Watson v. Buckhannon River Co.

42 Citing cases

  1. Statoil U.S. Onshore Props. Inc. v. Pine Resoures, LLC

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-cv-21169 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 14, 2018)   1 Legal Analyses

    Goodman v. Resolution Trust Corp., 7 F.3d 1123, 1126 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The question as to whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law to be determined by the court.") The Court previously held that the Pine PSA is ambiguous with respect to whether production is required. When contract language is ambiguous, courts may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22, 30, footnote 5 (W. Va. 2006) (quoting from Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 164, 120 S.E. 390 (1923)). When a contract is ambiguous, "parol evidence is admissible to show the situation of the parties, the surrounding circumstances when the writing was made, and the practical construction given the contract by the parties themselves either contemporaneously or subsequently."

  2. Miller v. WesBanco Bank

    No. 20-0041 (W. Va. Jun. 10, 2021)

    6. "'[W]here the meaning [of a writing] is uncertain and ambiguous, parol evidence is admissible to show the situation of the parties, the surrounding circumstances when the writing was made, and the practical construction given to the contract by the parties themselves either contemporaneously or subsequently. . . .' Syl. Point 4, Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 164, 120 S.E. 390 (1923)." Syllabus point 1, in part, Buckhannon Sales Co., Inc. v. Appalantic Corp., 175 W. Va. 742, 338 S.E.2d 222 (1985).

  3. Frederick Management Co., L.L.C. v. City Nat. Bank of West Virginia

    228 W. Va. 550 (W. Va. 2010)   Cited 1 times
    Holding that genuine issues of fact regarding fault of party seeking to be excused from contract performance prevented application of doctrine of impracticability

    If the parol evidence be not in conflict, the court must construe the writing; but, if it be conflicting on a material point necessary to interpretation of the writing, then the question of its meaning should be left to the jury under proper hypothetical instructions.’ Syllabus Point 4, Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Co., 95 W.Va. 164, 120 S.E. 390 (1923)." Syl. Pt. 1, Lee Enterprises, Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 172 W.Va. 63, 303 S.E.2d 702 (1983).

  4. Cotiga Dev. Co. v. Gas Co.

    147 W. Va. 484 (W. Va. 1962)   Cited 211 times
    Applying royalty rule, but concluding that defendant would be entitled to offset the present payment of royalty damages against royalties due when the wrongly delayed production of minerals is finally completed

    " Salisbury v. Brooks, 81 W. Va. 233, pt. 2 syl., 94 S.E. 117; Alderson v. Gauley Fuel Co., 116 W. Va. 95, pt. 1 syl., 178 S.E. 626. See also Petty v. United Fuel Gas Co., 76 W. Va. 268, pt. 1 syl., 85 S.E. 523; Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 164, pt. 2 syl., 120 S.E. 390. United Fuel contends that at the time of the making of the lease the universal custom of the natural gas industry in the Appalachian region was to base payments on all open end royalty clauses in gas leases on the wellhead price of gas; that the parties to the lease were charged with knowledge of this universal custom; that therefore it must have been within the contemplation of the parties when the lease was made; and that this custom should be employed by the Court in supplying the omission of the lease to state expressly the intent of the parties in this respect.

  5. Franklin v. Pence

    128 W. Va. 353 (W. Va. 1945)   Cited 36 times
    Recognizing that the assignments of error were general in nature making it "difficult to determine the exact points relied upon for reversal" and causing the Court to rely upon "statements in the brief" that were "considered as indicating the main grounds of attack upon the judgment"

    The proper measure of damages in this case is the difference between the contract price and the market value of the lumber at the time and the place of delivery called for by the contract. Reiser v. Lawrence, 96 W. Va. 82, 123 S.E. 451; Fuel Distributors v. Payne-Baber Coal Co., 107 W. Va. 465, 148 S.E. 854; Brooke County Court v. U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co., 95 W. Va. 439, 121 S.E. 422; News Publishing Co. v. Denison-Pratt Paper Co., 94 W. Va. 236, 117 S.E. 920; Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 164, 120 S.E. 390; Elias Brother v. Boone Timber Co., 85 W. Va. 508, 102 S.E. 488; 2 Williston on Sales (2d Ed.), paragraph 599; Sales, 24 R. C. L., paragraph 335. When there has been a breach of the contract by the seller, as here, the plaintiffs, the purchasers, were not required to go into the market and buy the lumber contracted for, but may sue for the damages represented by the profits which they would have received if the lumber had been delivered by the shipments at the time and the place designated in the contract, which shipments the defendant refused to make.

  6. Harvey v. Dwyer

    109 W. Va. 676 (W. Va. 1930)   Cited 1 times

    The ambiguity not being cleared by the legitimate evidence, the ambiguity remains, and, therefore, the court should not have construed it, but left its meaning to be ascertained by the jury under proper hypothetical instructions. Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Company, 95 W. Va. 164. It was error to strike out all of defendants' evidence, and it was likewise error to give a peremptory instruction for plaintiff. The verdict and judgment will be set aside and a new trial awarded.

  7. Statoil USA Onshore Props. Inc. v. Pine Res., LLC

    No. 15-2099 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 2017)   Cited 1 times

    As "Lord Sugden once said: 'Tell me what the parties have done under a contract and I will tell you what the contract means.'" Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Co., 120 S.E. 390, 394 (W. Va. 1923). PetroEdge's conduct shows that it read the Pine PSA as carrying no provision that terminates Section 5.7(b) upon assignment.

  8. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Kelly-Dempsey Co.

    111 F.2d 247 (10th Cir. 1940)   Cited 13 times
    Applying Oklahoma law

    Laurenzi v. Atlas Ins. Co., 131 Tenn. 644, 176 S.W. 1022; Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 164, 120 S.E. 390, 394; Bullowa v. Thermoid Co., 114 N.J.L. 205, 176 A. 596, 599;

  9. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Bastian

    31 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1929)   Cited 2 times

    The writing is the repository of what the parties meant, and cannot be varied by extraneous evidence. Northern Assur. Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n, 183 U.S. 308, 22 S. Ct. 133, 46 L. Ed. 213; Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 164, 120 S.E. 390; Smyth v. Brick Row Realty Co., 97 W. Va. 40, 124 S.E. 499; Good v. Dyer, 137 Va. 114, 119 S.E. 277; Warren v. Goodrich Strip Screen Co., 133 Va. 366, 112 S.E. 687. How should we construe Exhibit No. 3 hereinbefore quoted?

  10. Conner v. Associated Radiologists, Inc.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-cv-00329 (S.D.W. Va. May. 5, 2021)

    Where the evidence is not conflicting, a court must construe the contract. See Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Co., 120 S.E. 390 (1923). Here, however, there is scant evidence as to the intent or construction given by the parties, and indeed, ambiguity was not explicitly raised.