Warren v. State

7 Citing cases

  1. Lewis v. State

    283 Ga. 191 (Ga. 2008)   Cited 28 times
    Finding Edge violation where trial court, in response to specific jury question regarding distinction between murder and voluntary manslaughter, charged that voluntary manslaughter may be found only if “ ‘all the elements of malice murder and felony murder do not exist’ ”

    The 2005 amendment took away the right of the defendant to open and conclude, but it did nothing to alter the prosecution's rights with respect to closing argument. Warren v. State, 281 Ga. App. 490, 491 (2) ( 636 SE2d 671) (2006). 4. We disagree with Lewis' assertion that the trial court erred in allowing the lead investigator, Claude Wade, to remain in the courtroom and later testify after the rule of sequestration had been invoked.

  2. Lewis v. State

    292 Ga. App. 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 11 times

    This Court has addressed the same issue in prior cases and has ruled that the state is entitled to reserve its closing argument until after the defendant's counsel has argued. See English v. State, 282 Ga. App. 552, 553 (1) ( 639 SE2d 551) (2006); Warren v. State, 281 Ga. App. 490, 491-493 (2) ( 636 SE2d 671) (2006). Appellant concedes that this Court lacks jurisdiction to address any constitutional challenge to OCGA § 17-8-71.

  3. Newman v. State

    286 Ga. App. 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 2 times
    Affirming defendant's conviction as a party to the crime of child molestation, where the defendant instructed the underage victim to put cream on her ex-husband's penis

    Although the previous version of OCGA § 17-8-71 allowed a defendant who presented no evidence to open and conclude argument, the amended OCGA § 17-8-71, effective on July 1, 2005, provides that "[a]fter the evidence is closed on both sides, the prosecuting attorney shall open and conclude the argument to the jury," with no exception for cases in which the defendant presents no evidence. See generally Warren v. State, 281 Ga. App. 490, 491-493 (2) ( 636 SE2d 671) (2006) (allowing the State to reserve substantive argument for conclusion under OCGA § 17-8-71 as amended in 2005). Once again, a right to conclude argument is procedural, not substantive.

  4. Espinosa v. State

    645 S.E.2d 529 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 26 times

    The defendant shall be entitled to make a closing argument prior to the concluding argument of the prosecuting attorney.'" Warren v. State, 281 Ga. App. 490, 491 (2) ( 636 SE2d 671) (2006). See Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 427-428 (9) ( 554 SE2d 458) (2001); Dewberry v. State, 271 Ga. 624, 625 (2) ( 523 SE2d 26) (1999); Rowland v. State, 228 Ga. App. 66, 70 (3) (e) ( 491 SE2d 119) (1997).

  5. Parker v. State

    283 Ga. App. 714 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 19 times

    (Footnote omitted.) Warren v. State, 281 Ga. App. 490, 491 (2) ( 636 SE2d 671) (2006). Significantly, however, Parker was not required to introduce into evidence the witnesses' prior inconsistent statements, and thereby forego his right to open and close argument, in order to impeach the witnesses.

  6. English v. State

    282 Ga. App. 552 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 12 times
    Explaining that in construing a statute, this Court gives "each part of the statute meaning and avoid constructions that make some language mere surplusage," and noting that "[a]ll parts of a statute should be harmonized and given sensible and intelligent effect, because it is not presumed that the legislature intended to enact meaningless language

    1. Citing to OCGA § 17-8-71, governing the order of closing arguments, English argues that the trial court erred in failing to require the state to present a "full and fair initial closing argument" and instead, permitting the State to waive its argument until after English's counsel had argued. We recently addressed English's contention and decided it adversely to his position. Warren v. State, 281 Ga. App. 490, 491 (2) ( 636 SE2d 671) (2006). This allegation of error is without merit.

  7. People v. Payne

    461 P.3d 630 (Colo. App. 2019)   Cited 7 times

    And, even where the rule applies, a defendant’s right to not give the initial closing statement under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1 has not been interpreted as a constitutional right. See, e.g. , United States v. Cugno , 255 F. App'x 5, 12 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that "allowing the government to save its core arguments for rebuttal may constitute an abuse of discretion" and looking to whether the defendant could demonstrate prejudice); see also Warren v. State , 281 Ga.App. 490, 636 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2006) ("As construed by the federal courts, Rule 29.1 ‘does not establish a constitutional doctrine[.]’ ") (citation omitted).