Opinion
Civ. 1:21-CV-1391
08-11-2021
THOMAS WASHAM, Plaintiff, v. MR. KATTNER, et al., Defendants.
Conner, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a legally mandated screening review of the plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. 1). The plaintiff, Thomas Washam is a convicted murderer:
[A]nd a familiar habeas corpus litigant in this court. Washam has on numerous occasions previously filed habeas corpus petitions challenging aspects of his 1987 state murder conviction and sentence in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. Washam v. Mahally, No. 1:16-CV-564, 2016 WL 2624973, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 9, 2016); Washam v. Proud, No. 1:13-CV-052, 2013 WL 420674, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2013); Washam v. Walsh, No. CIV.A. 1:11-0540, 2011 WL 2194081, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:11-CV-540, 2011 WL 2194408 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 2011).Washam v. Shapiro, No. 1:19-CV-838, 2019 WL 2137268, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 16, 2019). Washam's prior legal forays in federal court have been marked by two recurring themes: They have been factually unintelligible and have relied upon odd and fanciful legal theories in an attempt to secure extraordinary legal relief.
So it is here. This case, Washam's latest federal lawsuit, is almost entirely unintelligible. His pleading consists of a complaint in the nature of a land condemnation lawsuit which is accompanied by a series of handwritten documents, copies of excerpts from legal texts, correspondence and miscellaneous state court pleadings, which are presented without any apparent content, context, or coherence. (Doc. 1). In an effort to infuse some meaning into this curious collection of legal artifacts, we surmise that Washam may now believe that he owns his jail cell in fee simple and seeks our assistance in confirming his legal title to this jail cell. (Id.)
While Washam's pleadings are far from clear on this point, it seems that he believes that he “owns” his jail cell through adverse possession. While we can appreciate that, from Washam's perspective, being confined to prison for murder may feel adverse, that subjective sense of adversity does not equate with adverse possession of real property. Rather, under Pennsylvania law:
One who claims title by adverse possession must prove actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct and hostile possession of the land for twenty-one years. Baylor v. Soska, 540 Pa. 435, 658 A.2d 743, 744 (1995), citing Conneaut Lake Park, Inc. v. Klingensmith, 362 Pa. 592, 66 A.2d 828 (1949). Each of these elements must exist; otherwise, the possession will not confer title. Smith v. Peterman, 263 Pa.Super. 155, 397 A.2d 793, 796 (1978).Johnson v. Tele-Media Co. of McKean Cty., 90 A.3d 736, 740-41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). Here, there is no indication that Washam has been housed in the same cell for 21 years. Moreover, while his cell status may have been visible, notorious and distinct, it cannot be said that this cell placement was in any way hostile to the interests of the Department of Corrections as landowner. Indeed, far from this cell assignment being a unilateral act by Washam hostile to the interests of the Department of Corrections, Washam's cell placement was actually mandated by that agency.
We will direct that the lodged complaint be filed on the docket for screening purposes only and will conditionally GRANT the plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. However, finding that the plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed without prejudice to Washam filing an amended complaint which states claims upon which relief may be granted.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints-Standard of Review
This Court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Likewise, we have a legal duty to screen complaints filed by inmates that seek legal recourse against government officials in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. Denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, this complaint is fatally flawed in a number of respects, as set forth below. Accordingly, it is recommended that this complaint be dismissed complaint without prejudice to the filing of a proper amended complaint.
B. Dismissal is Warranted Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In this case, Washam's complaint runs afoul of a series of insurmountable legal obstacles. At the outset, dismissal of this complaint is warranted because this pleading still fails to comply with Rule 8's basic injunction that “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). It is well settled that: “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and that each averment be ‘concise, and direct,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 Fed.Appx. 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, when a complaint is “illegible or incomprehensible[, ]” id., or when a complaint “is not only of an unwieldy length, but it is also largely unintelligible[, ]” Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 Fed.Appx. 785, 787 (3d Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly appropriate. See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 Fed.Appx. 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 Fed.Appx. 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos v. Cohen, supra; Scibelli v. Lebanon County, supra; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 450 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005).
Similarly, dismissal is appropriate in “those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Tillio v. Spiess, 441 Fed.Appx. 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted)); Tillio v. Northland Grp. Inc., 456 Fed.Appx. 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2012). Further, a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 when the pleading is simply illegible and cannot be understood. See, e.g., Moss v. United States, 329 Fed.Appx. 335 (3d Cir. 2009) (dismissing illegible complaint); Radin v. Jersey City Medical Center, 375 Fed.Appx. 205 (3d Cir. 2010); Earnest v. Ling, 140 Fed.Appx. 431 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing complaint where “complaint fails to clearly identify which parties [the plaintiff] seeks to sue”); Oneal v. U.S. Fed. Prob., Civ. No. 05-5509, 2006 WL 758301 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2006) (dismissing complaint consisting of approximately 50 pages of mostly-illegible handwriting); Gearhart v. City of Philadelphia Police, Civ. No. 06-0130, 2006 WL 446071 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006) (dismissing illegible complaint); Kane, No. 1:15-CV-1007, 2015 WL 3953112, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2015).
These principles control here and compel the dismissal of Washam's current lawsuit. Washam's complaint is unintelligible. It is “so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Tillio, 441 Fed.Appx. at 110. Thus, Washam's pleading would leave “the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action], ” Binsack v. Lackawanna Cnty. Prison, 438 Fed.Appx. 158 (3d Cir. 2011), and this filing is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio, 441 Fed.Appx. at 109. Since Washam's current complaint makes no sense, fails to comply with Rule 8, and is so utterly unclear that it defies understanding or response, this pleading should be dismissed.
C. The Complaint Should Be Dismissed Without Prejudice.
While it is clear that Washam cannot maintain this complaint in its current form, we recognize that in civil rights cases pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, acting out of an abundance of caution, it is recommended that the Court provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to correct these deficiencies in the pro se complaint by dismissing this deficient complaint at this time without prejudice to one final effort by the plaintiff to file an amended complaint containing any proper claims that he may have.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report, provided that the plaintiff acts within 21 days of any dismissal order.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.