Opinion
22 Civ. 01440 (PAE) (GWG)
12-21-2022
LANDON L. WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN SMART, et al., Defendants.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff pro se Landon L. Washington brought this action against a “C.O. Johnson,” Captain Gwendoline Smart, and the City of New York (“the City”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Complaint, filed Feb. 18, 2022 (Docket # 2) (“Compl.”). Defendants have moved to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, that motion should be granted.
See Notice of Motion, filed June 9, 2022 (Docket # 14); Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, filed June 9, 2022 (Docket # 15) (“Def. Mem.”); Letter, filed Aug. 15, 2022 (Docket # 25) (“August 15 Letter”); Letter, filed Dec. 8, 2022 (Docket # 32) (“December 8 Letter”).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Allegations in the Complaint
The City detained Washington at the Anna M. Kross Center (“AMKC”) on Rikers Island beginning January 11, 2022. Compl. at 2, 4. The complaint makes three sets of allegations relating to his detention.
The first set of allegations related to Washington's claim that he was “forced to consume cold food.” Id. at 4. This claim includes allegations regarding “Officer Johnson,” who is identified as the “food service officer.” Id. 1
The second set of allegations relate to Washington's claim regarding religious services. Washington's allegations as to this claim, in their entirety, are as follows:
I've wanted to attend Protestant services and yet have not been afforded the opportunity. I[']m not being provided a place to worship or practice my faith during a pandemic. I [complained] to Captain Smart about this matter[.] She said[,] “I have no control over the staff shortage through[]out the jail.”Id.
The final allegations relate to exhaustion of the administrative complaint process. Washington alleges: “I[']ve written grievances[,] but the department failed to reply to my complaint with a reference #. I called the New York City [c]omplaint hotline with the hopes [of] having this [i]ssue fixed. The reference [number is] # DC-00411269.” Id. at 4-5.
B. Procedural History
In an initial order in this case, the Court “dismiss[ed] Washington's cold food claim” and thus dismissed Johnson as a defendant. See Order, filed Mar. 10, 2022 (Docket # 7) (“March 10 Order”), at 3. Thereafter, on June 9, 2022, the remaining defendants - Captain Smart and the City of New York - filed the instant motion to dismiss the complaint. See Notice of Motion; Def. Mem. The Court ordered Washington to file any opposition by July 11, 2022. See Order, filed June 13, 2022 (Docket # 18). Washington did not do so. The undersigned issue a Report and Recommendation recommending dismissal of the case because a number of mailings to Washington had been returned as either “undeliverable” or because Washington was “no longer in system.” See Report and Recommendation, filed Aug. 2, 2022 (Docket # 24), at 1-2. Shortly thereafter, Washington filed a letter requesting counsel (which was later denied) and informing the Court of a new address in the jail system. See August 15 Letter. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Report and Recommendation and gave Washington additional time to respond to the 2 motion to dismiss. See Order, filed Aug. 15, 2022 (Docket # 26). Subsequently, a number of mailings addressed to Washington were returned as undeliverable.
The Court eventually determined that Washington's address within the jail system had changed following his release and re-arrest (although he had not informed the Court of this fact) and ordered him to respond to the motion by November 16, 2022. See Order, filed Nov. 2, 2022 (Docket # 30). When Washington did not do so, the Court granted him a “final extension” to file either a memorandum of law opposing the motion to dismiss or a letter stating that he does not intend to oppose the motion. See Order, filed Dec. 1, 2022 (Docket # 31). Shortly thereafter, plaintiff submitted an undated letter that said only:
In the light of the defendants' motion to dismiss, the plaintiff Landon Washington wish[es] to oppose said motion[] on the grounds of still being subjected to the same kind of treatment that [brought] about this issue. I wish to prosecute and move forward to resolve this matter at hand.December 8 Letter.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) when the opposing party's complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” While a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in a complaint, that principle does not apply to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”) (punctuation omitted). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and a court's first task is to disregard any conclusory statements in a complaint, id. at 679. 3
Next, a court must determine if the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter” which, if accepted as true, states a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Id. at 678 (punctuation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.... The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (punctuation omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” a complaint is insufficient under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) because it has merely “alleged” but not “‘show[n]' . . . ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999) (A pro se party's pleadings should be construed liberally and interpreted “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest[.]”) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994)). “However, that a party proceeds pro se ‘does not exempt [the] party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.'” DeLeon v. Dunaway, 2022 WL 3902734, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2022) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).
III. DISCUSSION
While defendants first argue that the Court should dismiss Washington's complaint because he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, see Def. Mem. 4-11, we find it unnecessary to address this issue because the complaint fails on the merits. 4
A. Claim as to Captain Smart
As noted, the allegation regarding the religious services claim is extremely brief and alleges only that Captain Smart told plaintiff that she had “no control over the staff shortage through[]out the jail.”
“It is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant's individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing cases); see also Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[I]n this Circuit personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (citation omitted); Green v. Dep't of Educ. of N.Y.C., 2019 WL 3432306, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2019).
Here, there is no allegation that Captain Smart took any action against plaintiff, let alone an unconstitutional one. Thus, even if the allegations suggested that some kind of constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had occurred, there is no claim that Captain Smart committed that violation. While the title of “Captain” suggests that Captain Smart has supervisory control over other jail personnel, the fact that she is a supervisor is not by itself sufficient to make her responsible for any constitutional violation. See generally Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 616-619 (2d Cir. 2020) (discussing ways in which a supervisor may be found to be personally involved in a constitutional violation). Thus, the motion to dismiss the claim against Captain Smart should be granted.
B. Claim Against the City
Defendants argue that Washington's complaint against the City should be dismissed for failing to state a claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See 5 Def. Mem. at 13-15. To plead a § 1983 claim against a municipality under Monell, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury.” Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008). To plead the existence of such a policy sufficiently, a plaintiff must allege the existence of one of the following:
(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.Savarese v. City of New York, 547 F.Supp.3d 305, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citation omitted).
Construing Washington's complaint and his December 8 Letter liberally, Washington could be seeking to hold the City liable only under the third category listed above. As noted, Washington's complaint alleges that as of the time of his complaint he had “not been afforded the opportunity” to attend Protestant services, Compl. at 4, and that upon telling Captain Smart about it, she told him she had no control over staff shortages, id.
In his reply letter, Washington states that he was “still being subjected to the same kind of treatment that [brought] about this issue.” See December 8 Letter.
These allegations, however, do not plausibly allege that there was “consistent and widespread” practice of denying detainees access to Protestant services. Instead, the complaint reflects only that Washington was subjected to the practice on an unknown number of occasions. Without specific and plausible allegations regarding the systemic nature of a challenged practice, 6 a Monell claim under the third category must fail. See Brock v. City of New York, 2022 WL 4544966, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2022) (finding that a similarly bare-bones allegation was not sufficient to make out a “widespread” practice claim, even where plaintiff alleged he could produce “at least twenty” other people facing the same issues); Smith v. Westchester Cnty., 2019 WL 5816120, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2019) (allegations were insufficient to state a Monell claim for consistent and widespread practice where plaintiff “describe[d] only his own experiences” and “fail[ed] to provide any factual details regarding [an alleged pattern of] other lawsuits and grievances”); accord Schnauder v. Gibens, 679 Fed.Appx. 8, 10 (2d Cir. 2017) (“detailed recounting of [plaintiff's] own experiences” is insufficient to plead a Monell claim); Dipinto v. Westchester Cnty., 2020 WL 6135902, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2020) (allegations that plaintiff and “at least two others” had been harmed were insufficient to establish municipal liability, because “simply naming three people [who have suffered similar circumstances] does not - without more - constitute a widespread policy”).
Because the complaint does not state a claim under Monell, the City must be dismissed as a defendant.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket # 14) should be granted.
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (b), (d). A party may respond to any objections within 14 days after being served. Any objections and 7 responses shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. Any request for an extension of time to file objections or responses must be directed to Judge Engelmayer. If a party fails to file timely objections, that party will not be permitted to raise any objections to this Report and Recommendation on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010). 8