Opinion
CLAIM NO. E700594
OPINION FILED MAY 12, 1998
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE JAY TOLLEY, Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
Respondents represented by the HONORABLE CAROL LOCKARD WORLEY, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed.
OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The claimant appeals an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on September 5, 1997. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found that the claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a compensable injury while employed by the respondent. In addition, the administrative law judge found that the claimant's claim for compensation benefits is barred by the Statute of Limitations. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the claimant's claim for compensation benefits is barred by the Statute of Limitations. Therefore, we decline to address the compensability of the claimant's injury, including the legal issue as to whether or not the claimant's allegedly work-related syncope condition was subject to the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-114 (Repl. 1996) or subject to the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996).The claimant was employed by the respondent as a concrete finisher when, on November 18, 1994, he fell at work experiencing what would later be diagnosed as a syncope episode. The claimant was admitted to Springdale Memorial Hospital later that day, and the medical record indicates that the claimant was discharged on November 24, 1994. The claimant testified that he returned to work the following Monday for the respondents, and that he quit working for the respondents shortly thereafter.
Since the claimant asserts that he sustained a compensable injury which occurred after July 1, 1993, this claim is subject to the provisions of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law as amended by Act 796 of 1993. With regard to the compensability of the claimant's alleged work-related injury, the claimant asserts that the compensability of his injury should be tested under the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996). On the other hand the respondents assert that the nature of a syncope injury is such that the claimant's claim for compensability should be tested under the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-114 (Repl. 1996). In addition the respondents assert that the claimant's claim for benefits for an injury which allegedly occurred on November 18, 1994 is barred by the Statute of Limitations, as codified in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (Repl. 1996). Because we find that the Statute of Limitations bars the claimant's claim for benefits regardless of whether compensability should be tested under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) or under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-114, we find it unnecessary to determine at this time under which of these two provisions the compensability of a syncope injury is properly tested. Moreover, because we find that the claimant's claim for benefits is barred by the Statute of Limitations, we find that the issue as to whether the claimant otherwise proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a compensable injury is moot.
Prior to the amendments of Act 796 of 1993, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a) (1987) provided:
TIME FOR FILING. (1) A claim for compensation for disability on account of an injury, other than an occupational disease and occupational infection, shall be barred unless filed with the commission within two (2) years from the date of the injury.
(Emphasis added)
In interpreting the term "date of the injury" under the Pre-Act 796 Code, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that Arkansas is a "compensable injury" state because the Statute of Limitations did not necessarily begin to run on the date of the accident.See, Hall's Cleaners v. Wortham, 311 Ark. 103, 842 S.W.2d 7 (1992). Instead, the Court held that the limitations period did not begin running until the injury becomes "compensable". Id. In this regard, the Arkansas Courts have held on numerous occasions that the Statute of Limitations for workers' compensation claims in Arkansas under the law that existed prior to the amendments of Act 796 did not commence to run until the injury caused an incapacity to earn the wages which the employee was earning at the time of the accident and until the incapacity continued long enough to entitle him to benefits under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-501(a) (1987). See, Wortham, supra; Cornish Welding Shop v. Galbraith, 278 Ark. 185, 644 S.W.2d 926 (1983); Donaldson v. Calvert-McBride Printing Co., 217 Ark. 625, 232 S.W.2d 651 (1950);Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark. App. 92, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983); Shephard v. Easterling Construction Co., 7 Ark. App. 192, 646 S.W.2d 37 (1983).
Act 796 of 1993 did not alter the language of that portion of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a) quoted above. However, in addition to the language quoted above, Act 796 of 1993 added the following relevant provision now codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a)(1)(B):
For purposes of this section, the date of the compensable injury shall be defined as the date an injury is caused by an accident as set forth in § 11-9-102(5).
Our research indicates that this is a case of first impression in interpreting the significance of the new provision codified in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a)(1)(B) (Repl. 1996). In assessing the meaning of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a)(1)(B), we note that the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(18) were also added by Act 796:
"Time of accident" or "date of accident" means the time or date of the occurrence of the accidental incident from which compensable injury, disability, or death results.
As we interpret these new provisions of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law as added by Act 796 of 1993, we believe the General Assembly intended to overrule that line of Arkansas cases holding that the "date of injury" for purposes of the commencement of the Statute of Limitations was the date that the claimant became entitled to disability benefits under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-501, as opposed to the date of the accident that caused the disability. Our decision today is limited only to injuries caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence (i.e., injuries defined by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) and Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(iv)). We do not take a position at this time on how, if at all, Act 796 amended the Statute of Limitations for gradual onset injuries.
Reading Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a)(1)(B) particularly in light of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(18), we understand the amendments of Act 796 to have changed the law regarding the commencement of the limitations, so that for injuries which occurred on or after July 1, 1993, and which were caused by a specific incident, the limitations period commences to run on the date of the accident and not the date that the claimant becomes entitled to disability compensation as was the rule of law under the Pre-Act 796 Code. Moreover, we note that injuries allegedly compensable under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) and under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(iv) must each be causally related to a specific incident to be compensable. See City of Blythville v. McCormick, 56 Ark. App. 149, 939 S.W.2d 855 (1997). Consequently, we find that the new provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a)(1)(B)would apply to this claim regardless of whether the compensability of the claimant's syncope episode was tested under either Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) or under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(iv).
In the present case, the record establishes that the accident which allegedly caused the claimant's need for medical treatment and disability occurred on November 18, 1994. However, the claimant did not file a claim for compensation with the Workers' Compensation Commission until January of 1997, more than two years after the "accident" which allegedly caused the claimant's injury. Therefore, we find the claimant's claim for workers' compensation benefits is untimely and is barred by the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a).
In reaching our decision, we note that the claimant seems to assert on appeal that, because the respondents had notice of the claimant's injury at least by February 10, 1995, and that the claimant might therefore file a claim with the Commission at some point thereafter, the respondent's notice of injury is somehow sufficient to toll the running of the limitations period. However, we note that the Arkansas Courts have held that the respondents' notice of an injury and the claimant's filing a timely claim for benefits with the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission are two distinct issues, and the fact that the respondent may have notice of an injury is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the claimant has filed a timely claim of benefits with the Commission. See Generally, Chambers v. International Paper Co., 56 Ark. App. 90, 938 S.W.2d 861 (1997);Garrett v. Sears, 43 Ark. App. 37, 858 S.W.2d 146 (1993). Consequently we fail to see the relevance to the issues presented in this case by the fact that the respondents had knowledge of the claimant's injury at least by February of 1995.
Therefore, after conducting a de novo review of the entire record, and for the reasons discussed herein, we find that the claimant's claim for workers' compensation benefits as a result of an alleged accident on November 18, 1994, is barred under the provisions of Statute of Limitations as amended by Act 796 of 1993. Therefore, we find that the decision of the administrative law judge must be affirmed. Because we find the Statute of Limitations bars the claimant's claim for benefits, we respectfully decline to address whether or not the compensability of the claimant's syncope injury is properly tested under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) or in the alternative under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-114.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Commissioner Humphrey dissents.