Opinion
2012 CA 0259
11-02-2012
RAYMOND WASHINGTON, SR., INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF RAYMOND WASHINGTON, JR. v. RENE CLAUSE AND SONS, INC., CURTIS CLAUSE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF RENE CLAUSE AND SONS, INC. AND ABC INSURANCE AGENCY/COMPANY
Lionel Burns New Orleans, Louisiana Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Raymond Washington, Sr. Individually and on behalf of the Estate of Raymond Washington, Jr. David K. Johnson Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Rene Clause and Sons, Inc., Curtis Clause, Individually and in his capacity as President of Rene Clause and Sons, Inc., and ABC Insurance Agency/Company
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEALED FROM THE TWENTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF ASSUMPTION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER 28,877, DIVISION "E"
Lionel Burns
New Orleans, Louisiana
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Raymond Washington, Sr.
Individually and on behalf of the
Estate of Raymond Washington, Jr.
David K. Johnson
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Rene Clause and Sons, Inc., Curtis
Clause, Individually and in his
capacity as President of Rene Clause
and Sons, Inc., and ABC Insurance
Agency/Company
BEFORE: KUHN, PETTIGREW, AND McDONALD, JJ.
McDONALD , J.
This is an appeal of a trial court's grant of summary judgment on behalf of the defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's decision.
A petition for damages was filed in the Twenty-Third Judicial District Court by decedent's father. The defendants were a farm corporation, its president, in his individual and corporate capacity, and its insurer. Among the facts alleged were that the decedent was employed as a laborer by the farm corporation, and that he fell from and was crushed beneath a tractor.
Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1032, regarding Workers' Compensation, provides for the exclusiveness of rights and remedies for employees against their employer. The exception to the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive remedy is for an "intentional act." Plaintiff alleges that the tractor involved in the fatal injury was extremely old and inherently dangerous, the decedent was operating the tractor for the first time and was not trained in operating tractors, and a litany of acts constituting the negligence of defendants. Defendants maintain that the exclusive remedy for the accident is workers' compensation, and the petition for damages cannot be maintained in a civil suit.
A Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by the defendants on September 22, 2011. The motion was assigned for hearing on November 28, 2011, at which time the matter was taken under advisement. On December 20, 2011, a judgment was rendered, granting the summary judgment, and dismissing the claims against the defendants. Plaintiff timely appealed. That is the matter before us.
The Workers' Compensation Act does provide that the exclusive remedy for employees against their employers for injuries sustained in the course and scope of employment is workers' compensation, except for intentional acts. In Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475 (La. 1981), the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the "intentional act" exception to the exclusive remedies in the Workers' Compensation Act.
The court's lengthy discussion began by noting that "By Act 147 of 1976 the legislature enlarged the category of employee injuries for which workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy." Bazley, 397 So.2d at 479. It also noted the "The principal legislative aim of the 1976 amendment was to broaden the class of defendants to be granted immunity from suits by injured employees in tort or delict.... Before the amendment, the absence of a prohibition against tort suits against co-employees allowed injured workers to seek tort recovery from negligent executive officers and their liability insurers." Bazley, Id.
Most important to the matter before us, the court went on to determine that:
[T]he exclusive remedy rule shall be inapplicable to intentional torts or offenses. The meaning of intent in this context is that the defendant either desired to bring about the physical results of his act or believed they were substantially certain to follow from what he did.... Intent is not, however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.Bazley, Id. at 482.
The circumstances here do not demonstrate the necessary legal intent to hold the defendants liable for an intentional act.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment. This memorandum opinion is issued in compliance with Uniform Rules - Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.1.B. Costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff, Raymond Washington, Sr.
AFFIRMED.