Opinion
No. CV05-4010286S
April 13, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE
The plaintiff and the defendant were cohabitants between October 1999 and December 2003. The plaintiff now seeks equitable relief and damages based upon an alleged breach of contract. The defendant moves to strike the plaintiff's complaint because Connecticut does not recognize common-law marriage or marital-type rights arising from cohabitation. Alternatively, the defendant moves to strike most of plaintiff's prayers for relief on the grounds that the remedies requested are only available in an action for marital dissolution and that the plaintiff has alleged no cause of action or facts that entitle her to the remedies requested.
In the plaintiff's memorandum of law, she admits that she has no right to palimony. She argues, however, that her cause of action is not for dissolution of common-law marriage, but for breach of contract, and the requested remedies may therefore be awarded. In the defendant's reply brief, he argues that plaintiff fails to state a cause of action because sounding in contract because the remedies she seeks are not available in a breach of contract case. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff does not allege an agreement that imposes a duty on the defendant to provide for the plaintiff after the termination of the parties' relationship.
For the reasons discussed below, the court denies the motion to strike the complaint but does strike some of the plaintiff's prayers for relief.
Connecticut does recognize a right of action between unmarried cohabitants. Our Supreme Court has held that "cohabitation alone does not create any contractual relationship or, unlike marriage, impose other legal duties upon the parties. In this jurisdiction, common law marriages are not accorded validity . . . The rights and obligations that attend a valid marriage simply do not arise where the parties choose to cohabit outside the marital relationship . . . Ordinary contract principles are not suspended, however, for unmarried persons living together, whether or not they engage in sexual activity." (Citations omitted.) Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 339 (1987). Our Appellate Court has recently found that "property and support disputes between unmarried cohabitants must be resolved by means outside the statutory scheme for dissolution of marriages, typically, under general contract principles." Loughlin v. Loughlin, 93 Conn.App. 618, 629 (2006).
Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to allege the elements of a breach of contract. While the complaint may not be as artfully drafted as it could have been, the court finds that plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim. "The elements of a breach of contract action are the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party and damages." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bross v. Hillside Acres, Inc., 92 Conn.App. 773, 780-81 (2005).
It should be noted that defendant did not file a request to revise the complaint.
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts: The parties agreed, inter alia, "to contribute their respective incomes to their shared family-type enterprise . . . for the purposes of maintaining their shared life-style and acquiring property, both real and personal, with the intention that such property and assets be owned legally and/or equitably by them jointly for their mutual benefit." The plaintiff "contributed her income, earnings and effort to the parties' joint enterprise . . . which produced substantial net profits and contributed substantially to the acquisition . . . of property, both real and personal . . ." While "the defendant contributed to some of the parties' personal expenses," he breached this agreement by "repudiat[ing] and den[ying] [the] plaintiff's lawful and equitable interest in the property, both real and personal . . . acquired by the parties during the period of their living together and which property had been nominally placed in [the] defendant's name although intended to belong to both parties." As a result, "the plaintiff has been placed in a situation requiring legal and equitable redress."
These allegations are sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the facts that the plaintiff intends to prove: that there was an agreement between the parties to contribute money toward the acquisition of real and personal property and that they would jointly own this property; that the plaintiff performed her part of the agreement; that the defendant has denied the plaintiff her share of the property and; that, because of this denial, she has been damaged. The court therefore finds that plaintiff has properly stated the elements of a breach of contract claim and the motion to strike the complaint is denied.
Plaintiff seeks many different legal or equitable remedies in her prayer for relief. The defendant has moved to strike all but one of them. Plaintiff agrees that her demand for palimony (section (a)) should be stricken and this is so ordered.
Under section (b) of the plaintiff's prayer for relief, she seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages and interest. "To furnish a basis for recovery of punitive damages, the pleadings must allege and the evidence must show wanton or wilful malicious misconduct, and the language contained in the pleadings must be sufficiently explicit to inform the court and opposing counsel that such damages are being sought." Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 335 (2004); see also Fioretti v. Brownstein, Docket No. CV 044001354 (J.D. of Hartford, March 1, 2005) (Satter, J.T.R.) (granting motion to strike punitive damages for failure to allege wanton or wilful malicious conduct in context of unmarried cohabitants). Plaintiff has not alleged any wanton or wilful malicious conduct by the defendant which could justify an award of punitive damages.
Plaintiff has alleged facts which could conceivably justify a discretionary award of prejudgment interest under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a. Our Appellate Court has held that "[t]o award § 37-3a interest, two components must be present. First, the claim to which the prejudgment interest attaches must be a claim for a liquidated sum of money wrongfully withheld and, second, the trier of fact must find, in its discretion, that equitable considerations warrant the payment of interest." Ceci Brothers, Inc. v. Five Twenty-One Corporation, 81 Conn.App. 419, 427 (2004).
The court grants defendant's motion to strike section (b) only insofar as it seeks punitive damages.
In sections (c), (e) and (j) of the prayer for relief, the plaintiff appears to seek equitable distribution in various forms, including specific performance. Additionally, the plaintiff seeks a judicial sale and equitable distribution in section (g). "The property rights of cohabitants are not based on the equitable distribution provisions of the marriage and divorce laws because the judicial recognition of mutual property rights between unmarried cohabitants would violate the policy of the state to strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage, as demonstrated by its abolition of common-law marriage." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Loughlin v. Loughlin, 93 Conn.App. 618, 629 (2006). Nevertheless, in lieu of an express or an implied contract, courts have ordered a judicial sale and equitably divided assets between cohabitants where the plaintiff has credibly shown an equitable interest in the property. See. e.g., Brace v. Solli, Docket No. CV 02 0817757 (J.D. of Hartford, August 8, 2005) (Shapiro, J.); Wichowska v. Kaniewski, Docket No. CV 01 0341917 (J.D. of Danbury, August 1, 2005) (Nadeau, J.); Zewinski v. Volpe Docket No. CV 98 0488391 (J.D. of New Britain, June 4, 2001) (Shapiro, J.); see also Dore v. Devine, Docket No. CV 000176933 (J.D. of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, October 6, 2000) (D'Andrea, J.) ( 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 313, 315) (denying motion to strike prayer for relief for specific performance where plaintiff sought transfer of real property to cohabitant by decedent's estate). In this case, if the plaintiff can credibly show an equitable interest in the property acquired during the parties' cohabitation, she may be entitled to the relief requested. The motion to strike sections (c), (e), (g) and (j) is therefore denied.
In section (d) of the prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks to have the court direct the defendant to maintain life insurance with the plaintiff designated as the irrevocable beneficiary and to provide further security as necessary. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-86(a), a court may direct a party to maintain life insurance to guarantee future alimony or support payments in marital dissolution actions. See, e.g., Loughlin v. Loughlin, supra, 93 Conn.App. 623-24. In the present case, the plaintiff does not provide, and research does not reveal, any authority that requires the defendant to maintain life insurance or further security in a breach of contract action between cohabitants. The motion to strike section (d) is therefore granted.
In section (f) of her prayer for relief, plaintiff seeks an accounting of the property acquired during the parties' relationship. "To support an action of accounting, one of several conditions must exist. There must be a fiduciary relationship, or the existence of mutual and/or complicated accounts, or a need of discovery, or some other special ground of equitable jurisdiction such as fraud." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mankert v. Elmatco Products, Inc., 84 Conn.App. 456, 460, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 925 (2004).
"The right to compel an account in equity exists not only in the case of those relationships which are traditionally regarded as those of trust and confidence, but also in those informal relations which exist whenever one person trusts in, and relies upon, another. The relationship between . . . parties to a business agreement . . . [has] . . . been deemed to involve such confidence and trust so as to entitle one of the parties to an accounting in equity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 460-61. While Connecticut has yet to recognize an action for an accounting between unmarried cohabitants, other jurisdictions have. See, e.g., Williams v. Lynch, 245 App.Div.2d 715, 666 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1997) (reinstating unmarried cohabitant's action for accounting because evidence could show relationship of trust and reliance); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 316 (Wis. 1987) (finding that unmarried cohabitant stated claim for accounting and share of accumulated property under theory of contract, theory of constructive trust based upon unjust enrichment and partition theory); McCall v. Frampton, 81 App.Div.2d 607, 438 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1981) (reversing dismissal of accounting and constructive claims but affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claims for future earnings).
In this case, the plaintiff alleges a relationship with the defendant based upon "express implied agreements." She further alleges that she "justifiably placed her absolute trust and reliance in [the] defendant." Therefore, construing the pleadings most favorably for the plaintiff, an informal relationship of trust and reliance may have existed between the parties, which may warrant an accounting. The motion to strike section (f) of the prayer for relief is therefore denied.
In section (h) of the prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks the appointment of a receiver. "The object of appointing receivers is to secure the property in dispute from waste or loss." Hartford Federal Savings Loan Ass'n. v. Tucker, 196 Conn. 172, 175, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920, 106 S.Ct. 250, 88 L.Ed. 258 (1985). The plaintiff has not alleged that any waste is occurring or that loss may occur. See State Street Bank Trust Co. v. Mallozzi, Docket No. CV 96 0152122 (J.D. of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford November 19, 1997) (Hickey, J.) (denying motion to strike prayer for appointment of receiver because facts pleaded indicated possibility of loss and waste). The motion to strike section (h) is therefore granted.
In section (i) of the prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks a constructive and or resulting trust. "While fraud, misrepresentation, bad faith, or overreaching generally provide a rationale for the imposition of constructive trusts, constructive trusts are also imposed in broader circumstances." 76 Am.Jur.2d 224, Trusts § 169 (2005). Between unmarried cohabitants, "courts may . . . employ . . . equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trust, when warranted by the facts of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boland v. Catalano, supra, 202 Conn. 341.
"The imposition of a constructive trust by equity is a remedial device designed to prevent unjust enrichment . . . Thus, a constructive trust arises where a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Giulietti v. Giulietti, 65 Conn.App. 813, 856, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 946, 947 (2001). Unjust enrichment is a basic element in all claims for a constructive trust. Filosi v. Hawkins, 1 Conn.App. 634, 639 (1984).
"Unjust enrichment is a very broad and flexible equitable doctrine that has as its basis the principle that it is contrary to equity and good conscience for a defendant to retain a benefit that has come to him at the expense of the plaintiff . . . The doctrine's three basic requirements are that (1) the defendant was benefited, (2) the defendant unjustly failed to pay the plaintiff for the benefits, and (3) the failure of payment was to the plaintiff's detriment . . . All the facts of each case must be examined to determine whether the circumstances render it just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, to apply the doctrine." (Citations omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 409 (2001).
In a case with somewhat similar facts, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed the issue of an unmarried cohabitant seeking a constructive trust or resulting trust. Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002). In that case, a trial court judge dismissed an unmarried cohabitant's counterclaims of breach of express and implied contract, promissory estoppel, constructive trust, resulting trust, and unjust enrichment for failure to state a cause of action because the agreements of the parties arose out of a meretricious relationship. Id., 1092-93. On appeal, the court overturned the dismissal of the counterclaims and stated that the unmarried cohabitant "asserted that the legal consideration [the defendant] provided to his former domestic partner for more than nine years unduly enriched plaintiff by benefiting his career and by helping him maintain his relationship with his children. Also, a constructive trust may have arisen in this case when [the] plaintiff allegedly acquired property in his individual name during the relationship subject to an agreement to share the same with [the defendant]. At least, a court sitting in equity might be persuaded to grant such relief if, as [the defendant] alleged, [the] plaintiff acquired certain property with the help of the legitimate services that [the defendant] provided to him under their alleged property-sharing arrangement. Such circumstances could give rise to an equitable duty on [the] plaintiff's part to convey a fair portion of the acquired property to [the defendant], especially if doing so would serve to avoid unjust enrichment." Id., 1095.
In the present case, the plaintiff asserts that her efforts and expenditures have benefited the defendant personally, in the acquisition of personal and real property during the parties' relationship, and professionally, in the opening and advancement of a veterinary business. A resulting or constructive trust may have arisen when the defendant acquired property during the relationship subject to the alleged agreement to share this property with the plaintiff. If the defendant acquired property with the help of the defendant's efforts and expenditures, a court could grant the requested equitable relief as a result of the defendant's equitable duty to convey a fair portion of the acquired property to the plaintiff, particularly if doing so would avoid unjust enrichment.
Section (i) also seeks a resulting trust. "When the purchase money for property is paid by one and the legal title is taken in the name of another, a resulting trust ordinarily arises at once, by operation of law, in favor of the one paying the money." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 193, 201 (1980). To impose a resulting trust, then, a plaintiff must show that he or she paid the purchase price and that title was taken in the name of another. See Farrah v. Farrah, 187 Conn. 495, 500 (1982). The plaintiff alleges that she contributed her money toward the acquisition of property during the parties' relationship. Further, she alleges that title to the property has been placed solely in the defendant's name.
The motion to strike section (i) of the prayer for relief is therefore denied.
In section (k) of the prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks a money judgment. Since the plaintiff may well be entitled to damages as part of the equitable relief she seeks, she is entitled to assert this claim, and the motion to strike section (k) is denied.
In section (l) of the plaintiff's prayer for relief, she also seeks attorneys fees and costs. Costs may be awarded to a prevailing party without any need to demand them in the complaint. Practice Book § 10-28. Plaintiff has not asserted any claim against defendant which could entitle her to attorneys fees if she prevailed on it. The motion to strike section (l) is therefore granted.
The motion to strike is granted as to sections (a), (b) (as to punitive damages only), (d), (h) and (l), and it is denied in all other respects. It is so ordered.