Opinion
Case No. 1:07-cv-230.
October 3, 2008
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial (Doc. #19) which she filed in response to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 17). Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum and Continued Reply Memorandum (Doc. # 13 and # 14) and Statement of the Case (Doc. #12). Defendant has replied (Doc. # 20).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In March and April of 2204, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI alleging a disability onset date of October 21, 2001, due to back pain and mental problems. ( See Tr. 53-55, 324, 26). Upon denial of her claims on the state agency level, she requested a hearing de novo before an ALJ. A hearing was held on July 12, 2006, at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. ( See Tr. 399-452). A vocational expert was also present and testified. (Tr. 443-49).
On August 2, 2006, the ALJ entered his decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. That decision became Defendant's final determination upon denial of review by the appeals council on January 17, 2007.
The ALJ's findings, which represent the rationale of the decision, were as follows:
A. The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2005.
B. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 21, 2001, the alleged on set date. ( 20 CFR 404.1520(b), 404.1571 et seq., 416.920(b) and 416.97 et seq.
C. The claimant has the following severe combination of impairments: myofascial pain; bipolar affective disorder, not otherwise specified; anxiety disorder; polysubstance abuse and dependance; and obesity ( 20 CFR. 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
D. The claimant does not have an impairments or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P. Appendix 1 ( 20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
E. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to lift up to 20 pounds occasionally and to carry up to 10 pounds frequently. Because of pain, the claimant requires an alternate sit/stand job, changing position every hour. The claimant is limited to occasional stooping. Because of her substance abuse/dependance, she should avoid working around unprotected heights and hazardous machinery. The claimant is at least capable of understanding remembering and carrying out one to three step instructions. She would do best with minimal interactions with coworkers, supervisors and the public. The claimant should also avoid the stress caused by a constantly rapid pace, such as a machine assembly line driven pace.
F. The claimant was born on November 25, 1969, and was 31 years old on the alleged disability onset date, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44. ( 20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963). She is still a younger individual.
G. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English ( 20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
H. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because the Medical-Vocational Rule, as a framework, supports a finding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (see SSR 82-42 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
I. Considering the Claimant's age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform ( 20 CFR 404.1560(c), 404.1566, 416.960(c), and 416.966).
J. The claimant has not been under a "disability," as defined in the Social Security Act, from October 21, 2001 through the date of this decision ( 20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
The ALJ concluded that the Plaintiff was not entitled to disability benefits or supplemental security income.
On appeal before the Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff, appearing pro se, sought remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff sought to introduce new evidence that corroborates her complaints of pain. The Magistrate Judge also interpreted Plaintiff's appeal to argue that the ALJ erred: 1) in evaluating her pain, credibility and subjective complaints; 2) in formulating Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and 3) in evaluating her mental impairments.
The Magistrate Judge evaluated each assertion according to the substantial evidence standard of review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In performing this review, the Magistrate Judge considers the record as a whole. Hepner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found the plaintiff disabled.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Magistrate Judge reviewed the record as a whole and determined that the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence and he recommended that the decision of the Commissioner, that Plaintiff was not entitled to a period of disability and disability income benefits be found supported by substantial evidence and affirmed.
In response, Plaintiff filed a "Motion for a New Trial" which is interpreted by this court as an objection to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When objections are received to a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on a dispositive matter, the assigned District Judge "shall make a de novo determination . . . of any portion of the Magistrate Judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made. . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
De novo review requires:
at least a review of the evidence before the Magistrate Judge; the Court may not act solely on the basis of a Magistrate's Report and [Recommendation]. The Court may supplement the record by entertaining additional evidence, but is not required to do so. After reviewing the evidence, the Court is free to accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. If the Court accepts a Report and Recommendation, the Court is not required to state with specificity what it reviewed; it is sufficient for the Court to state that it engaged in a de novo review of the record and adopts the Report and Recommendation.Shoucair v. Snacker, Not Reported in F. Supp.2d, 2006 WL 2604678 (E.D. Mich.)) (citing 12 Wright, Miller Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 3070.2 (1997); Hill v. Duriron Co., 656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981); Lardie v. Birkett, 221 F. Supp.2d 806, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (Gadola, J.)) (internal citations omitted). After review, the District Judge "may accept, reject or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions." Id; see also 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B).
General objections are insufficient to preserve any issues for review: "[a] general objection to the entirety of the Magistrate's report has the same effect as would a failure to object." Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). Only specific objections are entitled to de novo review under the Magistrate's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636. Fairfield v. Wacha, 2008 WL 584940, Case No. 1:07-cv-948 (Feb. 28, 2008). A district court need not provide a de novo review of an R R where the objections are frivolous, conclusory, or too general. Id. The burden is on the party objecting to indicate and specify that portion of the R R to which it objects and that it wishes the district court to consider. Id.
"A general objection to the entirely of the magistrate's report has the same effect as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the magistrate useless. The functions of the district court are effectively duplicated as both the magistrate and the district court perform identical tasks. This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrate's Act."Id. At *2.
Each objection to the magistrate's recommendation should include how the analysis is wrong, why it was wrong and how de novo review will obtain a different result on that particular issue. For example, incorporating by reference or reproducing an earlier unsuccessful motion for summary judgment is not a sufficient objection and will be treated as an "unavailing general objection." Id. Therefore, incorporating by reference is not sufficient to preserve an objection or right to appeal the report. Id.
The instant case involves a pro se Plaintiff. When considering pro se complaints, the courts are to apply a liberal standard. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). As this Court has recognized: "A court should make a reasonable attempt to read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with the pleading requirements." Ashiegbu v. Purviance, 74 F.Supp.2d 740, 746 (S.D. Ohio 1998), citing, Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
IV. OBJECTIONS
In the present case, the Plaintiff claims that the Magistrate Judge failed to consider "new evidence" and that if such evidence had been considered, she would have received an order for remand. Plaintiff claims that because the Magistrate Judge did not mention all the evidence she entered, she should be able to appeal. (Doc. # 19, p. 1). This "Motion for a New Trial" is in response to the R R. Therefore, this motion and Plaintiff's arguments contained therein are construed as objections to the R R.
V. ANALYSIS
In her memorandum Plaintiff specifically references prior briefs that she has filed and re-iterates the quotes from her medical records contained therein. (Doc. #19, p. 1-3). She points to no new evidence and cites to no additional authority to support her objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation.
In the record before this Court, it is abundantly clear that the Magistrate Judge conducted an exhaustive review of the Plaintiff's administrative record and medical evidence. In short, Plaintiff has failed to support her argument that the Magistrate's recommendation, that the ALJ's decision was based upon substantial evidence, was in error.
Moreover, Plaintiff's objections do not address specific portions of the Magistrate Judge's decision, rather she makes a general objection to the Report and Recommendation as a whole.
Because a general objection with only references to prior arguments and evidence has the same effect as a failure to object, and because there are no specific objections upon which this Court could base a de novo review, this Court finds that the Plaintiff's objections raised in Doc. #19, as well as any objections raised in Docs. # 12, 13, and 14, are not well taken and are OVERRULED.
THEREFORE, it ordered that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation are hereby ADOPTED.