Opinion
Case No. 99-3362-JWL
November 13, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants denied him the right to freely exercise his religion by observing the Jewish holiday of Sukkot in 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000. The matter is before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 118). For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the defendants' motion.
As the court explained in its Memorandum Order entered on November 12, 2002, Sukkot (also spelled Sukkoth, Succoth, Sukkos, Succot, or Succos) is "a Jewish autumn festival of double thanksgiving (one of the three Pilgrim festivals of the Old Testament) that begins on the 15th day of Tishri (in September or October), five days after Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement." The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 11 at 362 (15th ed. 1994). During the holiday, "[i]deally, Jews are to reside in booths-walled structures covered with thatched roofs-for the duration of the festival; in practice, most observant Jews take their meals in the sukka ("booth") but reside at home." Id. at Vol. 22, 426.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Wares originally alleged that defendant Chaplain VanBebber, in his individual and official capacity, violated plaintiffs First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion by intentionally interfering with his ability to observe the Jewish holiday of Sukkot in 1997 and 1998. Plaintiff sought both monetary and injunctive relief.
On June 7, 2002, defendant VanBebber filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 44) Mr. Wares' complaint. Therein, he argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred plaintiffs claims for monetary damages in the Chaplain's official capacity and qualified immunity barred such claims in his personal capacity. Moreover, defendant VanBebber argued that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983.
On November 12, 2002, the court entered its Memorandum Order granting defendant's motion in part, and denying it in part. Specifically, the court granted the motion as to plaintiffs request for damages against defendant VanBebber in his official capacity because the Eleventh Amendment bars such actions. The court denied the motion, however, as to plaintiffs damage claims against defendant VanBebber in his individual capacity because Mr. Wares' complaint alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right concerning the events surrounding Sukkot observance in 1997 and 1998. For the same reason, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a claim for relief.
On October 28, 2002, before the court entered its Memorandum Order resolving defendant VanBebber's motion to dismiss, Mr. Wares moved to amend his complaint. The proposed amended complaint sought to add new defendants and claims related to events regarding the observance of Sukkot in 1999 and 2000. Magistrate Judge Walters permitted Mr. Wares to amend his complaint to include the claims related to the observance of Sukkot in 1999 and 2000 and to add Khalil Green, Gloria Geither, and L.E. Bruce as defendants.
On August 11, 2003, defendants VanBebber, Green, Geither and Bruce filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Mr. Wares filed his response on October 14, 2003.
ANALYSIS
In their motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars Mr. Wares' claims. Alternatively, the defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants seek relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
I. Standard
When, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court construes his or her pleadings liberally and holds the pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 2001); accord Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)). In other words, "[n]ot every fact must be described in specific detail, . . . and the plaintiff whose factual allegations are close to stating a claim but are missing some important element that may not have occurred to him should be allowed to amend his complaint." Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110). The liberal construction of the plaintiffs complaint, however, "does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based," and "conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based." Id. (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110).
Mr. Wares was proceeding pro se when the court granted his motion to file an amended complaint. Moreover, Mr. Wares signed the amended complaint, under penalty of perjury, before he was appointed counsel on June 25, 2003, and before counsel entered her appearance on his behalf on September 2, 2003. As such, the court will construe his pro se pleading liberally.
The court will dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim only when "it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his [or her] claims which would entitle him [or her] to relief," Poole v. County of Otero, 271 F.3d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)), or when an issue of law is dispositive. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, and all reasonable inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff. Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001). The issue in resolving a motion such as this is "not whether [the] plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 122 S.Ct. 992, 997 (2002) (quotation omitted).
II. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment bars actions for damages against state officials in their official capacity. Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-02 (1984); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985). In this action, Mr. Wares' amended complaint fails to specify whether he is suing the defendants in their official or individual capacities. Defendants contend that because he "has failed to sue any of the four remaining defendants in their personal capacities, it must be inferred that they have been sued in their official capacities." The court cannot agree. While it is true that the amended complaint does not specify in what capacity Mr. Wares is suing the defendants, the court must construe pro se pleadings liberally. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). Thus, the court construes the amended complaint as asserting claims against defendants in their individual capacities, Scherer v. United States, 241 F. Supp.2d 1270, 1279 (D. Kan. 2003) (construing claims against defendants in their individual capacities in light of plaintiffs pro se status); Murphy v. Internal Revenue Serv., 2001 WL 1488603, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 7, 2001) (construing pro se complaint as asserting claims against defendants in their official and individual capacities despite the fact that all references to defendants referred to the manner in which they performed their official responsibilities), and denies defendants' motion to dismiss on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
II. Qualified Immunity
Defendants, in the alternative, move to dismiss Mr. Wares' amended complaint on qualified immunity grounds. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The purpose of qualified immunity is to evade excessive disruption of governmental functions and to dispose of frivolous claims in the early stages of litigation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The Supreme Court has reiterated that qualified immunity gives officials "a right, not merely to avoid `standing trial,' but also to avoid the burdens of `such pretrial matters as discovery.'" Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996) (quoting Mitchdl v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Consequently, the Supreme Court has explained "that courts should resolve the `purely legal question,' Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991), raised by a qualified immunity defense `at the earliest possible stage in litigation.'" Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)).
"In evaluating a claim for qualified immunity, the court must first determine whether, considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts alleged state the violation of a constitutional right." PETA, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d 1198, 1207 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). "If so, the court must go on to determine whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of injury." Id. "If the answer to either of these questions is no, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity." Id.
1. Violation of a Constitutional Right
The first inquiry is whether Mr. Wares has alleged facts that state a violation of a constitutional right. The United States Supreme Court has held that "convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison" and that "inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (internal citation omitted). "In some instances, however, constitutional rights must be curtailed due to the very fact of incarceration or for valid penological reasons." Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348). "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id. (quoting Turner v. Sofley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
To balance the prisoner's constitutional rights with legitimate penal interests, the court must determine:
(1) whether a rational connection exists between the prison policy regulation and a legitimate governmental interest advanced as its justification; (2) whether alternative means of exercising the right are available notwithstanding the policy or regulation; (3) what effect accommodating the exercise of the right would have on guards, other prisoners, and prison resources generally; and (4) whether ready, easy-to-implement alternatives exist that would accommodate the prisoner's rights.Suthers, 286 F.3d at 1185 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91). Mr. Wares, however, need not allege that prison officials completely denied his right to observe a religious practice in order to state a violation of the free exercise clause. Makin v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff sufficiently states a constitutional violation by alleging that prison officials placed an unreasonable burden upon him that diminished the spiritual experience he otherwise could have gained by observing Sukkott. Id. (finding that testimony demonstrated that burden defendants placed on plaintiff diminished the spiritual experience he otherwise could gain through Ramadan, which was "sufficient to constitute an infringement on his right to freely exercise his religion").
Here, defendants move to dismiss all claims founded upon their alleged interference with plaintiffs ability to observe Sukkot in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. As to plaintiffs observance of Sukkot in 1997 and 1998, Mr. Wares alleges that prison officials refused to provide him with a sukka booth. As such, Mr. Wares contends that he was unable to observe the religious holiday, which requires him to take his meals in the sukka. In its Memorandum Order resolving defendant VanBebber's motion to dismiss, the court found that these and other allegations, taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, were sufficient to state a violation of plaintiffs First Amendment right to reasonably exercise his religious beliefs. See Doc. 59. For the same reasons expressed in that order, the court denies defendants' renewed objection to plaintiffs claims based on the events surrounding Sukkot observance in 1997 and 1998.
As to Sukkot of 1999, prison officials did provide plaintiff with a sukka. However, Mr. Wares alleges that he requested that "the sukkah be staked down to keep it from being blown over by the wind," but that "this request was ignored and the sukkah was allowed to blow all over the yard on two days." In their motion to dismiss, defendants contend that they denied Mr. Wares request because the use of wooden stakes created a legitimate security risk, and that maintaining prison security is a valid penological interest. Nonetheless, Mr. Wares' amended complaint alleges that "Jewish inmates Ronald Pruitt. . . . Jimmy Searles. . . . and plaintiff, all witnessed that the yard area where the sukkah was located and where stakes would be a[n] [alleged] security risk, contained wooden boards which were staked down in the ground with wooden stakes." This allegation undermines the validity of the defendants' justification. Furthermore, Mr. Wares alleges that prison officials "ignored" his request. One can reasonably infer from this language that prison officials did not evaluate his request and that the "security issue" was merely a post-hoc justification. Additionally, plaintiff generally alleges that these defendants conspired to deprive Jewish inmates of the "ability to practice their Jewish faith, with malicious intent and/or reckless disregard and/or deliberate indifference, depriving plaintiff, not only of Sukkot observance and desecrating the sukkah, but every aspect of plaintiffs Jewish faith." These allegations, taken as true for purposes of the present motion, suggest that prison officials unreasonably diminished Mr. Wares' spiritual experience by failing to properly maintain the sukkah during the religious holiday. As such, his allegations sufficiently state a violation of plaintiffs First Amendment right to reasonably exercise his religious beliefs in 1999.
As to Sukkot observance in 2000, Mr. Wares alleges that he again requested stakes to tie down the Sukkah. He further alleges that after the events that transpired in 1999, the Kansas Secretary of Corrections informed him that Hutchinson Correctional Facility ("HCF") officials had agreed to "devise some method of further securing" the booth for observance of Sukkot in 2000. Nevertheless, plaintiff alleges that HCF officials continued to refuse to secure the sukkah, resulting in the booth "being blown over for the first 5 days of Sukkot, rendering the sukkah unusable." Once again, the court finds that these allegations, taken as true for purposes of this motion, combined with Mr. Wares' more general allegations of bad faith, sufficiently state a violation of plaintiffs First Amendment right to reasonably exercise his religious beliefs in 2000.
Additionally, Mr. Wares has alleged facts that specifically implicate defendants VanBebber, Green, Bruce and Geither in the events surrounding Sukkot observance on one or more of the years from 1997 through 2000. As such, the court finds that plaintiff has alleged facts that sufficiently state a constitutional violation against the named defendants.
2. Was the Right Clearly Established at the Time of the Alleged Misconduct?
The next relevant inquiry is whether plaintiffs right was clearly established in 1997. Defendants contend that Mr. Wares "has not provided any basis for finding that inmates have a constitutional right to worship in a Sukkot booth." In its previous order, the court, relying on Tenth Circuit precedent, refused to characterize the inquiry in such a narrow fashion. Instead, the court found the proper inquiry to be whether the right to a reasonable opportunity to exercise one's religion was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. The court concluded that this right, and more specifically, a prisoner's right to reasonable meal and dining accommodations to comply with his or her religious beliefs, was clearly established in 1997. Defendants offer no basis for modifying this inquiry or altering the court's previous conclusion. Accordingly, Mr. Wares' amended complaint states a violation of his First Amendment right to comply with the basic tenants of the Sukkot holiday from 1997 through 2000, and this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.
CONCLUSION
In the end, the court denies defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety. Specifically, the court construes Mr. Wares' complaint as asserting claims against defendants in their individual capacities, and therefore, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar his action. Moreover, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff has alleged violations of a clearly established constitutional right.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 118) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED