Opinion
July 15, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lane, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the cross motion is denied, and the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant.
In order to state a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract a plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that the defendant intentionally induced a third party to breach or otherwise render performance of a contract with the plaintiff impossible (see, Kronos, Inc. v. AVX Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 90, 94; Guard-Life Corp. v. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 189-190; Home Town Muffler v. Cole Muffler, 202 A.D.2d 764, 766). Specifically, the plaintiff must allege that the contract would not have been breached "but for" the defendant's conduct (see, Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116; Pyramid Brokerage Co. v Citibank (N.Y. State), 145 A.D.2d 912; Key Bank v. Lake Placid Co., 103 A.D.2d 19). Although on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) "the [narrow] question presented for review is not whether [the] plaintiff * * * should ultimately prevail in this litigation, but * * * whether [the complaint] state[s] cognizable causes of action" (Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 408), the allegations in the complaint cannot be vague and conclusory (see, O'Riordan v. Suffolk Ch., Local No. 852, Civ. Serv. Empls. Assn., 95 A.D.2d 800).
Here, the defendant Euclid Equipment, Inc. (hereinafter Euclid) breached its lease with the plaintiff by failing to make three consecutive rent payments. The plaintiff contends that but for the appellant's actions Euclid would have cured the breach and paid the subsequent rent payments that became due each month. However, the plaintiff did not support this conclusory allegation with any relevant facts. Indeed, the plaintiff merely asserted that the appellant had conversations with Euclid which caused Euclid to breach the lease agreement. The plaintiff's contention that Euclid breached the lease because of the appellant's actions, without a factual basis to support it, was insufficient to state a cause of action against the appellant for tortious interference with contractual relations (see, S.A.E. Motor Parts Co. v. Tenenbaum, 226 A.D.2d 518; M.J. K. Co. v. Matthew Bender Co., 220 A.D.2d 488; Fitzpatrick, Jr. Constr. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 138 A.D.2d 446, 449).
It is well established that leave to amend pleadings under CPLR 3025 (b) is to be freely given provided that there is no prejudice to the nonmoving party and that the amendment is not plainly lacking in merit (see, Metral v. Horn, 213 A.D.2d 524). The courts, however, should pass upon the proposed pleading's merit before granting leave to amend so as to promote judicial economy and avoid wasteful motion practice (see, Zabas v. Kard, 194 A.D.2d 784; Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 82 A.D.2d 350, 362, affd 56 N.Y.2d 332).
Here, the proposed amended complaint suffers from the same defects as the complaint with respect to the causation element of tortious interference with a contract. Accordingly, the court should not have granted leave to amend, since the merits of the proposed amended complaint were insufficient (see, Zabas v. Kard, supra).
In light of the foregoing we need not reach the parties' remaining contentions. Bracken, J.P., Thompson, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.