Opinion
# 2016-041-027 Claim No. 124899 Motion No. M-88246 Motion No. M-88303 Cross-Motion No. CM-88307
05-05-2016
DEXTER WASHINGTON A/K/A EZE ALIMASE v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
DEXTER WASHINGTON A/K/A EZE ALIMASE Pro Se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Paul F. Cagino, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claim alleging that defendant wrongfully confined claimant as a result of improperly classifying claimant as a violent felony offender is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action and upon the doctrine of res judicata; claimant's motion to amend claim is denied as moot.
Case information
| UID: | 2016-041-027 |
| Claimant(s): | DEXTER WASHINGTON A/K/A EZE ALIMASE |
| Claimant short name: | WASHINGTON |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 124899 |
| Motion number(s): | M-88246, M-88303 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | CM-88307 |
| Judge: | FRANK P. MILANO |
| Claimant's attorney: | DEXTER WASHINGTON A/K/A EZE ALIMASE Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Paul F. Cagino, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | May 5, 2016 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant moves to further amend his claim based upon "new information" and further seeks to add "additional causes of action."
Defendant opposes the claimant's motion and cross-moves to dismiss the claim which sets forth causes of action alleging that defendant violated the New York State Constitution and wrongfully imprisoned claimant by unlawfully "classifying or treating" him as a violent felony offender after receiving him for incarceration in 1998 and by filing a false affidavit in the course of a habeas corpus proceeding brought by claimant against defendant in 2014. Claimant opposes the defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the claim.
Neither claimant's affidavit in support of his motion to further amend his claim, nor his proposed amended claim, expressly reveal the "new information" claimant purportedly relies upon.
Defendant's potentially dispositive cross-motion to dismiss the claim will be considered first. As noted above, claimant alleges no new facts in his motion to further amend his claim which affect the Court's analysis of defendant's cross-motion.
The claim alleges that in 1997 claimant was convicted of two counts of burglary in the 1st degree, one count each of robbery in the 1st and 2nd degree and resisting arrest. Claimant began serving a combined determinate prison term of 25 years in January 1998. During claimant's prison term he has been classified by defendant as a violent felony offender based upon his above-described convictions.
In January of 2014, claimant filed a grievance at Otisville Correctional Facility challenging his classification as a violent felony offender. Claimant thereafter commenced a habeas corpus proceeding in the Orange County Supreme Court challenging his classification as a violent felony offender.
The claim further alleges that in the course of the habeas corpus proceeding, the defendant submitted an affidavit falsely stating that claimant had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to commencing the habeas corpus proceeding.
Claimant's habeas corpus proceeding was dismissed on the merits in Matter of Washington v Gerbing (Bartlett, J., Index No. 4313/2014, August 21, 2014), with the court stating that: "There is no merit whatsoever to Petitioner's claim." The Gerbing court made no mention of any issue relating to a failure to exhaust administrative remedies but did note that claimant had previously unsuccessfully challenged defendant's classification of him as a second felony offender (Washington v Napoli, 69 AD3d 1066 [3d Dept 2010]) and that "[t]his aspect of Petitioner's claim is accordingly barred by the doctrine of res judicata."
The doctrine of res judicata is explained in Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., Inc. (93 NY2d 343, 347-348 [1999]):
"Under res judicata, or claim preclusion, a valid final judgment bars future actions between the same parties on the same cause of action . . . . As a general rule, 'once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy' (O'Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357; Matter of Reilly v Reid, supra, at 30). Thus, where a [claimant] in a later action brings a claim for damages that could have been presented in a prior CPLR article 78 proceeding against the same party, based upon the same harm and arising out of the same or related facts, the claim is barred by res judicata"
The doctrine of res judicata, set forth as a defense in defendant's answer, bars claimant's cause of action based upon his classification by defendant as a violent felony offender.
Additionally, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claimant's contention that defendant unlawfully classified him as a violent felony offender. Claimant's remedy for the allegedly unlawful classification lies in Supreme Court in the context of a CPLR Article 70 or 78 proceeding.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is invoked where money damages are the essential object of the claim, unlike an instance where the principal claim is equitable in nature (such as to review action or inaction by a state agency), with monetary relief being incidental to the principal claim (see Harvard Fin. Servs. v State of New York, 266 AD2d 685, 685 [3d Dept 1999]; Matter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d 231, 236 [1988]).
In City of New York v State of New York (46 AD3d 1168, 1169-1170 [3d Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 705 [2008]), the court explains that:
"Two inquiries must be made to determine if the Court of Claims has subject matter jurisdiction. As that court has 'no jurisdiction to grant strictly equitable relief' (Psaty v Duryea, 306 NY 413, 416 [1954]), but may grant incidental equitable relief so long as the primary claim seeks to recover money damages in appropriation, contract or tort cases (see Ozanam Hall of Queens Nursing Home v State of New York, 241 AD2d 670, 671 [1997]), 'the threshold question is "[w]hether the essential nature of the claim is to recover money, or whether the monetary relief is incidental to the primary claim"' (Madura v State of New York, 12 AD3d 759, 760 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 704 [2005], quoting Matter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d 231, 236 [1988]). The second inquiry, regardless of how a claimant categorizes a claim, is whether the claim would require review of an administrative agency's determination--which the Court of Claims has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain (see Hoffman v State of New York, 42 AD3d 641, 642 [2007]), as review of such determinations are properly brought only in Supreme Court in a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see Matter of Scherbyn v Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 NY2d 753, 757 [1991])."
In order to award claimant damages in this action, the Court would necessarily be required to review and reverse the administrative determination of the defendant regarding claimant's classification. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to do so.
Finally, the claim's allegations fail to state a cause of action because the defendant's purported submission of a false affidavit in the habeas corpus proceeding was irrelevant to the Gerbing court's dismissal of the proceeding as "entirely lacking in merit."
The defendant's cross-motion to dismiss is granted. The claim is dismissed.
May 5, 2016
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims Papers Considered: 1. Claimant's Notice of Motion (M-88246) Pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b), filed February 22, 2016; 2. Affidavit of Dexter Washington, sworn to February 17, 2016, and attached exhibit; 3. Claimant's Notice of Motion (M-88303) Pursuant to CPLR 3025 (d), filed March 23, 2016; 4. Affidavit of Dexter Washington, sworn to March 20, 2016, and attached exhibit; 5. Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion to Dismiss (CM-88307), filed March 25, 2016; 6. Affirmation of Paul F. Cagino, dated March 25, 2016, and attached exhibits; 4. Affidavit in Opposition To Defendant Cross Motion To Dismiss of Dexter Washington, sworn to March 31, 2016.