Opinion
No. CV03 017 59 05 S
December 1, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
In this case, the Town of Watertown (CT) ("Town") has applied to this Court under General Statutes § 52-418 to vacate a grievance arbitration award ("Award") which was issued by the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration ("SBMA"), in favor of the CSEA, Local 760, White Collar Union ("Union"), on or about December 10, 2002. The arbitration panel issued a written award upholding the grievance filed by the Union and ordered that the grievant be restored to his position. In their decision, the arbitrators referenced an earlier arbitration decision involving these sane parties which construed the same section of the contract at issue in this present matter. The arbitrators noted that the Union had prevailed in that case and that the Town's subsequent application to vacate that decision had been denied by the Superior Court (Pittman, J.) May 10, 2002. The Town now claims that the SBMA's most recent award must be vacated for several reasons:
1) the arbitrators' award clearly violates strong public policy in that the award states that Mr. Sager shall be restored to his position even though his position had been eliminated by the Town's budget process in the year 2001 and is still unfunded in the year 2002;
2) the award does not conform to the submission;
3) the award manifests an egregious and patently irrational application of the collective bargaining contract provisions;
4) the award flies in the face of case law that requires a harmonious reading of all provisions of the contract in order to reach a rational result; and
5) the award manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law in that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter was not made.
See Motion to Vacate.
The Town has supported its Application with a memorandum of law. The memorandum of law discloses that the Town is alleging, in various ways, a violation of Sec. 52-418(a)(4). In response to the Town's Application, the Union filed a brief in opposition to Town's Application to Vacate. In their brief, the Union answered that the Award conforms to the submission and should be upheld, and, since the Award conforms to the submission, it cannot be said that it is not a final and definite Award, and that the arbitrators' Award does not violate public policy. The parties presented oral argument on their Application and Answer on November 7, 2003. The case is now before this Court for decision based on the following, essentially undisputed, set of facts.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Town and the Union were parties to a collective bargaining unit agreement covering the period July 1, 1999, to June 30, 2003. The grievant, in the position of Engineering Technician I with the town, is a member of the union. The Town experienced budgetary problems during the term of the agreement. As part of the budgets for fiscal years 2000-2001, the town was appropriated less than the cost of the position of Engineering Tech I. Once the appropriated sum was paid out to the grievant, he was notified (October 16, 2000) that the town "is abolishing the position of Engineering Tech I." A grievance was filed, the matter proceeded to arbitration, and the arbitration panel found that the Town had violated the collective bargaining agreement by not following the order of layoff. The remedy awarded by the panel was the reinstatement of the grievant with back pay and benefits. The Town appealed this Award and on May 10, 2002, the superior court (Pittman, J.) upheld the Award. The Town rehired the grievant, pursuant to the Award. The Town then, essentially contemporaneously, laid off the grievant, due to that year's budget constraints and the corresponding elimination of his position. He filed a grievance alleging that the second layoff violated the agreement because there were two probationary employees, in other departments, who were not laid off first. The grievance occasioned by the second layoff was similar factually to the grievance instigated by the first layoff.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The scope of review by the court of an arbitrator's power to make an award is limited. Arbitration is a creature of contract between the parties and its autonomy requires a minimum of judicial intrusion. The parties themselves, by the agreement of the submission, define the powers of the arbitrator. The submission constitutes the charter of the entire arbitration proceedings and defines and limits the issues to be decided. When the parties have agreed to a procedure and have delineated the authority of the arbitrator, they must be bound by those limits. An application to vacate or correct an award should be granted where an arbitrator has exceeded his power. In deciding whether an arbitrator has exceeded his power, we need only examine the submission and the award to determine whether the award conforms to the submission. Local 391 v. Dept. of Correction, 76 Conn. App. 15, 19.
"Merely because an arbitral decision is not based on the express terms of a collective bargaining agreement does not mean that it is not properly derived from the agreement. An arbitrator is entitled to take cognizance of contract principles and draw on them for guidance in construing an agreement . . . Neither a misapplication of principles of contractual interpretation nor an erroneous interpretation of the agreement in question constitutes grounds for vacatur." Harry Hoffman Printing, Inc. v. Graphic Communications International Union, Local 261, 950 F.2d 95, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1991).
Arbitration awards are not to be invalidated merely because they rest on an allegedly erroneous interpretation or application of the relevant collective bargaining agreement. Local 1042, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Board Of Education, 66 Conn. App. 457, 462, 784 A.2d 1018 (2001); Harry Hoffman Printing, Inc. v. Graphic Communications International Union, Local 261, supra, 950 F.2d 98-99. Rather, in determining whether the arbitration award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, the reviewing court is limited to considering whether the collective bargaining agreement, rather than some outside source, is the foundation on which the arbitral decision rests. Harry Hoffman Printing, Inc. v. Graphic Communications International Union, Local 261, supra, 98-99. If that criterion is satisfied, then the court cannot conclude that the arbitrator exceeded his authority or imperfectly executed his duty.
"In spite of the general rule that challenges to an arbitrator's authority are limited to a comparison of the award to the submission, an additional challenge exists under § 52-418(a)(4) when the award rendered is claimed to be in contravention of public policy . . . This challenge is premised on the fact that the parties cannot expect an arbitration award approving conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than parties can expect a court to enforce such a contract between them . . . When a challenge to the arbitrator's authority is made on public policy grounds, however, the court is not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator's decision but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award." ( Admin. Residual Employees, Local 4200 v. State, 77 Conn. App. 454 (2003), 822 A.2d 366 Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 474-75.
The Court has carefully considered the parties' written submissions, and their presentations in court. Based on that consideration, the court finds that the Town's basis for vacating the arbitrators' award are not compelling under applicable law. Accordingly, the Town's motion to vacate that award is hereby denied.
So ordered this 1st day of December 2003.
ALVORD, JUDGE.