Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Washtech V ), 395 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10-15 (D.D.C. 2019).
and where the opposing party will not be prejudiced, Rule 24(c) permits a degree of flexibility with technical requirements. Washington All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 395 F.Supp.3d 1, 21 n.4 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting New England Anti-Vivisection Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 16-cv-149, 2016 WL 10839560, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2016) (Brown Jackson, J.).
However, courts in this Circuit have not applied this rule particularly rigidly. E.g., Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1, 21 n.4 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing Spring Constr. Co. v. Harris, 614 F.2d 374, 376-77 (4th Cir. 1980)) (holding that where the intervenors' position was apparent and where the parties would not be prejudiced by intervention, "failure to include . . . a copy of [intervenors'] proposed answer to the Complaint does not procedurally bar [them] from intervening"); Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1236 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[P]rocedural defects in connection with intervention motions should generally be excused by a court.")); Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1, 21 n.4 (D.D.C. 2019). The D.C. Circuit has explicitly noted its "willingness to adopt flexible interpretations of Rule 24 in special circumstances."
ITServe Alliance, Inc., has associational standing because, as just demonstrated, its individual members have standing to sue in their own right; the interests ITServe seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose, which is to reduce the burden of immigration on its members; and participation by the individual members is unnecessary. See Washington All. of Tech Workers v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 395 F.Supp.3d 1, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2019). I.
In Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d at 1294, intervention was permitted as timely when the movant-intervenor "did not seek to present evidence or argument," JMH Reply at 4, but, unlike here, in that case the motion to intervene was filed shortly after appeal had been noticed, when it became apparent that the prospective intervenor's interests would not be protected on appeal. JMH also relies on Washington All. of Tech. Workers v. United States Dep't of Homeland Security, 395 F. Supp. 3d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2019), to buttress its claim that intervention is permissible when it will "not disrupt th[e] litigation or unfairly disadvantage any party," JMH Reply at 5, but in that case, unlike here, the intervenor moved to intervene early in the proceedings, before the government had even filed an answer to the complaint. Moreover, as plaintiffs aptly note, despite JMH's intended scope of intervention, JMH "admits that it intends to claim that this Court's judgment entitles it to relief on remand to the agency," Pls.' Opp'n at 6 (citing JMH Mem. at 5)—a position that HHS will likely contest, as evidenced by HHS's assertion that JMH's claims are now time barred, Def.'s Opp'n at 4-6.
v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. ("Washtech IV"), 395 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2019) (Walton, J.).
Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. , 48 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11, 22 (D.D.C. 2014) (concluding that organization lacked associational standing where none of its named members had established an injury-in-fact to confer Article III standing); cf.Wash. Alliance of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 395 F. Supp. 3d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2019) (concluding that organization had associational standing where it had demonstrated a "substantial probability that at least one of [its] members" would be injured by the action they challenged). C. Additional Rules, Parties, and Arguments