Opinion
1:21-CV-374-RP
07-15-2024
GARY WATSKY, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS; ROBERT CHODY; MARK LUERA; STEVE DEATON; and UNKNOWN WILLIAMSON COUNTY DEPUTIES, Defendants.
ORDER
ROBERT PITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant Williamson County's (the “County”) Partial Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 76). Plaintiff Gary Watsky (“Watsky”) responded in opposition, (Dkt. 92), and the County replied, (Dkt. 97). Having considered the parties' briefs, the record, and the relevant law, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Watsky alleges that his constitutional and civil rights were violated when County deputies raided his home on May 2, 2019. (3d Am. Compl., Dkt. 71). In his third amended complaint, Watsky alleges the following facts:
In 2018, the County contracted with the production company Big Fish Entertainment, LLC (“Big Fish”) to feature County law enforcement officers in the television series “Live PD” as they engaged in their police duties. The County officers staged dramatic arrests with raids for Live PD episodes, engaging in sensationalized acts of excessive force for the benefits of fame, compensation, and notoriety. To incentivize officers to participate in the television series, former Williamson County Sheriff Robert Chody (“Sheriff Chody”) offered officers gift cards, called them “Wilco Badasses,” and granted approval for them to appear on Live PD.
On April 17, 2019, the County issued an arrest warrant for Watsky's son, Asher Watsky (“Asher”), accusing Asher of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (shovel) at Watsky's residence. On May 2, 2019, while the arrest warrant was still pending, Asher appeared in Williamson County court for a probation hearing. Prior to the hearing, Sheriff Chody or former Williamson County Commander Stephen Deaton (“Cmdr. Deaton”) or one of their deputies removed Asher's arrest warrant from an electronic system so that Asher would not be arrested before or during the hearing at the County courthouse. Rather, Sheriff Chody and his supervising deputies planned to arrest Asher later, at Watsky's home, and to capture the arrest on film with Live PD.
The arrest warrant was served in the evening that same day. At approximately 7 PM, while being filmed on Live PD, Sheriff Chody and a number of his deputies clothed in combat attire and garnishing military grade rifles used police equipment to break down Watsky's front and back doors without knocking. Officers ran into the home, and one placed a rifle on Watsky's midsection with his finger on the trigger. Watsky stood with his hands up against the wall and was moved to a couch, where he was guarded by officers who told him not to move. The officers searched the entire house and garage with a K-9 unit, but found no contraband or evidence of other illegal activities. Watsky suffered an anxiety attack because he feared for his own life and was experiencing extreme humiliation. The officers did not give Watsky a copy of the search warrant, despite his request that they do so. After the officers left, Watsky exited his house and saw police cars, EMS, and SWAT vehicles. One of his neighbors informed him that the incident had been broadcast live on Live PD. Live PD cameramen entered the house with the deputies, and two Live PD directors or producers sat in a K-9 police SUV observing the video footage.
B. Procedural Background
Watksy brings this lawsuit against the County, Sheriff Chody, former Williamson County Lieutenant Mark Luera (“Lt. Luera”), Cmdr. Deaton, and unknown Williamson County Deputies (the “Unknown Deputies”). (3d Am. Compl., Dkt. 71). Watsky filed his original complaint in this Court on April 29, 2021, (Dkt. 1), and filed an amended complaint on June 22, 2021, (Dkt. 10), after the County and Cmdr. Deaton moved to dismiss the original complaint, (Dkts. 7, 9). The County, Cmdr. Deaton, and Lt. Luera each filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), alleging that Watsky had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See generally Dkts. 11, 12, 19). The Court denied all three motions to dismiss on March 29, 2022. (Order, Dkt. 26). Cmdr. Deaton filed a renewed motion to dismiss on April 29, 2022. (Dkt. 29). Watsky filed a second amended complaint on August 4, 2022. (Dkt. 35). The County and Sheriff Chody answered the second amended complaint, (Dkts. 40, 41), while Lt. Luera and Cmdr. Deaton filed motions to dismiss the second amended complaint, (Dkts. 42, 43). On July 7, 2023, the Court adopted the report and recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Susan Hightower concerning Lt. Luera and Cmdr. Deaton's motions to dismiss, (R. & R., Dkt. 49). (Order, Dkt. 53). The Court denied Lt. Luera's motion to dismiss and granted in part Cmdr. Deaton's motion to dismiss with respect to Watsky's claims that Cmdr. Deaton was liable as a bystander defendant and for implementing unconstitutional policies and failure to train. (Id.). Lt. Luera and Cmdr. Deaton then answered the second amended complaint. (Dkts. 54, 56).
Watsky then filed an unopposed motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, (Dkt. 70), which the Court granted via text order, (Text Order, Dec. 8, 2023; see also 3d Am. Compl., Dkt. 71). Watsky's third amended complaint brings four claims: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the County under Monell v. Dept of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (2) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Sheriff Chody, Cmdr. Deaton, and Lt. Luera for supervisory liability; (3) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Unknown Deputies for warrantless entry, search, seizure, and excessive use of force; and (4) a civil conspiracy claim against all Defendants. (3d Am. Compl., Dkt. 71, at 65-94). Watsky seeks compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees. (Id. at 95-96).
Sheriff Chody, Lt. Luera, and Cmdr. Deaton answered the third amended complaint, (Dkts. 74, 75, 77), while the County filed a partial motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 76). The County seeks to dismiss Watsky's civil conspiracy claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), alleging that Watsky has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Mot., Dkt. 76). Watsky responded in opposition, (Dkt. 92), and the County replied, (Dkt. 97).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, a “court accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations,' but must provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief-including factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). That is, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A court ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion may rely on the complaint, its proper attachments, “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Watsky's third amended complaint is unclear as to the legal basis for his civil conspiracy claim. (3d Am. Compl., Dkt. 71, at 93-94). The County moves to dismiss Watsky's civil conspiracy claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under both federal and state law. (Mot., Dkt. 76). In his response in opposition, Watsky clarifies that he brings his civil conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Dkt. 92, at 1-2), and he agrees to dismiss any civil conspiracy claim arising under state law, (id. at 14-15). Accordingly, the Court will grant in part the County's motion to dismiss Watsky's civil conspiracy claim to the extent he attempts to bring a claim under Texas law. The Court will only consider whether Watsky has stated a claim for civil conspiracy under Section 1983.
At the end of his response, Watsky notes that he also alleges civil conspiracy under Sections 1985 and 1986. (Dkt. 92, at 14-15). But his response only details his claim under Section 1983. Accordingly, the Court finds that he has only brought a federal civil conspiracy claim under Section 1983.
“[T]o prevail on a section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a conspiracy involving state action and (2) a deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to the conspiracy.” Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1187 (5th Cir. 1990). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff first must show “an actual violation of section 1983.” Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Morales v. Carrillo, No. EP-19-CV-217-PRM, 2021 WL 664854, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2021) (“the Court must first identify a violation of clearly established federal law”). A plaintiff cannot establish that a conspiracy occurred by merely alleging it happened through conclusory allegations with no factual support. Hicks v. Bexar Cnty., Tex., 973 F.Supp. 653, 676 (W.D. Tex. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Hicks v. Bexar Cnty., 137 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Conclusory allegations of conspiracy in a Section 1983 lawsuit are insufficient, absent reference to material facts, to state a substantial claim of federal conspiracy or withstand scrutiny under either Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e) ....”). Allegations of conspiracy without facts demonstrating prior agreement between defendants cannot survive a motion to dismiss. See Hey v. Irving, 161 F.3d 7, *3 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that “plaintiffs' bare conclusory allegation that ‘[a]ll three defendants demonstrated a meeting of the mind' absent any specific facts showing that the defendants reached an agreement to violate their rights, is not sufficient to plead a § 1983 conspiracy”).
On a motion to dismiss, courts “must look first to determine the objective reasonableness of the state action which is alleged to have caused harm to the plaintiff. Only if that state action is determined not to be objectively reasonable should we look at whether the officer's actions were taken pursuant to a conspiracy.” Pfannstiel, 918 F.2d at 1187. The Court finds that Watsky has stated a viable Monell claim against the County. See 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[M]unicipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force' is the policy or custom.”) (quoting Monel, 436 U.S. at 694); (Order, Dkt. 26, at 4-11). Accordingly, Watsky has made the preliminary showing of an actual violation of Section 1983. See Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d at 920; see also Morales, 2021 WL 664854, at *10.
The Court now considers whether the third amended complaint plausibly suggests the existence of a civil conspiracy through which the County may be liable. To suggest the existence of a civil conspiracy, Watsky must allege “operative facts” suggesting that the County agreed to violate his rights. Jackson v. City of Hearne, 959 F.3d 194, 206 n.16 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (5th Cir. 1987)). “Bald allegations that a conspiracy existed are insufficient.” Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1369-70; see also Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy cannot, absent reference to material facts, survive a motion to dismiss.”). Yet a plaintiff may “rely on circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom since conspiracies ‘are rarely evidenced by explicit agreements.'” Way v. Mueller Brass Co., 840 F.2d 303, 308 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Mack v. Newton, 737 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (5th Cir. 1984)). Watsky alleges that the Defendants conspired to violate his civil rights, specifically his rights “to be free from illegal and unreasonable warrantless entry, searches, and seizures using unnecessary force.” (3d Am. Compl., Dkt. 71, at 93). Specifically, he alleges that Defendants conspired to remove Asher's arrest warrant from the electronic system and categorize Asher as dangerous so that they could stage a raid at Watsky's home and increase viewership of Live PD as part of their pattern of engaging in sensationalized acts of excessive force as part of their agreement with Big Fish. (Id. at 93-94). While Watsky does not allege specific facts about the creation of the conspiracy, he has adequately alleged that a conspiracy exists. The third amended complaint is replete with specific facts regarding the alleged conspiracy. Watsky has provided circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy through alleging the existence of an agreement for the County deputies to participate in Live PD episodes, the deputies' decision to refrain from arresting Asher at the courthouse so that they could later arrest him at his home while livestreaming through Live PD, and the deputies' excessive use of force when executing the warrant at Watsky's house later that same day. These facts rise to a level far beyond the average Section 1983 case. The allegations in Watsky's third amended complaint lead to a reasonable inference that the County, alongside the other Defendants, conspired to violate Watsky's rights by using excessive force and committing constitutional violations to create dramatic events for television. Accordingly, the Court disagrees with the County's contention that Watsky has failed to adequately plead a conspiracy claim. (Mot., Dkt. 76, at 6).
The Court considers only facts in the third amended complaint and does not consider any new facts that may have been included for the first time in Watsky's response to the County's motion to dismiss.
The County also contends that even if Watsky has adequately pled a conspiracy claim pursuant to Section 1983, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars his claim because the County and the other Defendants (Sheriff Chody, Lt. Luera, Cmdr. Deaton, and the Unknown Deputies) are a single entity for purposes of the conspiracy analysis. (Mot., Dkt. 76, at 8-9). Under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, “there is no unlawful conspiracy when officers within a single corporate entity consult among themselves and then adopt a policy for the entity.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 153 (2017) (discussing traditional antitrust application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine). But the United States Supreme Court has expressly refrained from answering the question of whether or not the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to federal civil rights actions similar to this one, as different considerations may apply. See id. at 153-54 (“Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as either approving or disapproving the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine's application in the context of an alleged § 1985(3) violation. The Court might determine, in some later case, that different considerations apply to a conspiracy respecting equal protection guarantees, as distinct from a conspiracy in the antitrust context.”); but see Konan v. United States Postal Serv., 96 F.4th 799, 805 (5th Cir. 2024) (finding that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine would apply to a Section 1985 conspiracy claim); Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding “that a school board and its employees constitute a single legal entity which is incapable of conspiring with itself for the purposes of § 1985(3)”). In light of the lack of on-point precedent for a Section 1983 claim and given the differences between antitrust and civil rights law, Court declines to extend the application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to Section 1983.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Watsky has stated a cognizable claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for civil conspiracy against the County so as to survive dismissal at this stage. The Court finds that factual development on this claim as to both the County and the other Defendants, as well as on Watsky's other three claims, is appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the County's Partial Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. 76), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. To the extent that Watsky states a civil conspiracy claim arising under state law, that claim is DISMISSED. The County's motion to dismiss is DENIED with respect to Watsky's civil conspiracy claim under Section 1983, which should not be dismissed.