No. 05-06-00847-CR
Opinion Filed July 19, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 001-86077-05.
Before Justices MOSELEY, BRIDGES, and RICHTER
MARTIN RICHTER, Justice.
In this appeal from a conviction under section 46.02 of the Texas Penal Code for unlawfully carrying a weapon, we must determine if the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show a rungu is a "club" and prohibited weapon for purposes of section 46.02. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 46.02 (Vernon 2003). Concluding the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Roger Dale Warr was charged with the offense after Richardson police officer Glen Blackmon noticed, during a routine traffic stop, a club laying in the passenger floorboard within Warr's reach. At trial, which was before the court, Blackmon, the State's sole witness, testified Warr told him the club was a rungu, a "hunting and killing" instrument used by African tribesmen "to strike and render unconscious" gaming animals. Warr also told Blackmon that he carried it with him for self-defense because "sometimes he ends up in a wrong neighborhood and it could get kind of rough." The rungu was admitted into evidence along with a videotape of the traffic stop and arrest. The videotape shows the rungu to be a dark-colored wooden staff about eighteen inches in length and with a knob wider than the staff at one end. Warr did not testify, but called his roommate who testified Warr was moving to a different location on the day of the arrest and he did not normally carry the rungu with him. The trial court found Warr guilty as charged and assessed punishment at thirty days' confinement, probated for six months, and a $100 fine. Discussion
In two issues, Warr complains that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. Warr bases his argument on the definition of "club" as set forth in section 46.01 of the penal code. That section defines "club" as an instrument, such as a "blackjack, nightstick, mace, or tomahawk," that is "specially designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury or death by striking a person with the instrument." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 46.01(1). Warr argues that Blackmon's testimony that Warr told him the rungu was used for "hunting and killing" and to render animals "unconscious"-the only testimony concerning the function of the rungu-is insufficient to prove the rungu is "specially designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury" upon a person because it is based on hearsay and not personal knowledge. Warr also argues Blackmon's testimony, even if properly admitted, is still insufficient. In making this argument, Warr relies on Heerema v. State, 786 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no pet.), in which this Court concluded that evidence showing an instrument "polished on one end and rough cut on the other" and used by the appellant for self-defense was insufficient to prove it was a "club" under section 46.01 because there was no specific evidence the instrument was "adapted for use as a club." Id. at 533. Warr also relies on another case from this Court in which we concluded that a "nightstick-like" instrument-an eighteen-inch long wooden, cylindrical instrument with a strap through the handle-was not a club within the meaning of section 46.01 because evidence showed its function was to gauge air pressure in tires and not that of a weapon. See Coleman v. State, 790 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no pet.). Warr argues that although the rungu has a knob on one end and not a strap, it is otherwise similar to the "nightstick-like" instrument in Coleman-same length, wooden, and having a "function other than that of a weapon." Thus, he maintains, the rungu is not a club within the definition of section 46.01 and his conviction should be reversed. We disagree. We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict of guilt by viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the offense. Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Under this standard, the fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight given to the evidence, may draw reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts, and is entitled to resolve any conflicts in testimony and reject or accept any or all of the evidence presented by either side. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Loera v. State, 14 S.W.3d 464, 467 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.). Under the standard of review for a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether the fact-finder was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by viewing all the evidence in a neutral light. See Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). In conducting this review, we are permitted to substitute our judgment for the fact-finder's on the question of witness credibility and weight of evidence determinations, "albeit to a very limited degree." Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). We will reverse a verdict of guilty on a factual sufficiency challenge only when we can say, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradict's the fact-finder's verdict. Id. Viewing the evidence here under the appropriate standard, we conclude the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the rungu is a club under section 46.01 and that Warr carried it unlawfully. Unlike Heerema and Coleman where no evidence was presented showing the instrument was "adapted as a club" and functioned as a weapon, the State here presented testimony showing the rungu is a throwing instrument used for "hunting and killing" and rendering animals unconscious. From this, the trial court could reasonably find the rungu functions as a weapon or club and is "specially designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury." See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 46.01. That the testimony showed the rungu is used in Africa for hunting and killing animals and not humans is of no consequence as the trial court could reasonably infer the eighteen-inch throwing rungu that can kill or injure animals is an instrument also "specially designed, made, or adapted" for the purpose of injuring or killing a person. In reaching our conclusion, we necessarily reject Warr's argument that Blackmon's testimony was insufficient because it was based on hearsay and not personal knowledge. In considering the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence, whether properly admitted, before the fact-finder. See Wilson, 7 S.W.3d at 141; Jones, 944 at 647-48. We resolve Warr's two issues against him. In an additional third issue, Warr argues the trial court erred in overruling his hearsay and lack of personal knowledge objection to Blackmon's testimony that Warr told him what the purpose of the rungu was. However, as the State points out, other than citing generally to case law concerning the standard for reviewing trial court rulings on the admissibility of evidence and Texas Rules of Evidence 602 and 802 concerning lack of personal knowledge and hearsay, Warr provides no substantive legal analysis, argument, or authority to support his contention that the court erred in overruling his objections. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). As such, his point is inadequately briefed and presents nothing for review. Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (arguments that fails to cite to authority in support of claim presents nothing for review); Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 614 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (concluding court could not adequately evaluate issue without substantive argument or supporting authorities). We resolve Warr's third issue against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.