(152 Ill. App.3d at 416, 504 N.E.2d at 518.) In so holding, the Driver court expressly declined to follow two earlier appellate decisions, Watkins v. Martin (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 417, 450 N.E.2d 866, and People ex rel. Johnson v. Payne (1984), 127 Ill. App.3d 398, 469 N.E.2d 270. The instant respondent urges us to disregard the Driver holding in favor of the holdings in Watkins and Johnson. In Watkins, the trial court entered a paternity order and subsequent support order.
In accordance with that decision, this court similarly found that entry of an order of paternity and an order fixing the amount of child support constitutes a final order in a paternity action even where the court reserves collateral matters such as a request for retroactive child support expenses during pregnancy. Watkins v. Martin, 115 Ill.App.3d 417, 419, 71 Ill.Dec. 178, 450 N.E.2d 866 (1983). ¶ 10 In this case, the circuit court entered an order of parentage on April 27, 2010, and permanently fixed the amount of child support respondent was to pay on July 9, 2010, thereby rendering a final judgment despite reserving the issue of respondent's liability for retroactive support payments.
Id. (support order not final where court deferred ruling on issues of medical insurance and retroactive payments); see also In re Marriage of Mitchell, 692 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ill. 1998) (holding that 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/505(a)(5) requires that final support order state the obligation as a dollar amount); and Dep't of Pub. Aid ex rel. Corrigan v. Hawkins, 543 N.E.2d 317, 320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (support order not final where court reserved ruling on reimbursement of medical expenses). But see Watkins v. Martin, 450 N.E.2d 866, 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (support order final even though court reserved ruling on issues of pregnancy expenses and attorney fees). The support order directing Plaintiff to remit payments to Imogene Harris specified the exact amounts due.
The first district of the appellate court has reached a contrary conclusion where the issues reserved pertained to the mother's right to recovery of expenses incurred during pregnancy and whether she should be awarded attorney fees and costs. People ex rel. Johnson v. Payne, 127 Ill. App.3d 398, 404 (1984); Watkins v. Martin, 115 Ill. App.3d 417, 419-20 (1983). Although these two cases purport to apply Deckard, their analysis is dubious, at best.
In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill.2d 542, 553, 535 N.E.2d 818 (1989); People ex rel. Block v. Darm, 267 Ill. App.3d 354, 355, 642 N.E.2d 863 (1994). The entry of a paternity order and a determination of child support are the two basic orders needed to complete a paternity action, because they ensure that the child will not lack for support. Watkins v. Martin, 115 Ill. App.3d 417, 419, 450 N.E.2d 866 (1983). For that reason, an order establishing paternity is not a final judgment if it does not at least rule on the amount of child support for which the defendant is liable.
The Deckard case has been applied disparately by different districts of the appellate court. For example, the First District Appellate Court has held that only an adjudication of paternity and an order for prospective child support are required to make an order appealable, even though other relief has been sought. ( Watkins v. Martin (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 417, 450 N.E.2d 866; People ex rel. Johnson v. Payne (1984), 127 Ill. App.3d 398, 469 N.E.2d 270.) However, the Fourth District Appellate Court has stated that an order finding paternity and requiring the father to pay child support was not final and appealable where the ruling on the mother's claim for maternity expenses was reserved.
The physical evidence revealed by two medical exams supports a finding of sexual abuse of Kr. K. Furthermore, the testimonial evidence of numerous persons who interviewed the little girl supports a finding of neglect and sexual abuse of Kr. K. Although there is some conflicting testimony, the resolution of conflicting testimony is to be determined by the trier of fact and in a bench trial the judge's findings of fact are to be afforded the same deference as those of a jury. ( Watkins v. Martin (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 417, 422.) Furthermore, under section 2-18(3) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802-18(3) (now 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 1992))), the proof of the abuse or neglect of Kr. K. shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the neglect of Ke. K. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802-18(3) (now 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 1992)).)
The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be afforded their testimony are for the trier of fact, and its findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. ( Watkins v. Martin (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 417, 422.) The trier of fact may regard all the circumstances proved at trial and may give credence to one witness or the other if the facts and circumstances warrant it. Lyke, 2 Ill. App.3d at 115.
In a bench trial the findings of fact by the trial judge are to be afforded the same deference as those of a jury. Watkins v. Martin (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 417, 422, 450 N.E.2d 866, 870. Since it accepted the grain loaded onto the barge and did not revoke acceptance within a reasonable time, defendant is not entitled to deduct $12,596.83. It is, however, entitled, according to the contract, to take a 3 cent discount per bushel.
It is for the jury to resolve questions of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony ( People ex rel. Johnson v. Hampton (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 555, 388 N.E.2d 782), and the jury's findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. ( Watkins v. Martin (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 417, 450 N.E.2d 866.) The function of a reviewing court is to determine whether the result reached in the trial court was one which is reasonable on the facts in evidence, and not to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. Burge v. Morton (1981), 99 Ill. App.3d 266, 425 N.E.2d 539.