Opinion
NO. 02-15-00282-CR
05-26-2016
LAMAR R. WASHINGTON APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1389944D MEMORANDUM OPINION
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
A jury convicted Appellant Lamar R. Washington of evading arrest or detention with a vehicle, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years' confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04 (West Supp. 2015). In two points, Washington challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We will affirm.
At around 4:00 p.m. on September 13, 2014, Arlington Police Officer Aeron Hill ran a check on a license plate number belonging to a blue Hyundai Santa Fe. The inquiry revealed that a regional warrant had issued in connection with the vehicle, so Officer Hill initiated a traffic stop and requested backup. Officer Jesse Blanco arrived within a few minutes.
The driver was unable to produce a Texas driver's license—he said that he had an Arkansas driver's license—but he told Officer Hill that his name was Daniel Patterson. A warrant check came back negative for that name, and an additional inquiry indicated that the name was associated with a citation that had issued in Arlington, but the record did not contain a picture of Daniel Patterson. Further attempting to confirm the identity of the driver, Officer Hill asked him for his phone number, Social Security number, and address. The driver gave a phone number that began with a local area code, and a check on the number showed that it was registered to Lamar Washington. Officer Hill ran a check on Lamar Washington, and his in-car computer generated a photo that appeared to match the driver of the Santa Fe. Officer Hill asked the driver why he had a local phone number, and the driver said that it belonged to his girlfriend, Sherri Stephens. Officer Hill obtained a different phone number for Stephens, called her, and determined from his conversation with her that the driver was lying about his identity. Officer Hill determined that the driver was Washington, concluded that he had committed the offense of failure to identify, and made the decision to arrest him.
When Officer Hill approached the vehicle and asked Washington to get out, Washington reached to put the vehicle into drive, and Officer Hill attempted to enter the vehicle to try to stop Washington from driving away. Washington, however, managed to drive off, with Officer Hill "dangling" halfway out of the vehicle. The vehicle came to a stop across the street, and both Officer Hill and Officer Blanco, who had given chase on foot, struggled with Washington, but he was able to drive away. The officers pursed him but discontinued the chase. Authorities in Arkansas later apprehended Washington.
Washington argues in his first point that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove that he was the driver of the vehicle that was used to evade Officer Hill.
Washington argues in his second point that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction for the same reason. This court has not conducted a factual sufficiency review since the court of criminal appeals announced in Brooks v. State that the Jackson standard is the "only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt." 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We overrule Washington's second point.
In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 198 (2015).
The State has the burden to prove that the defendant committed the offense charged. Miller v. State, 667 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Identity may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The identification testimony of one eyewitness is sufficient to uphold a conviction. Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
In his argument, Washington purports to detail the evidence "in the light most favorable to the verdict," but he actually details evidence that conflicts with or is contrary to the jury's verdict. Properly viewed, the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict includes both Officer Hill's and Officer Blanco's in-court identification of Washington as the driver of the vehicle that was involved in the events described above; Officer Hill's testimony that he saw the driver of the vehicle multiple times when he was asking him questions on the side of the road; Officer Hill's testimony that he knew the driver was Washington when he made the final approach to the vehicle to arrest him; Officer Hill's testimony that he knew Washington was driving the vehicle because he was face to face with Washington when he drove off with Officer Hill "dangling" from the vehicle; and Officer Blanco's testimony that there was no doubt in his mind that Washington was the driver of the vehicle. This evidence is more than sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Washington was the driver of the vehicle. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support Washington's conviction for evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. We overrule Washington's first point.
Having overruled Washington's two points, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ Bill Meier
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and MEIER, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) DELIVERED: May 26, 2016