1997." (Pls.' Mem. at 14). Plaintiffs now assert that, given the defendants' representation of exhibit 21's completeness, defendants should have been precluded from publishing the more extensive videotapes at trial.
Plaintiffs did not present this argument regarding exhibit 21 at trial in response to the defendants' offering of the videotapes. Therefore, such argument is not a proper basis for Rule 59(e) relief. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 856 F. Supp. at 609 (noting party cannot invoke Rule 59(e) to raise arguments or evidence that should have been raised in the first instance). Moreover, even when considering the effect of exhibit 21, the court finds no error in its admission of the videotapes. As noted, defendants properly disclosed their videotape evidence to plaintiffs, thereby providing plaintiffs with the opportunity to review the videotapes and to prepare a defense.
Finally, the court notes that the videotapes portraying the inspections allegedly giving rise to plaintiffs' claims in this case were relevant under Fed.R.Evid. 401. Specifically, the videotapes were relevant to plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims regarding the manner in which the inspections were conducted. The videotapes depict the defendants' conduct during the searches, and therefore, are relevant to the reasonableness of those searches under the Fourth Amendment. In addition, the videotapes are relevant to plaintiffs' claims for damages related to the alleged damage to plaintiffs' real and personal property and to plaintiff Watson's claim that defendants' conduct interfered with her ability to lease the units depicted in the videotapes. The court finds no basis to show its ruling regarding the admissibility of the videotapes was in error. Plaintiffs' motion is denied on this basis.
Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Details of Case 98-CV-2380 and Details of Related State Cases
Plaintiffs assert the exclusion of evidence regarding Case 98-CV-2380 and related state law cases was in error. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that the exclusion of such evidence "left plaintiffs in a gray area from which they were unable to defend themselves." (Pls.' Mem. at 13).
At trial, the court ruled that the parties were precluded from making reference to, eliciting testimony concerning, or presenting evidence regarding these prior court decisions. The court noted the "inherent dangers" in the admission of judicial opinions, citing the Tenth Circuit's statement that "[t]he most significant possible problem posed by the admission of a judicial opinion is that the jury might be confused as to the proper weight to give such evidence. . . . Put most extremely, the jury might assume that the opinion is entitled to as much weight as the trial court's instructions since both emanate from the courts." Johnson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 797 F.2d 1530, 1534 (10th Cir. 1986). Further, the court noted that these dangers are heightened where the judicial opinion at issue involves the same set of facts presented in the case at bar — the situation presented in the present case. United States v. Zimmerman, 943 F.2d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 1991). The court noted the potential for prejudice to plaintiffs, but found under a Fed.R.Evid. 401/403 balancing analysis, that exclusion was appropriate. Plaintiffs have set forth no law, nor additional evidence to cast doubt on the court's ruling. Plaintiffs' motion is denied on this basis.
Exclusion of Mr. Jaskinia's Testimony
Finally, plaintiffs assert the court's exclusion of the testimony of plaintiffs' witness Ed Jaskinia was in error. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Jaskinia's testimony would have shown that the Kansas legislature and the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") found parts of the Rental Licensing Ordinance to be repugnant such that it was legislatively removed.
Following a voir dire of Mr. Jaskinia, the court ruled his testimony inadmissible, finding it irrelevant based upon the fact that Mr. Jaskinia's knowledge regarding the properties at issue involved matters occurring after the time frame deemed relevant in the present case. In addition, the court found the information and opinions of Mr. Jaskinia were unreliable, as they were based solely on the statements of others, and therefore, constituted inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiffs have provided no argument or evidence to cast doubt on the court's ruling. Instead, plaintiffs assert Mr. Jaskinia had information regarding the opinions of two entities — Kansas legislature and the ACLU — which were uninvolved in the present case, regarding the Rental Licensing Ordinance. Plaintiffs do not establish that this information was proferred at trial, nor that it would have an impact upon the court's original ruling. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion is denied on this basis.
Conclusion
Finding no basis for Rule 59(e) relief, the court denies plaintiffs' motion on each of the above enumerated issues.
Order
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Doc. 207) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.