We do not consider petitioner's contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, for it was not raised below. Watkins v. United States, 356 F.2d 472, 473 (9th Cir. 1966). One remaining contention, however, requires discussion.

The ninth circuit, in cases where a prisoner has claimed that counsel improperly failed to appeal, has denied collateral attack where he fails to show prejudicial errors calling for reversal. McGarry v. Fogliani (1966), 370 F.2d 42; Watkins v. United States (1966), 356 F.2d 472; Miller v. United States (1964), 339 F.2d 581. If we were to reach the question whether the state was responsible for the lateness of the appeal, we would find more difficulty.

261 F. Supp. at 461. Nor is this a case in which federal collateral relief is foreclosed for lack of a showing that "any prejudicial errors occurred that would have called for a reversal of his conviction", McGarry v. Fogliani, 370 F.2d 42, 44 (9 Cir. 1966); see, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 356 F.2d 472, 473 (9 Cir. 1966); Miller v. United States, 339 F.2d 581, 582 (9 Cir. 1965); it is difficult to conceive of a case of more extreme prejudice than one where, as here, an accused is, through no fault of his own, precluded from challenging a conviction which has been adjudicated upon the appeal of a codefendant to have been based on evidence insufficient to convict the codefendant and, apparently, the precluded defendant, also. Rather, this case more closely resembles Wainwright v. Simpson, 360 F.2d 307 (5 Cir. 1966), where counsel of defendant's choice, first retained and then assigned when defendant claimed he was indigent, failed to move for a new trial or to file a notice of appeal though he considered that meritorious grounds for appeal were present. What was there stated by the court in granting the petition for habeas corpus is equally applicable here: However laudable his motive, court appointed counsel for Simpson had no authority, without consulting with or obtaining the consent of his clie