Opinion
C/A 9:22-01675-RMG-MHC
07-05-2023
Laureen Glaze Washington; Leroy Ernest Glaze, Jr., Plaintiffs, v. Maria Walls, Beaufort County Treasurer; Dore Law Firm P.A., Attorney; Herbert N. Glaze, Paternal Uncle; The State of South Carolina; C; Kenneth E. Fulp, Jr., Beaufort County Probate Judge, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
This is a civil action filed by Plaintiff Laureen Glaze Washington (Washington), a pro se litigant. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge. In an Order entered October 27, 2022, Plaintiff Washington was directed to file certain documents (a summons form for Defendant The State of South Carolina and a Form USM-285 for each Defendant listed in the case) to bring her case into proper form. She was also apprised of material deficits in the Complaint and given time to file an amended complaint. Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff Washington was attempting to assert claims on behalf of the Estates of her parents, Leroy Ernest Glaze and Ruth Hamilton Glaze, she was directed to apprise this court whether she had been able to obtain counsel for the Estates. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff Washington and her brother, Plaintiff Leroy Ernest Glaze, Jr. (Glaze, Jr.), filed an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 21.
Plaintiff Glaze, Jr. is also a pro se litigant.
MOTION TO DISMISS/MOTION FOR DEFAULT
On November 21, 2022, Plaintiff Washington filed a motion she titled “motion to dismiss.” ECF No. 18. To the extent that Plaintiff Washington is asking that one or more Defendants be dismissed from this action, this does not appear to be her intent as she does not appear to be asking that Defendants be dropped from her lawsuit. Instead, Plaintiff Washington appears to be asking that Defendants be held in default. Plaintiff Washington claims that Defendants were required to respond by filing an answer after the court granted her motion to proceed in forma pauperis and she filed Local Rule 26.01 Answers to Interrogatories. Id. at 3. However, as noted in the October 2022 Order (ECF No. 7), no process is to issue in this case until the required proper form items are reviewed by the assigned magistrate judge. No serve order has been issued in this case, such that Plaintiff Washington's motion to dismiss, which instead appears to be a motion for default judgment, is premature. Thus, it is recommended that Plaintiff Washington's motion to dismiss/motion for default (ECF No. 18) be denied.
The motion is only signed by Plaintiff Washington (and not by Plaintiff Glaze, Jr.). As Plaintiff Washington has previously been apprised, she may not represent the interests of her brother, pro se. See ECF No. 7 at 2. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1654 allows individuals to “plead and conduct their own cases personally,” the statute does not extend that right to represent other parties. See Myers v. Loudon Co. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that a pro se person's right to litigate for oneself does not create a similar right to litigate on behalf of others); Asad v. Arab Bank, PLC, 117 Fed.Appx. 466, 467 (7th Cir. Nov. 12, 2004) (a plaintiff who is not a lawyer may not represent the interests of any other litigant).
On one page of her motion, Plaintiff Washington appears to ask that all Defendants except for her newly proposed Defendant, Probate Judge Kenneth E. Fulp, Jr. (Judge Fulp), be dismissed. ECF No. 18 at 4. However, she later requests that all Defendants be dismissed. Id. at 5.
I. BACKGROUND
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that their basis for federal court jurisdiction is federal question and they bring federal claims under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 to 3733. ECF No. 21 at 3. They also assert diversity of citizenship as a basis for federal court jurisdiction and appear to be attempting to allege claims under South Carolina law. Id. at 3, 17, and 20.
Plaintiffs submitted numerous “Statement of Claim” sections in which they allege:
On May 22, 1944, The State of SC, County of BFT [Beaufort] removed and altered Plaintiffs original deed with seal belonging to Plaintiffs parents deced[e]nts Leroy E. Glaze and Ruth H. Glaze (see Ex F), Deed Book 61 page 513. See (Ex A) Fraudulent Deed.
(1) On 11/14/2006, Maria Walls, Beaufort CO treasure: registrar office removed Plaintiffs and their heirs as Grantor and replaced with deceased pa[]ternal grandmother Minnie Glaze who died 1996. See (Ex. M)
(2) On 10/22/2014, Maria Walls, Beaufort Co treasurer received $851,331.49 for bogus Parcel (0040) from 2014 Beaufort County Tax Sale. This property belongs to Plaintiffs and their heirs. (0155) Parcel of land was never divided. See Ex (J)
(3) On March 19, 2015, Maria Walls, Beaufort County treasurer received $366,045.20 for bogus Parcel (0040) Receipt # B15.36105 Session # 338869138 by 2014 Beaufort County tax sale. This is the same property belonging to Plaintiffs and their heirs. See Ex (K).
(4). On 1/19/2016, Maria Walls, the Beaufort County Treasurer, Beaufort Count Probate Court; The State of SC; Herbert N. Glaze violated False Claim Act - 31 USC § 3729(a)(1)(A)(B) (1863) by submitting and receiving a fraudulent deed title. This Not Warranty Title is not notarized nor sealed! See Ex. (C1).
(5) On 1/15/2019, Maria Walls, Beaufort Co treasure: office Continue to use Sham legal process violating S.C. Code § 30-9-30(B)(1) - the Clerk of Court or register of deed may refuse to accept materially false or fraudulent or is a sham legal process. See Ex (L)
(1) On 1/23/2007, The State of S.C. and the Beaufort Co. Probate Court accepted a fraudulent deed from Dore Law Firm, PA Attorneys. In the matter of Minnie McGraw Glaze Case # 1999ES0700313. Plaintiffs Paternal grandmother died (1996). The bogus Parcel (0040) is the same Parcel as Plaintiffs and their heirs (0155). See (Ex D)
(2) On 10/31/08, The State of S.C. and BFT. CO Probate Court accepted a fraudulent deed from Dore Law Firm, PA. w/o seal attached to defendant Herbert N[.] Glaze, paternal uncle. See (Ex H).
(3) On 10/28/20, the Plaintiffs filed a Demand for Hearing (Estate only) Pursuant to SCPC 62-3-1001 for deed book 61, p. 513 and deed book 269 p 1232-36.
(4) On 11/13/20 it was cancelled due to NO RECORDS Found Plaintiffs Parents (Ex I). Exhibit (I) Cancelled Demand for Hearing - Pursuant SCPC 62-3-1 001
(1) The State S.C. & Defendant, Dore Law Firm, P.A. Attorneys prepared (2) two fraudulent deeds without the benefit of a title examination or notary seal. for Defendants, Beaufort CO. Probate Court and Beaufort CO treasurer, Maria Walls (Ex B and D)
(1) On 12-21-92, Dore Law Firm, defendant Listed to Real Estate (Deed Book 61 p. 513) Parcel (0080) at the Beaufort Co. Treas., Register of deed office with a fraudulent deed & with no notary seal attached, Violation of False Claim Act - 31 USC § 3729(1)(A)(B).
(2) On 1/23/07, defendant, Dore Law Firm prepared a fraudulent deed with no notary seal attached to Beaufort CO Probate Court case # 1999ES0700313, In the matter of Plaintiffs' paternal grandmother, Minnie McGraw Glaze who died in 1996. See Ex (D)
(1) On 10/31/08 Defendants Dore Law Firm and Herbert N Glaze submitted fraudulent deed to Beaufort CO. Probate Court, the State of SC, and Beaufort CO. treasurer's office register of deed w/o seal.
(2) On 6/30/17, defendant removed Plaintiff's information from Marshel's Wright Donaldson Home for Funerals and added his billing Info with the same contract # 8400-0051-16 as Plaintiffs see Ex (G). The defendant is NOT Heirs to Plaintiffs Leroy Glaze and Leroy Glaze, Jr. and their heirs. See (Ex E).See ECF No. 21 at 9, 12-25 (errors in original). Plaintiffs request monetary damages. See id. at 910, 12-14, 18-19, 21-25.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case is before the Court for pre-service review. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (pleadings by non-prisoners should also be screened). Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint herein pursuant to the procedural provisions of § 1915, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
Section 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without paying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. However, to protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolousness can be made where the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 31. Hence, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327.
This Court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiffs May Not Assert Claims on Behalf of their Parents' Estates
Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, may be attempting to bring claims on behalf of the Estate of their father, Leroy Ernest Glaze, and perhaps on behalf of the Estate of their mother, Ruth Hamilton Glaze. However, Plaintiffs have presented no facts to indicate that they may appear for or represent the Estates.
Additionally, Plaintiffs have not obtained counsel to represent the Estates in this action. Under federal law, “a person ordinarily may not appear pro se in the cause of another person or entity.” See Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 392-93 (2nd Cir. 1997) (pro se litigant may not represent corporation, estate, partnership, or “his or her minor child”). Courts are in general agreement that where an estate has beneficiaries other than the personal representative, the estate must be represented by counsel. See Witherspoon v. Jeffords Agency, Inc., 88 Fed.Appx. 659 (4th Cir. 2004); Malone v. Nielson, 474 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2007); Pridgen, 113 F.3d at 393 (“[W]hen an estate has beneficiaries or creditors other than the administratrix or executrix [or personal representative], the action cannot be described as the litigant's own, because the personal interests of the estate, other survivors, and possible creditors will be affected by the outcome of the proceedings.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Although a pro se litigant cannot generally represent third parties in a lawsuit, there may be an exception to this rule where the person attempting to represent an estate pro se is the personal representative of the estate and there are no creditors or other beneficiaries. See Witherspoon, 88 Fed.Appx. 659, at **1 (remanding the matter for further proceedings to ascertain whether there are any creditors involved). Neither Plaintiff has alleged that she or he is the personal representative of the Estate of Leroy Ernest Glaze or the Estate of Ruth Hamilton Glaze (and Plaintiffs have not filed a copy of any appointment as personal representative of either of these Estates). Additionally, Plaintiffs have not alleged that there are no creditors of beneficiaries of these Estates. Finally, Plaintiffs have not alleged that there are no other possible beneficiaries of these Estates.
In the court's October 2022 Order, Plaintiff Washington was directed to apprise the court if she had been able to obtain counsel for the Estates and was advised that a failure to do so might result in the dismissal, without prejudice, of claims asserted on behalf of the Estates. ECF No. 7. On November 21, 2022, Plaintiff Washington wrote that Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in obtaining counsel. ECF No. 11 at 2. Thus, any claims asserted on behalf of the Estate of Leroy Ernest Glaze and the Estate of Ruth Hamilton Glaze should be dismissed. See, e.g., Koerth v. Cty. of Montgomery, No. 3:20-CV-00878, 2021 WL 2836979 (M.D. Tenn. June 18, 2021) (recommending dismissal of claims brought by a pro se plaintiff on behalf of an estate where the plaintiff failed to obtain counsel or show that she could represent the estate pro se), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2827093 (M.D. Tenn. July 7, 2021).
B. Failure to State a Federal Claim
Plaintiffs appear to allege that Defendants violated the FCA, specifically 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) and (B). These provisions provide, in pertinent part:
(a) Liability for certain acts.
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), any person who--
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim;
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, as adjusted by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note; Public Law 104-4101), plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.
The FCA permits either the Attorney General or a private party to initiate a civil action alleging fraud on the United States. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a-b). A private enforcement action under the FCA is called a qui tam action. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of NY, 556 U.S. 928, 932 (2009); Vermont Agency of Nat. Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 (2000). “The purpose of the FCA is to enhance the Government's ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Government.” Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., L.L.C., 397 F.3d 925, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 816 (2005). Here, however, Plaintiffs have brought no claims on behalf of the United States and Plaintiffs provides no factual support regarding any qui tam issues, nor any coherent explanation for their reference to this statute. Moreover, it is well-settled that pro se litigants, such as Plaintiffs, may not represent the interests of the United States in a qui tam FCA action. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 237 Fed.Appx. 802, 803 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that qui tam FCA actions may “not be pursued pro se”); Wojcicki v. SCANA/SCE&G, 947 F.3d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding pro se litigant may not pursue qui tam FCA suit because “the relator party has an interest, [but] it is not the sole interest at stake”); Bond v. Hughes, 671 Fed.Appx. 228, 229 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“[A] pro se litigant may not pursue a qui tam action on behalf of the Government under the FCA.”). Thus, any claims pursuant to the FCA should be summarily dismissed.
C. Failure to State a Claim under South Carolina Law
Plaintiffs also assert diversity jurisdiction and appear to be attempting to allege claims pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 30-9-30(B)(1) which provides that:
Diversity jurisdiction is determined as of the date the suit is filed. See, e.g., Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248, 255-56 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that “a court determines the existence of diversity jurisdiction ‘at the time the action is filed,' regardless of later changes in originally crucial facts such as the parties' citizenship or the amount in controversy”). In her Complaint, Plaintiff Washington appeared to assert diversity jurisdiction based on there being over $75,000 is controversy and because of complete diversity because Plaintiff Washington is allegedly a citizen of Florida and Defendants are allegedly citizens of South Carolina. See ECF No. 1 at 4-7. A district court may have jurisdiction of a civil action “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...and is between - (1) citizens of different States...”. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-374 (1978). However, Plaintiff Washington may also be attempting to bring this action as the personal representative of one or more South Carolina Estates. “[T]he legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent[.]” 28 U.S.C § 1332(c)(2). Thus, if Plaintiff Washington is attempting to bring this as a personal representative that is deemed a citizen of South Carolina, complete diversity may be lacking.
If a person presents a conveyance, mortgage, judgment, lien, contract, or other document to the clerk of court or the register of deeds for filing or recording, the clerk of court or the register of deeds may refuse to accept the document for filing if he reasonably believes that the document is materially false or fraudulent or is a sham legal process. Within thirty days of a written notice of such refusal, the person presenting the document may commence a suit in a state court of competent jurisdiction requiring the clerk of court or the register of deeds to accept the document for filing.S.C. Code Ann. § 30-9-30(B)(1) (emphasis added). This statute “authorizes a clerk of court to remove a sham document from the public records upon proper notice if the clerk reasonably believes the document to be fraudulent.” Barnes v. State, 859 S.E.2d 260, 262 n. 2 (S.C. 2021).
Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts that indicate they can bring a civil action against Defendants because Plaintiffs believe that a deed was fraudulent. They have alleged no facts to indicate that this statute provides them with a cause of action. Generally, when a statute does not expressly create civil liability, a duty will not be implied unless the statute was enacted for the special benefit of a private party. Doe v. Marion, 645 S.E.2d 245, 248 (S.C. 2007); see also 16 Jade St., L.L.C. v. R. Design Constr. Co, 747 S.E.2d 770, 773 (S.C. 2013) (applying the rules for establishing a private cause of action in the context of determining whether a statute imposes a legal duty). Here, Plaintiffs were not the ones who filed the documents in question and they are not asking that the documents in question be accepted for filing. Thus, they fail to state a claim under S.C. Code Ann. § 30-9-30. See Kubic v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 785 S.E.2d 595, 599 (S.C. 2016) (noting that § 30-9-30 “merely offers guidance as to how [government officials] should carry out their job duties” and noting that it is the “person presenting the document” who is entitled to “commence a suit in a state court” to require the register of deeds to accept the document for filing or prevent the removal of the document).
Plaintiffs also mention S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-1001. See ECF No. 21 at 20. However, they fail to state any cognizable claim under this statute. Plaintiffs merely allege that they filed a demand for an estate hearing and were told that the hearing was cancelled because there were no records found as to Plaintiffs' parents. They submitted a letter from Defendant Judge Fulp noting that they submitted a form indicating they were requesting an original deed be recorded, but their original document was being returned because the Beaufort County Probate Court records did not show estates for either of the decedents (Leroy E. Glaze and Ruth H. Glaze). Plaintiffs were also informed that copies of deeds could be obtained from the Beaufort County Register of Deeds. ECF No. 21-10. Moreover, there is no indication that this statute creates any civil liability. Thus, Plaintiffs' state law claims should be summarily dismissed.
This statute provides: (a) Within the later of: (i) the expiration of the applicable time limitation for any creditor to commence a proceeding contesting a disallowance of a claim pursuant to Section 62-3-806 (a); (ii) the time when all legal proceedings commenced for allowance of a claim have ended in accordance with Sections 62-3-804 and 62-3-806; and (iii) if a state or federal estate tax return was filed, within ninety days after the receipt or a state or federal estate tax closing letter, whichever is later, a personal representative shall file with the court:
(1) a full accounting in writing of his administration, unless the accounting is waived pursuant to subsection (e);
(2) a proposal for distribution of assets not yet distributed, unless the proposal for distribution of assets is waived pursuant to subsection (e);
(3) an application for settlement of the estate to consider the final accounting or approve an accounting and distribution and adjudicate the final settlement and distribution of the estate; and
(4) proof that a notice of right to demand hearing and copies of the accounting, the proposal for distribution, and the application for settlement of the estate have been sent to all interested persons including all creditors or other claimants of whom the personal representative is aware whose claims are neither paid nor barred, unless the notice of right to demand hearing is waived pursuant to subsection (e).
(b) If the personal representative does not timely perform his duties pursuant to subsection (a), and all interested persons have not waived the requirement pursuant to subsection (e), an interested person may petition for an order compelling the personal representative to perform his duties pursuant to subsection (a). After notice and hearing in accordance with Section 62-1-401, the court may issue an order requiring the personal representative to perform his duties pursuant to subsection (a).(c) After thirty days from the filing by the personal representative of proof that a notice of right to demand hearing has been sent to all persons entitled to the notice pursuant to subsection (a), or at any time after the filing of the application of settlement if notice of right to demand hearing has been waived pursuant to subsection (e), the court may enter an order or orders approving settlement and directing or approving distribution of the estate, terminating the appointment of the personal representative, and discharging the personal representative from further claim or demand of any interested person. However, if an interested person files with the court a written demand for hearing within thirty days after the personal representative files proof that a notice of right to demand hearing has been sent to all persons entitled to the notice pursuant to subsection (a), the court may enter its order or orders only after notice to all interested persons in accordance with Section 62-1-401 and hearing. (d) If one or more heirs or devisees were omitted as parties in, or were not given notice of, a previous formal testacy proceeding, the court, on proper petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate pursuant to this section, and after notice of hearing to the omitted or unnotified persons and other interested parties determined to be interested on the assumption that the previous order concerning testacy is conclusive as to those given notice of the earlier proceeding, may determine testacy as it affects the omitted persons and confirm or alter the previous order of testacy as it affects all interested persons as appropriate in the light of the new proofs. In the absence of objection by an omitted or unnotified person, evidence received in the original testacy proceeding constitutes prima facie proof of due execution of a will previously admitted to probate, or of the fact that the decedent left no valid will if the prior proceedings determined this fact. (e) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, a personal representative shall not be required to file an accounting in writing of his administration, a proposal for distribution of assets not yet distributed, or a notice of right to demand hearing if and to the extent these filings are waived by all interested persons.
Plaintiffs have not alleged that estates were opened for their parents or that personal representatives were appointed. Records from the South Carolina Probate Index do not reveal any case for either of Plaintiffs' parents in the Beaufort County Probate Court. See https://www.southcarolinaprobate.net/search/default.aspx [select Beaufort County and search under Glaze, Leroy and Glaze, Ruth]. This Court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n. 1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869, at * 2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records).
D. Appeal of State Court Decision
Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiffs may be attempting to appeal the results of a ruling from a state court action to this Court, the current action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because federal district courts do not hear “appeals” from state court actions. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983) (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can only be conducted by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); see also Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2020). To rule in favor of Plaintiffs on claims filed in this action may require this court to overrule and reverse orders and rulings made in the state court. Such a result is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Davani v. Virginia Dep't. of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719-720 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293-294 (2005); Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable both to claims at issue in a state court order and to claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with such an order. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to indicate that this is a case where the federal complaint raises claims independent of, but in tension with, a state court judgment such that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not be an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction. See Vicks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 676 Fed.Appx. 167 (4th Cir. 2017) (district court erred in applying Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar appellants' claims where the claims did “not seek appellate review of [the state court] order or fairly allege injury caused by the state court in entering that order”); Thana v. Bd. of Licenser Comm'rs for Charles Cty., Md., 827 F.3d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 2016) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction when the federal complaint raises claims independent of, but in tension with, a state court judgment simply because the same or related question was aired earlier by the parties in state court).
Appeals of orders issued by lower state courts must go to a higher state court. Secondly, the Congress, for more than two hundred years, has provided that only the Supreme Court of the United States may review (review is discretionary by way of a writ of certiorari and is not an appeal of right) a decision of a state's highest court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491(3d Cir. 1997). This Court cannot sit in judgment of a state court decision, and must dismiss any claims concerning any state court decisions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Moore v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 3:15CV515, 2016 WL 775783, at *5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016).
E. Judicial Immunity
Defendant Judge Fulp is also entitled to summary dismissal because, based upon the facts alleged, he is entitled to judicial immunity. It is well settled that judges have immunity from claims arising out of their judicial actions. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351-64 (1978); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (a suit by South Carolina inmate against two Virginia magistrates); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (“It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions.”); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (immunity presents a threshold question which should be resolved before discovery is even allowed; see also Knight v. Episcopal Church of U.S., No. 2:10-cv-516-DCN-RSC, 2010 WL 2926156, at *5 (D.S.C. July 23, 2010) (noting that “judicial immunity applies to probate judges performing judicial acts”); Addison v. Pearlman, No. 2:06-cv-3403-HFF-RSC, 2006 WL 3843616, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2006) (finding that judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity with respect to his judicial acts in probate court case involving plaintiff's estate). Further, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. Judicial immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (holding that “immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly”). Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11.
F. Failure to Get Case into Proper Form
Finally, Plaintiff Washington has failed to bring this case into proper form. As noted above, Plaintiff Washington was directed to bring the case into proper form by providing a summons form listing Defendant The State of South Carolina and to provide completed and signed Forms USM-285 for each Defendant. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff Washington failed to provide a completed summons form and a completed and signed Form USM-285 for Defendant The State of South Carolina. See ECF No. 13; see also ECF No. 6.
Plaintiff Glaze, Jr. has also not paid the filing fee or submitted a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Form AO-240). See General Order In Re: Procedures in Civil Actions Filed by NonPrisoner Pro Se Litigants, No. 3:07-mc-5015-JFA (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2007); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(a)(1). Although he submitted a Pro Se Party's Answers to Rule 26.01 Interrogatories form, he failed to answer questions A, B, and C. ECF No. 15. He also has failed to provide a summons form and a Form USM-285 for Defendant The State of South Carolina.
Although Plaintiffs list The State of South Carolina at the top of one of their summons forms, they failed to provide an address for service of this Defendant. See ECF No. 13 at 1. Plaintiffs also failed to sign the Forms USM-285 they submitted for the other Defendants. See ECF No. 13.
The time for Plaintiff Washington to bring this case into proper form has passed, has failed to provide all of the required proper form documents. Plaintiff Washing specifically warned (ECF No. 7) that the failure to provide the necessary information w timetable set forth in the Order would subject the case to dismissal. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 in the alternative, it is recommended that this action be dismissed without prejudice in acc with Fed.R.Civ.P. 41. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Ballard v. 882 F.2d 93, 95-96 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that district court's dismissal following an exp reasonable warning was not an abuse of discretion).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Plaintiff Washington's m dismiss/motion for default (ECF No. 18) be denied. It is also recommended that the Court this action without prejudice, without further leave to amend, and without issuance and se process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that “when a distri dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend ... the order dismis complaint is final and appealable”).
Plaintiffs' attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. \0 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).