Opinion
No. 214, 2002
Submitted: July 26, 2002
Decided: August 28, 2002
Court Below — Family Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County File No. CN98-07211 Petition No. 01-36314.
Affirmed.
Unpublished opinion is below.
MARGARET WARDYGA, Petitioner Below-Appellant, v. STEPHEN WARDYGA, Respondent Below-Appellee. No. 214, 2002 In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: July 26, 2002 Decided: August 28, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices.
ORDER
E. NORMAN VEASEY, Chief Justice.
This 28th day of August 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The petitioner-appellant, Margaret Wardyga, filed an appeal from orders of the Family Court dated December 13, 2001 and April 1, 2002. In the first order, the Family Court denied Ms. Wardyga's petition for attorney's fees and an expert fee. In the second order, the Family Court modified its previous order and ordered the respondent-appellee, Stephen Wardyga, to pay 50% of Ms. Wardyga's attorney's fees attributable to her current attorney. We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
It appears that Ms. Wardyga has had three different attorneys during the course of this Family Court litigation.
(2) In her appeal, Ms. Wardyga claims that the Family Court committed legal error and abused its discretion by denying her petition for payment of the fees of her previous attorneys and an expert.
(3) On October 11, 2001, the Family Court issued a decision regarding certain ancillary matters in this litigation, concluding, among other things, that it would be inequitable for Ms. Wardyga to pay all of her attorney's fees in light of her financial position. The Family Court awarded Ms. Wardyga 50% of all of her reasonable attorney's fees and costs and directed her to submit the appropriate petition. Ms. Wardyga's attorney requested two extensions of time to submit the petition, which the Family Court granted. The petition, with supporting documentation, was filed on November 8, 2001. On December 13, 2001, upon its review of the petition and supporting documentation, the Family Court denied Ms. Wardyga all the requested attorney's fees and costs on the ground that the petition was inadequately supported by affidavits.
Specifically, the Family Court modified one of its original property division calculations and found that Ms. Wardyga actually would owe Mr. Wardyga $19,582.00.
FAM. CT. CIV. PROC. R. 88. Specifically, the Family Court found that the fees requested with respect to Ms. Wardyga's two prior attorneys and her expert were not supported by properly executed affidavits attesting to the validity of the requested fees.
(4) On December 26, 2001, Ms. Wardyga filed a motion for reargument of the Family Court's December 13, 2001 decision. In the motion, Ms. Wardyga argued, among other things, that the Family Court had improperly failed to determine whether her fees should be awarded utilizing an equitable analysis. In its April 1, 2002 decision on the motion for reargument, the Family Court agreed with Ms. Wardyga and applied an equitable analysis to her petition for fees and costs. The Family Court awarded Ms. Wardyga 50% of the fees incurred by her current counsel, but declined to award any other counsel fees or the expert fee.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 Del. C. § 925 (15) (1999).
(5) A motion for attorney's fees in the Family Court must be supported by an affidavit from counsel stating (1) time and effort expended; (2) an itemization of services rendered; (3) relevant hourly rates; (4) itemization of disbursements claimed; (5) any sums received or that will be received with respect to legal services and/or disbursements; and (6) any information that will enable the Family Court to properly weigh the relevant factors set forth in Rule 1.5 of the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct.
FAM. CT. CIV. PROC. R. 88.
(6) An award of attorney's fees is determined by the Family Court as an exercise of discretion. Accordingly, the applicable standard of review is whether the Family Court abused that discretion. If the award of attorney's fees is the result of a logical deductive process and is supported by the record evidence, it will not be disturbed on appeal.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 Del. C. § 1515 (1999). Wheeler v. Wheeler, 636 A.2d 888, 892 (Del. 1993).
Gray v. Gray, 503 A.2d 198, 204 (Del. 1986).
(7) We find no basis to overturn the Family Court's award of attorney's fees in this case. While the attorney's fees expended by Ms. Wardyga's current counsel were properly attested to by affidavit, the fees incurred by her two previous counsel and her expert were not. The Family Court's decision to limit Ms. Wardyga's fee award to 50% of the fees incurred by her current counsel after weighing the equities involved is supported by a logical deductive process and by record evidence and will not be disturbed by this Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court is AFFIRMED.
In his answering brief, Mr. Wardyga argues that the Family Court made a number of erroneous calculations in its orders and that the Family Court erred in requiring him to pay 50% of Ms. Wardyga's current counsel's fees. All such matter contained in Mr. Wardyga's answering brief is hereby stricken, since he did not take an appeal from these rulings. SUPR. CT. R. 34. Also, Mr. Wardyga's request that this Court apply sanctions against Ms. Wardyga for violating the Supreme Court Rules is denied.