"If the materials used in House No. 1, for example, were fully paid for, it is wrong to charge against that house a portion of the amount due for materials used in house No. 75." 93 A.2d 316, 319. Our conclusions are that the requirement of apportionment in our mechanics' lien law is mandatory and that Warner has failed to comply with it.

Heitz v. Savers, Del. Super., 113 A. 901, 901-902 (1913); E. J. Hollingsworth Co. v. Contimental-Diamond Fiber Co., Del. Super., 175 A. 266, 268 (1934); Ceritano Brickwork, Inc. v. Kirkwood Indus., Inc., Del. Supr. 276 A.2d 267, 268 (1971).Carson at *3 ( citing Warner Co. v. Leedom Construction Co., Del. Super., 93 A.2d 316, 319 (1952)).Carson at *3 (citations omitted).

And as the center is held by a single owner, and it is not contemplated, nor is it likely, that it will be divided among several owners, the entry of a unitary lien upon the center does not present the problems which would result from entry of a unitary lien upon a housing development. Compare Warner Co. v. Leedom Const. Co., Del.Super., 8 Terry 457, 93 A.2d 316 (1952), aff'd Del.Supr., 9 Terry 58, 97 A.2d 884 (1953); Di Mondi v. S. S. Builders, Del.Supr., 11 Terry 123, 124 A.2d 725 (1956). For purposes of the statement of claim for mechanics' lien now before the Court, then, the entire shopping center was properly designated as a single structure.

It has been held without exception that the Delaware Mechanics Lien Law does not permit a unitary lien upon several houses in a housing development. Warner Co. v. Leedom Const. Co., Del.Super., 8 Terry 457, 93 A.2d 316 (1952), aff'd., Del.Supr., 9 Terry 58, 97 A.2d 884 (1953). DiMondi v. S. S. Builders, 11 Terry 123, 124 A.2d 725 (1956).