Warner v. State

9 Citing cases

  1. Oller v. State

    472 N.E.2d 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 3 times

    This Court has previously held that computer printouts are admissible as they show arrests, but by themselves do not prove prior convictions. Cunningham v. State, (1982) Ind. App., 438 N.E.2d 308; Warner v. State, (1980) Ind. App., 406 N.E.2d 971. IND. CODE § 9-11-4-14(b)(1), provides that a certified copy of a person's driving record obtained from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles is prima facie evidence of previous convictions of operating while intoxicated.

  2. Mogle v. State

    471 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 8 times
    In Mogle we vacated a conviction of operating a motor vehicle while an habitual traffic offender because the State failed to connect to the defendant Mogle any court documents showing that someone with the same name had been found an habitual traffic offender.

    This document was properly admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. See Warner v. State, (1980) Ind. App., 406 N.E.2d 971. Exhibits 6 and 7 are both court records of convictions with certificates of the respective court clerks involved. Exhibit 7 was properly certified in accordance with T.R. 44(A)(1) and was, therefore, properly admitted.

  3. Linnebur v. People

    476 P.3d 734 (Colo. 2020)   Cited 25 times
    In Linnebur, we commented that the unfairness associated with permitting the defendant to be tried for a misdemeanor to the jury and then sentenced for a felony by the judge on the basis of a fact that had to be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence was so significant that it risked running afoul of the Sixth Amendment.

    ; Ronning v. State , 116 Nev. 32, 992 P.2d 260, 261 (2000) ; State v. Thompson , 164 N.H. 447, 58 A.3d 661, 663 (2012) ; State v. Begay , 130 N.M. 61, 17 P.3d 434, 435–36 (2001) ; Commonwealth v. Reagan , 348 Pa.Super. 589, 502 A.2d 702, 704 (1985) ; State v. Payne , 332 S.C. 266, 504 S.E.2d 335, 336 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) ; State v. Bacon , 286 N.W.2d 331, 332 (S.D. 1979) ; State v. Nash , 294 S.W.3d 541, 551 (Tenn. 2009) ; State v. Palmer , 189 P.3d 69, 72 (Utah Ct. App. 2008), aff'd , 220 P.3d 1198 (Utah 2009) ; State v. Tatro , 161 Vt. 182, 635 A.2d 1204, 1207 (1993) ; State v. Braunschweig , 384 Wis.2d 742, 921 N.W.2d 199, 208 (2018) ; Derrera v. State , 327 P.3d 107, 110–11 (Wyo. 2014).Ross v. State, 950 P.2d 587, 589–90 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) ; Peters v. State , 286 Ark. 421, 692 S.W.2d 243, 245 (1985) ; State v. Tenay , 156 Conn.App. 792, 114 A.3d 931, 939 (2015) ; State v. Finelli , 780 So.2d 31, 33 (Fla. 2001) ; State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai'i 383, 219 P.3d 1170, 1185 (2009) ; Warner v. State , 406 N.E.2d 971, 973–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) ; State v. Ellender, 274 So.3d 144, 151 (La. Ct. App. 2019) ; State v. Berkelman , 355 N.W.2d 394, 396 (Minn. 1984) ; People v. Van Buren , 82 N.Y.2d 878, 609 N.Y.S.2d 170, 631 N.E.2d 112, 113 (1993) ; State v. Hyden , 175 N.C.App. 576, 625 S.E.2d 125, 127 (2006) ; State v. Mann, 876 N.W.2d 710, 713–14 (N.D.), vacated on other grounds , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 114, 196 L.Ed.2d 5 (2016) (mem.); State v. Brooke , 113 Ohio St.3d 199, 863 N.E.2d 1024, 1027 (2007) ; Baker v. State , 966 P.2d 797, 798 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) ; State v. Probst , 339 Or. 612, 124 P.3d 1237, 1244–45 (2005) ; Oliva v. State , 548 S.W.3d 518, 519–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) ; McBride v. Commonwealth , 24 Va.App. 30, 480 S.E.2d 126, 127 (1997) ; State v. Santos , 163 Wash.App. 780, 260 P.3d 982, 984 (2011) ; State v. Fox , 207 W.Va. 239, 531 S.E.2d 64, 66 n.2 (1998).

  4. Spranger v. State

    498 N.E.2d 931 (Ind. 1986)   Cited 41 times

    [I.C. 18-3-1-20, 18-3-1-32, recodified as I.C. 36-5-7-4 by Acts 1980, P.L. 212, § 4.] In Warner v. State (1980), Ind. App., 406 N.E.2d 971, the Second District of the Court of Appeals construed the former statute I.C. § 18-3-1-32 which delineated the powers and duties of a town marshal. 18-3-1-32 [48-213].

  5. Coates v. State

    650 N.E.2d 58 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 12 times
    Holding motor vehicle documents fell within exception because they were a compilation of the bureau's "regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities"

    Nevertheless, on these facts, the trial court properly admitted Exhibit 1 over Coates' Rule 803(8)(c) objection. Before adoption of the Rules of Evidence, our courts consistently held that properly certified BMV records fell within the common law "official records exception" to the hearsay rule and, thus, were admissible. See Cruite v. State (1994), Ind., 641 N.E.2d 1264, 1265-66; Collins v. State (1991), Ind., 567 N.E.2d 798, 800; Mogle v. State (1984), Ind. App., 471 N.E.2d 1146, 1151; Warner v. State (1980), Ind. App., 406 N.E.2d 971, 973. Although according to one commentator, "Rule 803(8) is far more specific, and demands a far different analysis, than earlier Indiana law," we discern no reason why the BMV records in the present case should not be treated as public records admissible under Evidence Rule 803(8). 13 R. MILLER, INDIANA PRACTICE § 803.108, at 653 (1995); see State v. Morin (1991), Me., 598 A.2d 170, 172 (computer printout of driving record admissible under Maine Evidence Rule 803(8), which is substantially similar to Indiana rule).

  6. Quakenbush v. Lackey

    604 N.E.2d 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 4 times

    We have held that it is inappropriate to cite unpublished opinions to the Court. Miller Brewing Company v. Best Beers of Bloomington (1991), Ind. App., 579 N.E.2d 626, 633, n. 4, reh. denied; Qazi v. Qazi (1986), Ind. App., 492 N.E.2d 692, 693, n. 2. reh. denied, trans. denied; Drake v. City of Gary (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 624, 626, n. 1; Warner v. State (1980), Ind. App., 406 N.E.2d 971, 973, n. 8. Governmental entities and their employees such as police officers are subject to liability for torts committed by them, unless the activity giving rise to the tort falls within the exceptions enumerated in the Tort Claims Act.

  7. Jennings v. State

    503 N.E.2d 906 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 4 times

    The BMV driving record must unambiguously show that the defendant has previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated. See e.g., Warner v. State (1980), Ind. App., 406 N.E.2d 971, 976. Here, however, the BMV report is not the only evidence which supports the conclusion that Jennings had a prior conviction for driving while intoxicated.

  8. Oller v. State

    469 N.E.2d 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 7 times

    Appellant objected to the admission of State's Exhibits Nos. 4, 5, and 6, arguing that they failed to establish a prior conviction. It is the law in Indiana that a certified copy of one's driving record, attested as public records by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, is admissible. Cunningham v. State, (1982) Ind. App., 438 N.E.2d 308; Warner v. State, (1980) Ind. App., 406 N.E.2d 971. However, Cunningham and Warner also hold that such computer printouts are not by themselves adequate to prove prior convictions, because their entries are ambiguous and confusing. They do not show convictions, only arrests.

  9. Cunningham v. State

    438 N.E.2d 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 5 times

    Cunningham's argument is that the "records do not support the conclusions and therefore the conclusions and supporting records when taken together are confusing, ambiguous, and raise the spectre of an error in interpretation," and are not sufficient to prove a prior conviction of driving under the influence. He cites State v. Loehmer, (1973) 159 Ind. App. 156, 304 N.E.2d 835, and Warner v. State, (1980) Ind. App., 406 N.E.2d 971, in support of his argument. We are of the opinion that those cases do not aid his cause.