Opinion
Civil 1:21-CV-226
05-20-2021
JILL WATERS, Plaintiff, v. CRST, Defendant.
Conner Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
On February 8, 2021, Jill Waters filed pro se employment discrimination lawsuit by against her former employer, CRST, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq (“Title VII”). (Doc. 1). On April 12, 2021, CRST filed a motion to dismiss this complaint which asserted, in part, that Waters had failed to timely file her lawsuit after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on September 23, 2020. (Docs. 12 and 13).
Waters did not respond to this motion to dismiss and the response deadline passed. Accordingly, on May 7, 2021 we entered an order which stated in clear and precise terms as follows:
There is a motion to dismiss pending in this case. (Doc. 12). the plaintiff had not responded to this motion, and the time for responding had passed. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows: The plaintiff is directed to respond to this motion on or before May 17, 2021. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.7 the movants may then file reply briefs on or before May 31, 2021. All briefs must conform to the requirements prescribed by Local Rule 7.8. No further extensions shall be granted, absent compelling circumstances. The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, is advised that Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions, and provides that:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant's brief.
Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
It is now well-settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.'” Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 091704, 2010 WL 3703808, *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (1991)). Therefore, a failure to comply with this direction may result in the motions being deemed unopposed and granted.
(Doc. 14).
This deadline has now also passed without any action by Waters to respond to this motion or litigate this lawsuit. Accordingly, in the absence of any response by Waters, this motion will be deemed ripe for resolution and we recommend that the motion to dismiss be granted.
II. Discussion
A. Under the Rules of This Court, This Motion Should Be Deemed Unopposed and Granted.
At the outset, under the Local Rules of this Court, the plaintiff should be deemed to concur in this motion to dismiss since the plaintiff has failed to timely oppose the motion or otherwise litigate this case. As we have stated before, these procedural defaults completely frustrate and impede efforts to resolve this case in a timely and fair fashion, and under the rules of this court warrant dismissal of this lawsuit since Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions and provides that:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant's brief.
Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
It is now well-settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.' ” Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., Civ. No. 09-1704, 2010 WL 3703808, *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991)). In this case, the plaintiff has not complied with the local rules or this Court's Standing Practice Order by filing a timely response to this motion. Therefore, these procedural defaults by the plaintiff compel the court to consider:
[A] basic truth: we must remain mindful of the fact that “the Federal Rules are meant to be applied in such a way as to promote justice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Often that will mean that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible. However, justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion ....”Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting McCurdy v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1998)).
With this basic truth in mind, we acknowledge a fundamental guiding tenet of our legal system. A failure on our part to enforce compliance with the rules, and impose the sanctions mandated by those rules when the rules are repeatedly breached, “would actually violate the dual mandate which guides this Court and motivates our system of justice: ‘that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible [but that] justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion.' ” Id. Therefore, we are obliged to ensure that one party's refusal to comply with the rules does not lead to an unjustified prejudice to those parties who follow the rules.
These basic tenets of fairness apply here. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 7.6 by filing a timely response to this motion to dismiss. This failure now compels us to apply the sanction called for under Rule 7.6 and deem the plaintiff to not oppose this motion.
B. Dismissal of this Case Is Warranted Under Rule 41.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the Court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). That discretion, while broad, is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of the following factors: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190 (quoting Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984)).
In exercising this discretion, “there is no ‘magic formula' that we apply to determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation' to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)). Consistent with this view, it is well settled that “ ‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.'” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Moreover, recognizing the broad discretion conferred upon the district court in making judgments weighing these six factors, the court of appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amenable to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (3d Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (3d Cir. 2007).
In this case, a dispassionate assessment of the Poulis factors weighs heavily in favor of dismissing this action. At the outset, a consideration of the first Poulis factor, the extent of the party's personal responsibility, shows that the delays in this case are entirely attributable to the plaintiff, who has failed to abide by court orders and has otherwise neglected to litigate this case.
Similarly, the second Poulis factor, the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to abide by court orders, also calls for dismissal of this action. Indeed, this factor is entitled to great weight and careful consideration. As the Third Circuit has observed:
“Evidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial weight in support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, prejudice includes “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)..... However, prejudice is not limited to “irremediable” or “irreparable” harm. Id.; see also Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1988). It also includes “the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222.Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259-60.
In this case, the plaintiff's failure to respond to the motion to dismiss or comply with court orders now wholly frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. In such instances, the defendant is plainly prejudiced by the plaintiff's continuing inaction and dismissal of the case clearly rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Tillio, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (failure to timely serve pleadings compels dismissal); Reshard, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (failure to comply with discovery compels dismissal); Azubuko, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (failure to file amended complaint prejudices defense and compels dismissal).
When one considers the third Poulis factor, the history of dilatoriness on the plaintiff's part, it becomes clear that dismissal of this action is now appropriate. In this regard, it is clear that “ ‘[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.' ” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260-61 (some citations omitted) (quoting Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994)). Here, the plaintiff has failed to timely file a response to the motion to dismiss and has not complied with an order of the court. Thus, the plaintiff's conduct displays “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency [and conduct which] constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874.
The fourth Poulis factor, whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith, also cuts against the plaintiff in this case. In this setting, we must assess whether this conduct reflects mere inadvertence or willful conduct, in that it involved “strategic, ” “intentional or self-serving behavior, ” and not mere negligence. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. At this juncture, when the plaintiff has failed to comply with instructions of the court directing the plaintiff to take specific actions in this case, the court is compelled to conclude that the plaintiff's actions are not accidental or inadvertent, but instead reflect an intentional disregard for this case and the court's instructions.
While Poulis also enjoins us to consider a fifth factor, the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, cases construing Poulis agree that in a situation such as this case, where we are confronted by a pro se litigant who will not comply with the rules or court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See, e.g., Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize other lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion. In any event, by entering our prior orders, and counseling the plaintiff on her obligations in this case, we have endeavored to use lesser sanctions, but to no avail. The plaintiff still declines to obey court orders and otherwise ignores her responsibilities as a litigant. Since lesser sanctions have been tried, and have failed, only the sanction of dismissal remains available to the court.
Finally, under Poulis, we are cautioned to consider one other factor, the meritoriousness of the plaintiff's claims. In our view, however, consideration of this factor cannot save this particular plaintiff's claims, since the plaintiff is now wholly non-compliant with her obligations as a litigant. The plaintiff cannot refuse to address the merits of her claims, and then assert the untested merits of these claims as grounds for denying a motion to sanction her. Furthermore, it is well settled that “ ‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' Ware, 322 F.3d at 222, [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.' Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263. Therefore, the untested merits of the non-compliant plaintiff's claims, standing alone, cannot prevent imposition of sanctions.
In any event, it appears that Waters' complaint is time-barred, yet another factor which favors dismissal of this lawsuit.
C. Waters' Complaint is Time-Barred.
Finally, it appears that Waters' complaint is now time-barred. On this score, Waters states that she received her right to sue letter from the EEOC on September 23, 2020 and she states that she signed her complaint and mailed it in for filing on February 2, 2021. (Doc. 1 at 5, 6). Thus, by her own account, at least 132 days have elapsed between Waters' receipt of this right to sue letter from the EEOC and the filing of the instant complaint.
For Waters, this is a fatal delay since it is well settled that in order to maintain a claim for relief in federal court under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a complaint within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984); Burgh v. Borough City Council of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001). The 90-day period set by Title VII generally begins to run on the date “the complainant receives the right-to-sue letter.” Id. (citations omitted). This 90-day filing period operates as a statute of limitations in Title VII cases and is not subject to extension, except where equitable considerations are found to apply. Mosel v. Hills Dep't Store, Inc., 789 F.2d 251, 253 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Burgh, 251 F.3d at 470 (“[I]n the absence of some equitable basis for tolling, a civil suit filed even one day late is time-barred and may be dismissed.”)
In this case, it is evident on the face of the plaintiff's complaint that she received her right to sue letter from the EEOC on September 23, 2020 but failed to file this lawsuit until 132 days later, on February 2, 2021. Thus, September 23, 2020 marked the beginning of the 90-day statute of limitations in this case and more than 90 days elapsed before Waters proceeded to federal court, triggering the statute of limitations. Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149 (1984); Burgh v. Borough City Council of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, by failing to respond to this motion to dismiss Waters has not provided any legitimate grounds for equitable tolling of this statute of limitations. Accordingly, on the face of the complaint, this claim is time-barred and should be dismissed.
Thus, all of the Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal of this complaint. Therefore, it is recommended that the defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 12), be GRANTED and Waters' complaint be dismissed.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 12), be GRANTED and this case be DISMISSED.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.