Opinion
No. 2-489 / 01-1414.
Filed July 31, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, GARY KIMES, Judge.
Appellant appeals the decision of the district court that she had only a security interest in a life insurance policy. AFFIRMED.
James Ballard and David Brown of Hansen, McClintock Riley, Des Moines, for appellant.
Richard Malm and Krista Tanner of Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler Hagan, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Hayden, Habhab, and Snell, S.J.
Senior Judges assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001).
In this appeal we must decide whether the district court erred when, in construing the parties' dissolution decree, it held that the appellant (Catherine) held but a security interest in the proceeds of an AIG Life Insurance policy having a death payable value of $205,232.88 (includes interest of $5,232.88). As a result of its holding, the district court awarded Catherine her remaining alimony of $9000 granted her under the dissolution decree along with the policy premiums paid by her and her share of accrued interest for a total of $15,068.20. The Estate was awarded the balance of $190,164.68. Catherine clams on appeal that under the terms and provisions of the stipulation and decree, she was given a full ownership interest in the AIG Life Insurance policy. We affirm.
In awarding Catherine the amounts she paid as premiums on the life insurance policy, the trial court relied on a statement in the Estate's brief in support of its summary judgment motion that Catherine is entitled to reimbursement for premiums paid of $5,624. The amounts awarded are not in dispute on appeal.
1. Catherine and William Wefel Warner (William) were married in Des Moines, Iowa in 1985. Their marriage was dissolved in Arizona in 1993. The disputed language in the decree that gives rise to this controversy is as follows:
5. SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE
That commencing October 1993, Husband shall pay to wife the sum of $3,000 per month as and for spousal maintenance for a total of seven (7) years (84 months).6. LIFE INSURANCE
Wife's receipt of spousal maintenance as identified in the section above shall be secured against certain life insurance proceeds on Husband's life during the term of the award. Husband presently has a $200,000 policy through AIG Life Insurance Company (policy number L85409987). Wife shall be the owner and sole beneficiary thereon in the full death benefit so long as a spousal maintenance obligation exists. * * *
* * *
The requirement to transfer ownership of the life insurance policy to Wife (and restrictions on Husband's interference with Wife's maintaining thereof) shall be deemed to be an integral part of the spousal maintenance obligation and shall be enforceable thereas.
Identical language to the above appears in an instrument designated as a "Property Settlement Agreement" that was executed by the parties and incorporated into the dissolution decree. The agreement is comprehensive and detailed in defining the rights and obligations of the parties. In a separate paragraph identified as "Division of Property," each spouse conveyed to the other certain property and specifically listed in attachments other properties. The disputed life insurance policy does not appear therein. Rather, it appears under a separate heading identified as "Life Insurance."
2. William died June 20, 2000, in Des Moines. His estate was open for probate in Polk County Iowa. On the date of his death, there were yet due three alimony payments. Catherine contacted AIG Life Insurance Company to seek payment of the $200,000 benefits of the policy. AIG responded by informing Catherine that a claim to those proceeds was made by the Warner Estate.
Catherine then brought this suit against AIG alleging breach of contract. AIG responded by depositing the funds with the court and interpleading the Estate. A stipulation was entered into by the parties whereby the proceeds of the policy plus interest was deposited with the court and AIG was dismissed from this action. This left Catherine and the Estate to contend for the policy proceeds. Appropriate pleadings followed along with summary judgment motions.
3. The district court, after distinguishing the facts in this case from those in Serrano v. Hendricks, 400 N.W.2d 77 (Iowa Ct.App. 1986), held that Catherine had only a "secured interest to the extent of her spousal support in the life insurance policy and not ownership."
In reaching this result, the district court sustained the interpleader-defendant's (Estate of William Wefel Warner) motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, our review of its summary judgment ruling is for correction of errors of law. Iowa R. App. P. 4; Kelly v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 2000). If the district court applies an erroneous rule of law that materially affects its decision, we will reverse. Hollingsworth v. Schminkey, 553 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Iowa 1996).
The district court was called upon to interpret the meaning of the dissolution decree. The construction of a dissolution decree is a matter of law. Sorenson v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Iowa 1984). When construing dissolution decrees, we have said:
The decree should be construed in accordance with its evident intention. Indeed the determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the decree. Effect is to be given to that which is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed. Of course, in determining this intent, we take the decree by its four corners and try to ascertain from it the intent as disclosed by the various provisions of the decree.Serrano, 400 N.W.2d at 79 ( citing In re Roberts Estate, 257 Iowa 1, 6, 131 N.W.2d 458, 461 (1964)) (citations omitted).
4. We agree with the trial court that when the decree and the incorporated property settlement agreement are considered by their four corners, they reflect an intent to grant Catherine only a security interest in the AIG policy. It is true there is the language in the decree that Catherine "shall be the owner and sole beneficiary" of the life insurance policy. But when all provisions of the decree and incorporated property settlement agreement are considered, it is clear that such ownership interest was given as security for the spousal maintenance awarded her under the dissolution decree. That is what the first sentence of the paragraph where the provision appears states, i.e. "wife's receipt of spousal maintenance. . . . shall be secured against life insurance proceeds on Husband's life during the terms of the award."
As noted earlier in this opinion, in a separate paragraph identified as 23 "Division of Property" each spouse conveyed to the other certain property and specifically listed in attachments other properties. Paragraph 23 further provides that the listed assets are to be the sole property of the person acquiring the same. In addition, it makes mention that such division is equitable. The AIG policy is not included in those conveyances.
The guiding word in the aforesaid statement is secured. Secure is defined as "supported or backed by security or collateral." Black's Law Dictionary 1357 (7th Ed. 1999). Like in the results reached in Sarrano, when a life insurance policy is given for security for support payments, the beneficiary (Catherine) is entitled only to as much of the policy as is necessary to properly secure payment of those payments. See Sarrano, 400 N.W.2d at ___.
AFFIRMED.