" In Ward v. Ward, 189 Okla. 609, 119 P.2d 64, 67, cited by respondent, the following language is found: "But it may be noted that it must further appear that, even though the adverse party may be in one or more of the relations to the deceased person mentioned in the statute, the party called upon to testify must also have acquired title to the cause of action immediately from the deceased person, before the statute disqualifies the witness.
Plaintiff contends that the action of the trial court was not error of law, but that where other witnesses had testified to the services rendered by plaintiff, she was not within the prohibition of the statute, but could testify to the services rendered and the value thereof. In support of this contention they call attention to Ward v. Ward, 189 Okla. 609, 119 P.2d 64; Robitaille v. Mumaugh, 167 Okla. 339, 29 P.2d 602, Chandler v. Chapman, 189 Okla. 108, 114 P.2d 471, and Ball v. Fleshman, 183 Okla. 634, 83 P.2d 870. Examination of the cases cited by defendants discloses that the question presented in the instant case was not involved in those cases.
Such are not the facts in the present case. We call attention to the previous ruling of this court in Ward v. Ward, 189 Okla. 609, 119 P.2d 64, wherein the court said: "The inhibition provided under section 271 [ 12-271], O.S. 1931, 12 Okla. St. Ann. § 384 [ 12-384], is against the party who has acquired title to the cause of action immediately from the deceased person, when he becomes a witness and offers to give testimony in respect to any transaction or communication had personally with the deceased.
"The witness, Fickel, was a party to the litigation, but he did not acquire his title and interest immediately from the decedent and there was no error in permitting him to testify as to the true consideration agreed on by the decedent and Burnam for the quitclaim deed made to Burnam." Webb v. Burnam, supra, has been cited with approval and followed in York v. Long, supra; First National Bank Trust Co. v. Bohannon's Heirs, supra; Wright v. Quinn, supra; and Ward v. Ward, 189 Okla. 609, 119 P.2d 64. In the latter case, citing Webb v. Burnam, supra, as authority, it was said:
There is no merit in the contention that Sam S. Gill, one of the defendants, was an incompetent witness to testify to the transaction with S.A. Apple, deceased, under 21 O. S. 1941 § 348. Gill did not take his cause of action "immediately" from S.A. Apple. There were several intervening conveyances between Apple and Gill. This statute is strictly construed and means "directly without an intermediary." Webb v. Burnam et al., 111 Okla. 248, 239 P. 653; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 180 Okla. 228, 68 P.2d 494; Ward v. Ward, 189 Okla. 609, 119 P.2d 64; York v. Long, 186 Okla. 643, 99 P.2d 1041; Bush v. Bush, 142 Okla. 152, 286 P. 323; McCann v. Hartman, 190 Okla. 264, 122 P. 999. The remaining question is one of champerty.
If the party did not acquire title to the cause of action directly from the deceased person, he is not disqualified as a witness under the statute. York v. Long, 186 Okla. 643, 99 P.2d 1041; Ward v. Ward, 189 Okla. 609, 119 P.2d 64. We are also committed to the rule that the above section must be strictly construed, and a party is disqualified from testifying in his own behalf as to transactions had personally with the deceased only when the conditions expressly mentioned in the statute exist.