Opinion
No. 41, 2005.
Submitted: November 4, 2005.
Decided: January 24, 2006.
Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Sussex County, Cr.ID No. 0008014970.
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.
ORDER
This 24th day of January 2006, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Robert W. Warrington, filed an appeal from the Superior Court's January 3, 2005 order denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2) In November 2001, Warrington was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Murder in the First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, and Conspiracy in the First Degree. He was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 25 years. Warrington's convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.
Warrington v. State, 840 A.2d 590 (Del. 2003).
(3) In this appeal, Warrington claims that: a) the Superior Court abused its discretion by failing to appoint counsel to represent him in the postconviction proceeding; b) his counsel provided ineffective assistance; c) his statement to police should have been suppressed; d) there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his convictions; e) the jury instructions were improper; and f) he was improperly denied transcripts of his counsel's opening and closing statements.
(4) Warrington's first claim is that the Superior Court abused its discretion by refusing to appoint counsel to represent him in the postconviction proceeding. A defendant does not have a right to the appointment of counsel in postconviction proceedings. Counsel will be appointed only for good cause shown. In this case, the Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing on Warrington's postconviction motion solely to clarify the nature of his claims. Based upon the evidence presented, the Superior Court confirmed that there was no factual basis for any of Warrington's claims. In the absence of a showing of "good cause," we find that the Superior Court acted within its discretion in determining that there was no need to appoint counsel for Warrington in that proceeding.
Cropper v. State, Del. Supr., No. 309, 2001, Walsh, J. (Dec. 10, 2001) (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987)).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e) (1).
(5) Warrington's second claim is that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. In order to prevail on this claim, Warrington must demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a "strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable." Our review of the record does not support Warrington's claim of ineffective assistance. He has not demonstrated that any alleged error on the part of his counsel resulted in prejudice to him.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
(6) Warrington's next claim is that his statement to the police should have been suppressed. Specifically, he argues that he was under the influence of marijuana and felt coerced when he gave his statement to the police. Because this claim was never raised in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, it is barred unless Warrington can establish cause for the procedural default and prejudice. Warrington has failed to overcome the procedural bar. Our review of the record in this case reveals no evidence of coercion and no evidence to support his claim.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B).
(7) Warrington's next claim, which he also raises for the first time in this proceeding, is that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his convictions. In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In so doing, we make no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Moreover, it is for the jury to weigh the relative credibility of the witnesses and reconcile any conflicting testimony. The record in this case reflects that there was ample evidence presented at trial to support Warrington's convictions of Murder in the First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, and Conspiracy in the First Degree. In the absence of any evidence of cause and prejudice, this claim, too, is procedurally barred.
Barnett v. State, 691 A.2d 614, 618 (Del. 1997).
Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Del. 1990).
Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B).
(8) Warrington's next claim is that the instructions given to the jury were faulty. To the extent this claim is different from the issue decided by this Court in Warrington's direct appeal, it is barred as procedurally defaulted. To the extent this claim is the same as the issue decided by this Court in Warrington's direct appeal, it is barred as formerly adjudicated. Moreover, Warrington has presented no evidence to overcome the procedural bars. The record reflects that the Superior Court properly instructed the jury on self-defense as well as the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that there was no prejudice to Warrington.
Warrington v. State, 840 A.2d 590 (Del. 2003) (holding that the trial court gave a correct instruction on the Delaware law concerning self-defense within a dwelling).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).
Thompson v. State, 610 A.2d 727 (Del. 1992).
(9) Warrington's final claim is that he was improperly denied transcripts of his counsel's opening and closing statements. The record reflects that approximately one year prior to filing his postconviction motion, Warrington requested the Superior Court to provide him with trial transcripts at State expense. The Superior Court denied his request, but stated that the request could be raised again when the postconviction motion was filed. When Warrington filed his postconviction motion, he did not renew his request for trial transcripts. Absent a showing of a particularized need for a transcript, the Superior Court is within its discretion to deny a motion for a transcript at State expense. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court with regard to Warrington's request for transcripts and no factual support for Warrington's claim that his request for transcripts was improperly denied.
Warrington later requested a copy of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing in conjunction with the instant appeal and the Superior Court granted his request.
Freeman v. State, 820 A.2d 371 (Del. 2003).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.