Both the Tenth Circuit and Oklahoma recognize that a final judgment is presumed valid. See United States v. Ransom, 13 F.3d 407 (10th Cir. 1993) (“A guilty plea, like all final judgments, is presumed valid”); Matter of Akers' Est., 541 P.2d 284, 286 (citing Warren v. Stansbury, 126 P.2d 251 (1942)) (“a presumption [exists] that judgments, when impeached collaterally, are in all respects valid.”).
* * *" See Vinton Oil Sulphur Co. v. Gray, supra; Hamburger, Jr., v. Purcell, supra. The following cases of our sister states are also authority for the proposition that every presumption will be indulged in favor of a judgment that is collaterally attacked: Dean v. Brown, 261 Ky. 593, 88 S.W.2d 298; Sams v. Sams, 242 Ala. 240, 5 So.2d 774; Warren v. Stansbury, 190 Okla. 554, 126 P.2d 251; In re Crouch's Estate, 191 Okla. 74, 126 P.2d 994; Lee v. Harvey, 195 Okla. 178, 156 P.2d 134; Mack v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 15 S.E.2d 62; Fletcher v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 79 Cal.App. 468, 250 P. 195. In the instant case the presumption that the proceedings were legal and that proper process was issued upon the curator ad hoc duly appointed by the court is applicable, and there is nothing in this record to overcome the presumption.
A demurrer to the petition was sustained and on appeal the judgment was by this court affirmed. Warren v. Stansbury, 190 Okla. 554, 126 P.2d 251. Thereafter plaintiff commenced an action in forcible entry and detainer against the defendant Delish Warren and recovered judgment. On appeal this court reversed the judgment upon finding that plaintiff's right to proceed in forcible entry and detainer was barred by the statute of limitations.
We must presume that a sufficient showing was made to support that judgment. Warren v. Stansbury, 190 Okla. 554, 126 P.2d 251. That adjudication is binding upon plaintiff in the present action, and he may not now relitigate that question. Brown v. Higby, 191 Okla. 173, 127 P.2d 195.
HURST, V.C.J. The plaintiff, Troy Stansbury, sued the defendant, Delish Warren, in forcible entry and detention in the justice of the peace court to recover possession of the 40 acres of land that was involved in Warren v. Stansbury, 190 Okla. 544, 126 P.2d 251. The facts out of which the present controversy arose are as follows: The land was sold and conveyed to the county at a tax resale by deed executed May 20, 1936, and recorded June 11, 1936.
" In Warren v. Stanbury, 190 Okla. 554, 126 P.2d 251, we held that when a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered a judgment in relation to any subject within its jurisdiction, the presumption arises that it had before it sufficient evidence to authorize it to render such judgment and that all facts required to be proved to confer jurisdiction were duly proved though the recond is silent upon the matter. To the same effect see Drum v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 189 Okla. 307, 116 P.2d 715; In re Crouch's Estate, 191 Okla. 74, 126 P.2d 996; Yahola Oil Co. v. Causey, 181 Okla. 129, 72 P.2d 817.
Citing May v. Casker, 188 Okla. 448, 110 P.2d 287 (1940) and Hixson v. Cook, 1962 OK 273, 379 P.2d 677. Citing Warren v. Stansbury, 190 Okla. 554, 126 P.2d 251 (1942).Res Judicata has been explained such that a judgment in an action bars the parties or their privies from relitigating not only the adjudicated claim, but also any theories or issues that were actually decided together with those which could have been decided.
One of the general rule's features is its invocation of a presumption that judgments, when impeached collaterally, are in all respects valid. Warren v. Stansbury, 190 Okla. 554, 126 P.2d 251 (1942). Of more importance, however, is the fact that the doctrine is closely akin to two others — res judicata and collateral estoppel by judgment — and appears to have emerged from the equitable law of estoppel which the courts early created to aid justice and its administration by according finality to adjudicated controversies and thereby heading off repetitive litigation. Woodrow v. Ewing, Okla., 263 P.2d 167 (1953).