Under a general grant of power to take any property necessary for the public purpose, the legislature can delegate the determination of necessity to an independent board or tribunal or even a corporation or person empowered by the legislature to condemn. Water Commissioners v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, 157 (1912). Similarly confining the analysis to the delegation issue, under Chapter 130 the determination of what particular property in a redevelopment area is to be taken to effectuate the public purpose is a matter for the legislature and when the legislature delegates the power of the determination to another agency, such as the Redevelopment Agency, "the decision of that agency is conclusive; it is open to judicial review only to discover if it was unreasonable, or in bad faith or was an abuse of the power conferred."

That the legislature intended the report to be subject to review in a manner usual in the case of reports by committees appointed by a court is fairly implied and the respondent both under the charter and the law is entitled to a judicial review and to an appeal at the appropriate time. That the respondent's claim that the applicant's charter is too broad, that the grant of power is unnecessary, unreasonable and violates Section 1 of Article 1 of the Connecticut Constitution is untenable (see Water Com. vs. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151). That the respondent's claim that Section 2541 (Power to take lands and streams) General Statutes, Revision of 1930 has superseded the applicant's charter is unsound because of Section 6570 (Repeal of former statutes) General Statutes, Revision of 1930; and for the further reason that Section 2541 is neither mandatory nor exclusive and is in no way inconsistent with the applicant's charter. The fact that the applicant has power to determine when it is expedient and necessary to take land does not make the grant of power unconstitutional, for the legislature that has that power may delegate such power if it deems wise; and the exercise of that power is always open to judicial review to discover if it was unreasonable, or in bad faith.

The right to decide what property was necessary for the parking facility was primarily within the province of the authority. 27 Spec. Laws 549, No. 611 5 (amended, 28 Spec. Laws 470, No. 371, 1); Water Commissioners v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, 158, 84 A. 727. Its decision, however, is open to judicial review to discover if it was unreasonable or in bad faith or in abuse of power conferred. Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 146, 104 A.2d 365; Water Commissioners v. Johnson, supra, 159.

It attaches to every man's land and is paramount to his right of ownership. Water Commissioners v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, 164, 84 A. 727. It lies dormant in the state until set in motion by legislative enactment.

The determination of the necessity must be made by the legislature either itself or by some body or persons to whom it delegates its own power of making this determination. Water Commissioners v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, 157, 84 A. 727. Under the general practice the legislature determines that there is necessity for the exercise of the power of eminent domain; but it may, as it has power to do, designate the particular property or rights to be taken.

On the contrary, legislative action within the limits of legislative authority and conformably to constitutional safeguards and established principles is the law of the land." Water Commissioners v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, 162, 84 A. 727. Due process in this case is a legislative action subject to the Constitution and laws of this State and not contrary to the Constitution of the United States or any law or treaty of the United States. French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 331, 21 Sup. Ct. 625. Mr. Justice Johnson, in Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244, declared that "the good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this: that they [the words, due process of law] were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of rights and distributive justice."

Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U.S. 480, 23 L.Ed. 478. It also means such an exercise of the powers of government as the settled maxims of the law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of private rights as these maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs. Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors of San Francisco, 101 Cal. 15, 35 P. 353, 40 Am. St. Rep. 17; Water Com'rs of Norwich v. Johnson. 86 Conn. 151, 84 A. 727, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1024. The plaintiff invokes the constitutional limitations of this state and also the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and on general principle every citizen is entitled to the protection afforded by these fundamental provisions of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.

As to the proposition that the development and maintenance of water-power is in itself a public use within the meaning of the rule relied on by the respondent, it should be noted that it has long been the custom of the General Assembly to grant to public and private corporations, chartered for the purposes of municipal water supply, general authority to take water from any source within specified limits. In Water Commissioners v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, 164, 84 A. 727, the validity of these general grants was affirmed, with the remark that if they were not valid "much, if not most, of our legislation empowering municipalities to provide water-supplies would fail." It is also notorious that practically all of our streams available for municipal water supply were long ago utilized for water-power, either directly or through their connecting waters.

The appropriation of the property is an act of public administration, and the form and manner of its performance is such as the legislature shall, in its discretion, prescribe." In the case of Board of Water Commrs. v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, [41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1024, 84 A. 727], the court said: "But the respondents urge that they have never had the opportunity to be heard upon the question of necessity, and that for that reason there has not been due process of law. They were not entitled to such opportunity.

12 Special Laws (1897), § 6, p. 897. In Water Commissioners vs. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, 153, (1912) the Water Commissioners of the City of Norwich, acting under the charter, voted "to adopt a plan . . . and to proceed as speedily as possible to acquire by purchase or condemnation the land, water, water rights and other property . . . to carry out the project and execute the work . . ." As a result of that application the Water Commission made application to the Superior Court for the determination of the amount of compensation to be paid to certain owners of land.