Summary
finding that a plaintiff's unexplained failure to respond to two requests for information from the EEOC prevented investigation of her claims, resulting in dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
Summary of this case from Young v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc.Opinion
No. WMN-00-2522.
March 19, 2001.
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Paper No. 6). The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision. Upon a review of the pleadings and the applicable case law, the Court determines that no hearing is necessary (Local Rule 105.6) and that Defendant's motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This action arises out of Plaintiff Donetta Washington's employment with Defendant Nordstrom, Inc. Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant in March 1996, as a temporary employee. Plaintiff received a permanent position in February 1997, as a warehouse processor at Defendant's distribution center in Upper Marlboro, Maryland.
Plaintiff alleges that during her employment she was subjected to continuous sexual harassment by her supervisor Courtney McKissik. The harassment included McKissik making "obscene sexual remarks, sexual advances, including physical touching, and [seeking] to coerce [Plaintiff] into sexual relations." Complaint at ¶ 8. When McKissik failed to heed Plaintiff's repeated requests to stop his harassing behavior, Plaintiff informed upper management of the misconduct. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. Management investigated the claim but refused to take corrective action on the basis that the "evidence was inconclusive." Id. at ¶ 9. As a result, McKissik continued to harass Plaintiff. He also "enlisted other employees in his campaign against her." Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. As a way to escape these unpleasant work conditions, Plaintiff sought a transfer to Defendant's Tysons Corner location. This request was denied. Id. at ¶ 13. Unable to continue to "abide by the oppressive conditions," Plaintiff resigned on April 1, 1999. Id. at ¶ 15. On May 10, 1999, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Opp. at 2. On June 29, 1999, Plaintiff, at EEOC's request, completed EEOC's questionnaire for harassment cases. Id. An interview was scheduled by the EEOC for July 2, 1999 but Plaintiff was unable to attend.
Plaintiff made several unsuccessful attempts to reschedule the interview. Id. at 3. On August 16, 1999, Plaintiff filed a formal charge of discrimination and harassment with the Maryland Commission on Human Relations, which was cross-filed with the EEOC. Id. On January 11, 2000, and again on April 27, 2000, the EEOC, by letter, requested additional information from Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not respond to either request, see Reply at 1-2, even though the latter request informed Plaintiff that her failure to comply may result in the dismissal of her charge. See EEOC Letter dated April 27, 2000.
On May 19, 2000, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights ("Notice"). The Notice informed Plaintiff that her file was being closed for the following reason: "[h]aving been given 30 days in which to respond, you failed to provide information, . . . or otherwise failed to cooperate to the extent that it was not possible to resolve your charge." EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights. The Notice also informed Plaintiff of her "Suit Rights," which Plaintiff exercised by filing the present action on August 18, 2000.
While receipt of a notice of right to sue is an essential prerequisite to filing suit in federal court, it does not displace the requirement that a plaintiff exhaust all administrative remedies. Rather, the notice "is merely an administrative mechanism through which the EEOC closes its file and advises the claimant that relief, if any, must now be sought in another forum." Wood v. Central Parking Sys. of Pa., Inc., 2000 WL 873310, *5 (E.D.Pa. June 23, 2000).
In her complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief for alleged sexual harassment, disparate treatment based on gender and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Defendant responded by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). In its motion, Defendant asserts that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies as required under section 2000e-5(b).
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move the Court to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In deciding such a motion, "the district court is to regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Richmond, Fredericksburg Potomac Railroad Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Adams v. Bains, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)). The Fourth Circuit requires that, "[b]efore a federal court may assume jurisdiction over a claim under Title VII, . . . a claimant must exhaust the administrative procedures enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), which include an investigation of the complaint . . . by the EEOC." Davis v. North Carolina Dept. of Correction, 48 F.3d 134, 137 (4th Cir. 1995). The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction remains, at all times, with the plaintiff. Richmond, Fredericksburg Potomac Railroad Co., 945 F.2d at 768.
III. DISCUSSION
Title VII provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]henever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved . . . alleging that an employer . . . has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of the charge . . . on such employer . . . and shall make an investigation thereof." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit has held that these requirements are mandatory. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Appalachian Power Co., Inc., 568 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1978).
The EEOC's administrative scheme is necessary because "it provides the EEOC the first opportunity to investigate discriminatory practices and enables it to perform its roles of obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliatory efforts." Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180-81 (1989)). See also Kozlowski v. Extendicare Health Services, Inc., 2000 WL 193502, *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2000). "A complainant who fails to provide the agency with the information necessary to evaluate the merit of his or her complaint cannot be deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies." Wade v. Secretary of Army, 796 F.2d 1369, 1376 (11th Cir. 1986). To hold otherwise might encourage the claimant to "be dilatory at the administrative level, knowing he can get into federal court anyway." Johnson v. Bergland, 614 F.2d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1980).
In the instant case, Plaintiff asserts that she did exhaust her administrative remedies because the "only action that she took which could possibly be construed as failing to cooperate was her request to reschedule the July 2, 1999, interview." Opp. at 7. This contention is clearly erroneous. The EEOC sent a letter to Plaintiff dated January 11, 2000, in which it requested that Plaintiff review Defendant's position statement and provide rebuttal information to the EEOC on or before January 26, 2000. When Plaintiff did not respond, a second request, dated April 27, 2000, was sent to Plaintiff. In addition to asking for Plaintiff's rebuttal information, this letter also informed Plaintiff that her failure to reply within 10 days "may result in the dismissal of [her] charge." EEOC Letter dated April 27, 2000. Plaintiff did not respond to this letter and she has provided no explanation to either the EEOC or this Court for her failure.
While the Court notes that the EEOC may have erred in sending these letters directly to Plaintiff without also sending a copy to her counsel of record, this error is not determinative. The letters clearly indicate that a response is necessary. In addition, the second letter goes so far as to inform Plaintiff that the consequence of her failure to respond may be the dismissal of her claim. The correspondence put Plaintiff on notice that some further action was required of her. In any event, Plaintiff should have brought her receipt of the letters to the attention of her attorney — this being especially true if Plaintiff was uncertain as to how to proceed on her own. Her failure to do so is inexcusable and cannot now serve as an excuse for her failure to comply with the administrative requirements of Title VII.
Plaintiff's failure to respond prevented the EEOC from completing its investigation. This is fatal to Plaintiff's claim that she exhausted her administrative remedies, which is a prerequisite to her filing suit in this Court. See, e.g., Briley v. Carlin, 172 F.3d 567, 567 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Plaintiffs refusal to comply with a reasonable request for information amounts to a breach of her duty to cooperate in good faith in the administrative procedure, which amounts to a failure to exhaust administrative remedies."); Barnes v. Levitt, 118 F.3d 404, 408-10 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that a claimant may not refuse to provide requested information, wait for the 180 days to pass, and then invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court because such a claimant has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies); Davis, 48 F.3d at 137-78 (holding that a federal district court does not have jurisdiction until the EEOC has conducted an investigation and determined the validity of the claim); Kozlowski, 2000 WL 193502, *3 (finding that the plaintiff's claim was not properly before the court because, "in failing to cooperate with the EEOC, the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as she was required to do by Title VII").
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted. A separate order will issue.
ORDER
Pursuant to the foregoing memorandum, and for the reasons stated therein, IT IS this 19th day of March 2001, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED:
1. That Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Paper No. 9) is hereby GRANTED;
2. That this case is hereby CLOSED;
3. That any and all prior rulings made by this Court disposing of any claims against any parties are incorporated by reference herein and this order shall be deemed to be a final judgment within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 58; and
4. That the Clerk of the Court shall mail or transmit copies of the foregoing memorandum and this order to all counsel of record.