Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-279 (NHP).
May 13, 1999
Mr. William Lee Watley, III, Northern State Prison, Newark, N.J., Plaintiff Pro Se.
Stephen D. Holtzman, Esq., LALLY, HOLTZMAN, GILLIGAN, DUFFIN QUASTI, Linwood Commons, Linwood, N.J., Attorneys for Defendants.
LETTER ORDER ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Litigants:
This matter comes before the Court on Magistrate Judge Ronald J. Hedges' Report and Recommendation, filed April 27, 1999, to dismiss plaintiff William Lee Watley's Complaint. The Court has decided this matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. Having received no substantive reply from plaintiff and after careful consideration of the record, the Court will ADOPT Judge Hedges' Report and Recommendation and DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
This Court shall now make a de novo determination whether to accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings made by the Magistrate Judge. Local Rule 40D. The United States Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a Magistrate makes a finding or ruling on a motion or an issue, his determination should become that of the district court unless specific objection is filed within a reasonable time." Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1985).
In determining whether it is appropriate to dismiss plaintiff William Lee Watley's ("plaintiff") Complaint with prejudice, this Court finds ample support in the record to sustain Judge Hedges' findings made pursuant to the Eighth Amendment analysis set forth in the Report and Recommendation and the discussion herein.
Section 1983
On December 25, 1998, plaintiff filed the subject Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging inadequate medical treatment and/or withholding essential medical treatment in connection with an injury sustained to his right ankle and leg while incarcerated at South Woods State Prison.
In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the defendant has deprived him of a right secured under the constitution, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
In this matter, plaintiff alleges that defendants, who collectively comprise the State, State agencies and various prison and law enforcement officials, as well as medical personnel, violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.
To prove a violation of one's Eighth Amendment rights, the plaintiff "must satisfy both the objective and subjective elements of a cruel and unusual punishment allegation." Diaz v. Edgar, 831 F. Supp. 621, 623-24 (N.D.Ill. 1993). The objective prong of an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis requires that the deprivation be "sufficiently serious." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Notably, the objective component of an Eighth Amendment analysis is "contextual and responsive to `contemporary standards of decency.'"Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). Accordingly, the courts have indicated that a condition will be deemed "sufficiently serious" if the "`conditions. . ., alone or in combination, deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Union County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 999 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981),cert. denied, sub. nom., Union County Jail Inmates v. Fauver, 465 U.S. 1101, sub. nom., Di Buono v. Fauver, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984))).
The subjective element of an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis requires that the plaintiff show that the resulting injury was caused by the prison official's "deliberate indifference."Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 820 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd dub nom,Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). To establish that a state actor was deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's conditions of confinement, it must be shown that the prison official acted with "subjective recklessness." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). In other words,
a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.Id. at 837. Thus, an analysis of the prison official's state of mind is entirely mandatory in the determination of whether the complainant has suffered cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 838.
Notably, "[w]here a person is suffering injury as an incidental and unintended consequence of official actions, the abuse of power contemplated in the Due Process and Eighth Amendment cases does not arise." Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1979). Accordingly, mere negligence on the part of a state official does not implicate the Due Process Clause. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986). See also Office of Inmate Advocacy v. Fauver, 222 N.J. Super. 357, 360 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 111 N.J. 637 (1988).
Medical Conditions
A state clearly has the obligation to provide medical care for inmates at a penal institution since the inmates are unable to provide medical care for themselves. In the Matter of the Commitment of F.H., 258 N.J. Super. 532, 536-537 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 1992). A medical need meets the objective prong and is, therefore, "sufficiently serious" if the condition is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987),cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988) (citing Pace v. Fauver, 479 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981))); see also Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a condition is "sufficiently serious" if "a failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering, injury or death.").
In this matter, plaintiff sustained an injury to his right ankle and leg on August 1, 1997. This Court will assume for purposes of this analysis that plaintiff's injury to his right ankle and leg is sufficiently serious and, therefore, will address only the subjective prong of the analysis in detail. As aforementioned, the subjective prong of the analysis requires an inquiry into whether defendants were "deliberately indifferent" to plaintiff's serious medical needs.
To establish the subjective prong of the analysis, a plaintiff must produce evidence that the prison officials and/or prison doctors intentionally delayed or denied access to the inmate's treatment once such treatment was prescribed by a physician. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). A showing of deliberate indifference requires "facts which indicate not only the conduct but also the attitude of prison authorities." Smith v. Fielder, 867 F. Supp. 832, 834 (E.D.Wis. 1994).
Notably, not every "inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care," however, can be deemed violative of the Eighth Amendment. For example, "[n]eglect, carelessness, or malpractice [are] more properly the subject of a tort action in the state courts." Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that "the law is clear that simple medical malpractice is insufficient to present a constitutional violation"); Lewandowski v. Fauver, 531 F. Supp. 53, 54 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding no claim exists under § 1981 for negligent or incorrect medical treatment). Essentially, in order to succeed in an action claiming inadequate medical treatment, a prisoner must show more than mere negligence; he must show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67. It is only such "deliberate indifference" that can affront "evolving standards of decency" in direct contradiction to the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
In the present matter, the facts set forth in plaintiff's Complaint do not support a finding that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. In fact, plaintiff's Complaint is replete with evidence that he visited the prison infirmary and an orthopedic specialist on a number of occasions since the date of his injury. Plaintiff also contends that he visited with a few prison physicians on several occasions to receive medication. Such action cannot affront the "evolving standards of decency." Quite simply, plaintiff's subjective belief that there was a delay in medical treatment does not establish deliberate indifference to medical treatment.
In light of the foregoing, plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED AS TO ALL DEFENDANTS WITH PREJUDICE.