Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center

87 Citing cases

  1. Paul v. Bier

    758 A.2d 40 (D.C. 2000)   Cited 16 times
    Applying equitable considerations in evaluating timeliness of the cross-claim

    Paul would have received a total of $4,500,000: $2,500,000 from Dr. Bier and the $2,000,000 settlement from GWU, which by virtue of its decision to settle with Paul would have limited its liability in the suit. See District of Columbia v. Shannon, 696 A.2d 1359, 1368 (D.C. 1997) ("[A] plaintiff . . . must have an opportunity to develop the record in opposition to the claim [for a pro rata credit]") (citing Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 188 (D.C. 1990)). A threshold obstacle to Paul's claim that a pro rata credit should have been applied to the verdict rendered against Dr. Bier is the absence of either a judicial determination or a stipulation, see Berg, 673 A.2d at 1251 n. 13; Lamphier v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 524 A.2d 729, 733 n. 5 (D.C. 1987), that GWU is a joint tortfeasor with Dr. Bier.

  2. District of Columbia v. Shannon

    696 A.2d 1359 (D.C. 1997)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that because playground accident due to poor maintenance could have been reasonably foreseeable to the District, trial court properly denied District's motion for judgment on the ground it owed no duty to child using playground

    See Snowden v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 147 U.S.App.D.C. 204, 206, 454 F.2d 1047, 1049 (1971). For a defendant to receive a pro rata Martello credit, rather than a pro tanto Snowden credit, however, the liability of the settling defendants must be established either by adjudication, see Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 189 (D.C. 1990), or by stipulation between the plaintiff and the settling defendant, see Berg v. Footer, 673 A.2d 1244, 1251 (D.C. 1996). See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971).

  3. Berg v. Footer

    673 A.2d 1244 (D.C. 1996)   Cited 17 times
    Crediting judgments with proceeds of a settling defendant

    A "defendant," as we use the term here, may be comprised of a number of separately named parties to the complaint, such as a firm of anesthesiologists or a group of laboratory technicians, all of whom comprise one unit for purposes of calculating a pro rata share. See Rose v. Assoc'd Anesthesiologists, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 246, 248 n. 5, 501 F.2d 806, 808 n. 5 (1974); see also Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 185 n. 10 (D.C. 1990). [I]n the factual circumstances of this case . . . when settlement is made with one joint tort-feasor and later a verdict is obtained against the other, and the jury finds that the settling tort-feasor should contribute, then the verdict should be credited with one-half its total amount and the defendant tort-feasor should be required to pay only the remaining balance, namely, one-half the total original verdict. It is true that in a case like the present one, where the verdict figure is in excess of twice the settlement figure, the application of this formula will necessarily reduce the amount of the injured plaintiff's recovery.

  4. Travers v. District of Columbia

    672 A.2d 566 (D.C. 1996)   Cited 36 times
    Rejecting the testimony of an expert as to the national standard of care where "the expert expressed a personal opinion rather than a national standard of care"

    See, e.g., Spain v. McNeal, 337 A.2d 507, 508-09 (D.C. 1975). In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove the applicable standard of care, deviation from that standard and a causal relationship between the deviation and the injury. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C. 1990). In this jurisdiction, the applicable standard is a national standard, not just a local custom.

  5. Derzavis v. Bepko

    766 A.2d 514 (D.C. 2000)   Cited 14 times
    Upholding trial court decision setting aside verdict in plaintiff's favor and granting doctor judgment as a matter of law

    In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury. "Expert testimony is usually required to establish each of [these] elements, except where proof is so obvious as to lie within the ken of the average lay juror." Washington v. Washington Hospital Center, 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C. 1990) (citations omitted); see Lasley v. Georgetown University, 688 A.2d 1381, 1383 (D.C. 1997) (rule requiring expert testimony applies to proof of causation), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1060 (1998). Because the present case "involve[d] . . . the exercise of professional skill and judgment," expert testimony was required to make a prima facie showing of negligence. Harris v. Cafritz Memorial Hospital, 364 A.2d 135, 137 D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 968 (1977); accord, e.g., Eibl v. Kogan, 494 A.2d 640, 643 (D.C. 1985).

  6. Rhodes v. United States

    967 F. Supp. 2d 246 (D.D.C. 2013)   Cited 16 times
    Finding the 3.5% rate relied on by plaintiff's expert and based on the yield rates for government bonds as an appropriate discount rate

    Under District of Columbia law, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence three elements: (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) the fact that the defendant, through his or her actions or inactions, deviated from that standard of care; (3) and that a causal relationship exists between the defendant's deviation and the plaintiff's injuries. Flores–Hernandez v. United States, 910 F.Supp.2d 64, 72, (D.D.C.2012) (enumerating tripartite burden in medical malpractice actions) (citing Washington v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C.1990)); Ornoff v. Kuhn & Kogan, Chartered, 549 A.2d 728, 731 (D.C.1998); Psychiatric Inst. of Wash. v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 623–24 (D.C.1986)); see also Burton v. United States, 668 F.Supp.2d 86, 98 (D.D.C.2009); Appleton v. United States, 180 F.Supp.2d 177, 182 (D.D.C.2002) (in FTCA negligence suit, the plaintiff “bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to demonstrate the applicable standard of care, deviation from that standard, and the causal relationship between the deviation and plaintiff's injury”) (citing Messina v. District of Columbia, 663 A.2d 535, 537–38 (D.C.1995)); Giordano v. Sherwood, 968 A.2d 494, 498 (D.C.2009); Nwaneri v. Sandidge, 931 A.2d 466, 470 (D.C.2007).

  7. Riddick v. Washington Hosp. Center

    183 F.R.D. 327 (D.D.C. 1998)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that the issues " comes down to whether [the physician] reached her opinions about causation and injury directly through her treatment of [the patient] or whether she developed those opinions close in time to the litigation of this matter and in connection therewith or at the request of counsel"

              As defendants point out, in a negligence action founded on medical malpractice the plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the applicable standard of care, (2) a violation of that standard of care by the defendant, and (3) a causal relationship between the violation and the plaintiff's injury. Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C.1990); Ornoff v. Kuhn and Kogan Chartered, 549 A.2d 728, 731 (D.C.1988). Furthermore, where such a case involves the exercise of professional skill and judgment, a jury usually will not be qualified without the assistance of an expert to determine whether there was negligent treatment and whether it caused injury.

  8. Cárdenas v. Muangman

    998 A.2d 303 (D.C. 2010)   Cited 8 times

    "Because these issues are `distinctly related to some science, profession, or occupation,' expert testimony is usually required to establish each of the elements, except where the proof is so obvious as to lie within the ken of the average lay juror." Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C. 1990) (quoting District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1273 (D.C. 1987)). Admissibility

  9. Convit v. Wilson

    980 A.2d 1104 (D.C. 2009)   Cited 34 times
    Abandoning the common-law rule and citing cases from Florida, North Carolina, and New Jersey for support

    "Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 187-88 (D.C. 1990).Id. at 186 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

  10. Giordano v. Sherwood

    968 A.2d 494 (D.C. 2009)   Cited 18 times
    Noting that in expert testimony “certainty is not required”; rather, the testimony need only be “based on fact or adequate data”

    "The `purpose of expert testimony is to avoid jury findings based on mere conjecture or speculation.'" Nwaneri v. Sandidge, 931 A.2d 466, 470 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Washington v. Washington Hospital Center, 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C. 1990)). Thus, "[t]he sufficiency of the foundation for [expert] opinions should be measured with this purpose in mind."