Repinski v. Jubilee Oil Company, 85 Ill.App.3d 15, 40 Ill.Dec. 291, 295, 405 N.E.2d 1383, 1387 (1980). See also Warner v. City of Chicago, 72 Ill.2d 100, 19 Ill.Dec. 1, 378 N.E.2d 502 (1978); Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst, 11 Ill.2d 601, 145 N.E.2d 105 (1957). "The law is . . . that a city can be found guilty of negligence only when the defect in a sidewalk is such that a reasonably prudent man should anticipate some danger to persons walking upon it."
A disparity between a photograph and the object as it appeared at the time in question does not render the photograph inadmissible if the authenticating witness acknowledges the disparity and the jury is not misled by it. Warnerv. City of Chicago, 72 Ill. 2d 100, 105 (1978); Burke v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R. Co., 148 Ill. App. 3d 208, 213-14 (1986). We review the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of a photograph, including the question of whether a proper foundation was laid, for an abuse of discretion.
Defendants argued that, under the Illinois rule, a sidewalk deviation one-half inch to three-fourths of an inch high is such a minor defect that it is de minimis and, as a matter of law, cannot be the basis of a negligence action. (See Warner v. City of Chicago (1978), 72 Ill.2d 100, 103-04, citing Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst (1957), 11 Ill.2d 601, 604 (municipality has no duty to keep all sidewalks in perfect condition; slight inequalities in level or other minor defects frequently found in traversed areas are not actionable).) Plaintiff argued that the facts presented a jury question and the minor defect rule should not be applied to situations where a publicly used sidewalk belongs to private landowners.
Slight inequalities in the levels of sidewalks and other minor defects frequently found in traversed areas are not actionable unless the defect in the sidewalk is such that a reasonably prudent person should anticipate some danger to persons walking on the sidewalk. ( Warner v. City of Chicago (1978), 72 Ill.2d 100, 103-04, 378 N.E.2d 502, 503; Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst (1957), 11 Ill.2d 601, 604-05, 145 N.E.2d 105, 106-07.) Both the Warner and Arvidson cases, and others which have discussed similar issues, make it clear there is no mathematical standard which can be used to determine when a defect is so minor as to not be actionable. ( Warner, 72 Ill.2d at 104, 378 N.E.2d at 503; Arvidson, 11 Ill.2d at 604, 145 N.E.2d at 106.
We cannot say the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict. β’ 5, 6 Defendant also contends that, as a matter of law, the defect in the sidewalk depicted in exhibit No. 5 was so slight as to be nonactionable. Although a city has a duty to maintain its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition, it does not have to keep them in perfect condition and slight inequalities in level or other minor defects are not actionable. ( Warner v. City of Chicago (1978), 72 Ill.2d 100, 103, 378 N.E.2d 502; Repinski v. Jubilee Oil Co. (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 15, 20, 405 N.E.2d 1383.) Certain defects are so slight that their actionability may be determined as a matter of law ( Warner v. City of Chicago (1978), 72 Ill.2d 100, 104, 378 N.E.2d 502; Hess v. City of Chicago (1981), 101 Ill. App.3d 426, 429, 428 N.E.2d 581, appeal denied (1982), 88 Ill.2d 550), but the question may be withdrawn from a jury only where all reasonable minds would agree that a claimed defect is so minor that no danger to pedestrians could reasonably be foreseen ( Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst (1957), 11 Ill.2d 601, 609, 145 N.E.2d 105; Repinski v. Jubilee Oil Co. (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 15, 20, 405 N.E.2d 1383; Baker v. City of Granite City (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 157, 160, 394 N.E.2d 33, appeal denied (1979), 79 Ill.2d 619). β’ 7 Although a mathematical standard to determine the unreasonableness of a defect cannot be established ( Warner v. City of Chicago (1978), 72 Ill.2d 100, 104, 378 N.E.2d 502; Arvidson v. City
The village cites Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst (1957), 11 Ill.2d 601, and its progeny for the proposition that, where all reasonable minds would agree that a defect is so minor that no danger could reasonably be foreseen, the question should be withdrawn from the jury. These cases all related to sidewalk defects and emphasized that, in determining which defects are "minor," each case must be examined as to its own particular facts. ( 11 Ill.2d 601, 604; Warner v. City of Chicago (1978), 72 Ill.2d 100, 104; Repinski v. Jubilee Oil Co. (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 15, 20, 405 N.E.2d 1383, 1387; Baker v. City of GraniteCity (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 157, 160, 394 N.E.2d 33, 34.) While all agreed that minor sidewalk defects are not actionable, each concluded that the defect in the sidewalk at issue, which ranged in those cases from 1 1/2 inches deep to "about 2" inches deep, was actionable under the circumstances. ( Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst (1957), 11 Ill.2d 601; Warner v. City of Chicago (1978), 72 Ill.2d 100; Repinski v. Jubilee Oil Co. (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 15, 405 N.E.2d 1383; Baker v. City of Granite City (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 157, 394 N.E.2d 33.)
ΒΆ 43 There is no mathematical formula or bright-line test for determining whether a sidewalk defect is de minimis . Thus, the question turns on the facts of each case. Warner v. City of Chicago, 72 Ill. 2d 100, 104, 19 Ill.Dec. 1, 378 N.E.2d 502 (1978). Factors relevant to this analysis include the difference in height between adjoining slabs, the anticipated volume of traffic on the sidewalk and whether the sidewalk is located in a commercial or residential area.
In the second instance, the "stumbling point" between actionable and de minimis occurs at a firm two inches. Birck, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 122 ("[t]he stumbling point for most of these cases seems to occur as the defect approaches two inches"; height difference of 1 ? inches held to be de minimis); see also Warner v. City of Chicago, 72 Ill. 2d 100, 104-05 (1978) (height difference of 1 ? inches was de minimis); Putman v. Village of Bensenville, 337 Ill. App. 3d 197, 202-03 (2003) (height difference of one inch was de minimis). The case-by-case factors that seem to impede the uniform application of the two-inch "stumbling point" include whether the subject sidewalk was commercial versus residential, the amount of foot traffic, the location of the defect relative to the property's ingress and egress, and the total amount of sidewalk to monitor.
A municipality has no duty to repair sidewalk defects unless a reasonably prudent person should anticipate danger to persons walking on the sidewalk. ( Arvidson, 11 Ill.2d at 605, 145 N.E.2d at 107; Warner v. City of Chicago (1978), 72 Ill.2d 100, 103-04, 378 N.E.2d 502, 503; Birck v. City of Quincy (1993), 241 Ill. App.3d 119, 122, 608 N.E.2d 920, 923, appeal denied (1993), 151 Ill.2d 561, 616 N.E.2d 331.) Thus, de minimis or slight defects frequently found in traversed areas are not actionable, as a matter of law.
Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst (1957), 11 Ill.2d 601, 145 N.E.2d 105. Slight inequalities in level or other minor defects are not actionable. ( Warner v. City of Chicago (1978), 72 Ill.2d 100, 104, 378 N.E.2d 502, 503; Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst (1957), 11 Ill.2d 601, 145 N.E.2d 105.) A diversity of opinion exists as to which defects are minor. In Arvidson, the court noted that each case must be examined on its own facts and no mathematical standard could be adopted which would fix the line of demarcation between minimal and actionable. ( 11 Ill.2d 601, 604, 145 N.E.2d 105, 106.)