Wasco County v. Afscme

10 Citing cases

  1. Mass. Org., St. Engr. Scientists v. La. Rel. Comm

    389 Mass. 920 (Mass. 1983)   Cited 24 times
    Discussing “ duty to arbitrate”

    Contrary to the MTA's assertions, we think it equally likely, as a matter of statutory construction, that the Legislature's explicit reference to the employer's right to strike and its silence as to any reciprocal obligation on the part of the employer is evidence that the Legislature intended no such quid pro quo. See Wasco County v. American Fed'n of State, County Mun. Employees, 30 Or. App. 863, 865 (1977), after remand, 46 Or. App. 859 (1980). We note that the Legislature has, in G.L.c. 150E, § 10, specifically delimited prohibited practices for a public employer without reference to unilateral changes.

  2. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. v. Pub. Emp. Rel. Bd.

    142 Cal.App.3d 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 6 times

    However, since the report of the decision includes headnotes but omits the court's opinion, we are unable to consider it. These cases may be profitably compared with Wasco County v. American Fed. of State, etc. (1980) 46 Or. App. 859 [ 613 P.2d 1067], in which it was held the state's employment relations board could properly interpret the statutory impasse procedure to make it per se unlawful for a public employer to implement its last proposed wage increase during impasse. The specific unilateral actions the Board found unlawful were: "(1) elimination of stipends for counselors, for Reading Resource, Educationally Handicapped (EH) and Educable Mentally Retarded (EMR) teachers, and for high school special education and reading teachers; (2) elimination of extra duty stipends at the junior high school for sports supervision, special education, journalism, year book, drama, reading, vocal music and band; (3) increase in class size for grades 1-3; (4) reduction in preparation time for grades 4-6, and (5) failure to bargain over the negotiable effects of the District's decision to eliminate the Miller-Unruh teaching positions and the positions of assistant football coach (2 positions)."

  3. Ass'n of Or. Corr. Emps. v. Or. & Dep't of Corr.

    353 Or. 170 (Or. 2013)   Cited 11 times
    In Assn. of Oregon Corrections Emp. v. State of Oregon, 353 Or. 170, 295 P.3d 38 (2013), the Department of Corrections changed employees’ scheduled days off and shift times without first engaging in collective bargaining.

    As DOC acknowledges, a public employer commits a per se violation of ORS 243.672(1)(e) if it makes a unilateral change regarding a mandatory subject of bargaining while the employer has a duty to bargain.See Wasco County v. AFSCME, 46 Or.App. 859, 613 P.2d 1067 (1980) (upholding ERB's authority to adopt “violation per se ” analysis of unilateral changes). When reviewing an allegation of unlawful unilateral change, ERB considers (1) whether an employer made a change to an “established practice,” often referred to as the “status quo”; (2) whether the change concerned a mandatory subject of bargaining; and (3) whether the employer exhausted its duty to bargain.

  4. Am. Fed'n of State v. City of Portland

    366 P.3d 787 (Or. Ct. App. 2016)

    The union identifies the appropriate subject as "charges for information required to be produced under PEBCA" and argues that it is per se mandatory for bargaining under ORS 243.650(7)(a) as "direct or indirect monetary benefits" and "grievance procedures." See Wasco County v. AFSCME, 46 Or App 859, 864-65, 613 P2d 1067 (1980) (upholding ERB's authority to adopt "violation per se" analysis of unilateral changes). ERB's per se model follows an analogous rule adopted by the National Labor Relations Board to enforce the duty to "bargain collectively" under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. Assn. of Oregon Corrections Emp., 353 Or at 177 n 6.

  5. Oregon State Police Officers' Ass'n v. State

    246 P.3d 97 (Or. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 1 times

    We have consistently held that "[a] unilateral action on a mandatory subject of bargaining during negotiations is a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith." Gresham Tchrs. v. Gresham Gr. Sch., 52 Or App 881, 889, 630 P2d 1304 (1981) (citing Wasco County v. AFSCME, 46 Or App 859, 613 P2d 1067 (1980)). For example, in Gresham Tchrs., while the association and school district were in the middle of contract negotiations, the school district made the unilateral decision to increase "student contact hours."

  6. Lincoln Cty. Ed. Assn. v. Lincoln Cty. S.D

    187 Or. App. 92 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 5 times

    An employer is considered automatically to have refused to bargain in good faith if the employer institutes a unilateral change to the status quo involving a mandatory subject of bargaining before bargaining for that change has ended. Marion Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. v. Marion Cty., 130 Or. App. 569, 574, 883 P.2d 222 (1994), rev den, 320 Or. 567 (1995); Wasco County v. AFSCME, 46 Or. App. 859, 861, 613 P.2d 1067 (1980). The amount of student contact time is a mandatory subject of bargaining between school districts and teachers.

  7. Federation of Oregon Parole & Probation Officers v. State, Department of Corrections

    132 Or. App. 406 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 1 times
    Discussing prior proceedings in this case

    Such changes constitute a per se violation of the statutory duty to bargain in good faith. Wasco County v. AFSCME, 46 Or. App. 859, 861, 613 P.2d 1067 (1980). Applying the per se rule, ERB reasoned that, because the state did not initiate the transfer decision, it did not unilaterally change employment conditions and could not be held liable for refusing to bargain over the impacts arising from that decision.

  8. Marion Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. v. Marion Cty

    130 Or. App. 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 6 times

    Regarding the first assignment, the County and the Sheriff concede that a unilateral change in the status quo regarding a mandatory subject of bargaining, such as hours of work, during the period of negotiations constitutes an unfair labor practice. See Wasco County v. AFSCME, 46 Or. App. 859, 613 P.2d 1067 (1980). According to the County and the Sheriff, there simply has been no change in the status quo regarding hours of work, because the collective bargaining agreement, which expressly allowed the Sheriff to change schedules as "necessary to best meet the operating needs of the department," never expired.

  9. Gresham Grade Teachers Ass'n v. Gresham Grade School District No. 4

    630 P.2d 1304 (Or. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 11 times
    Ordering employer to pay back wages

    A unilateral action on a mandatory subject of bargaining during negotiations is a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith. Wasco County v. AFSCME, 46 Or. App. 859, 613 P.2d 1067 (1980); see also, Labor Board v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 82 S Ct 1107, 8 L Ed 2d 230 (1962). Second, the Oregon Public Employment Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA) contains no language which suggests that mandatory subjects are bargainable only if referred to in written bargaining proposals.

  10. Arnold v. Board of Accountancy

    619 P.2d 912 (Or. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 4 times

    Id., at 304, 308. See also Wasco County v. AFSCME, 46 Or. App. 859, 863, 613 P.2d 1067 (1980). In fact, as the court in Megdal noted, the Board of Accountancy is authorized to adopt a Code of Professional Conduct.